

How to Choose Among Investment Offerings See Page 484

The ANNALIST

A Magazine of Finance, Commerce and Economics

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The Annalist Barometer of Business

Prices:

	Week Ending Oct. 6, 1923.		Previous Week.		Same Week, 1922.	
	High.	Low.	High.	Low.	High.	Low.
Stocks (Average of 50 Issues) . . .	81.20	78.55	79.90	78.33	89.72	85.80
Bonds (Average of 40 Issues) . . .	75.94	75.58	76.11	75.59	82.05	81.41
Annalist Food Cost of Living . . .	174.205		176.970		195.568	

Finance:

	Week Ending Oct. 6, 1923.	Previous Week.	Same Week, 1922.
Federal Reserve Ratio	75.8	76.4	77.4
Money Rates in New York. { Call Time	4 to 6 5½	4½ to 5½ 5½ to 5¾	4 to 5 4¾

Production:

	September, 1923.	August, 1923.	September, 1922.
Unfilled Steel Orders Tons	*5,414,663	†5,910,763	*5,950,105
Pig Iron Production . . . Daily, tons	†104,120	†111,254	67,466
Building Permits { Cities	*150	†167	*150
	{ Amount	*\$239,272,427	*\$212,508,595
Commercial Failures { Number	1,280	1,319	1,460
	{ Liabilities	\$27,497,408	\$32,514,510

*August figures. †July figures. ‡Revised figures.

Transportation:

	Period or Date.	1923.	Normal.	Per Cent. Departure from Normal.
Revenue Car Loadings:				
All commodities	Year to Sept. 22	36,211,617	30,473,636	+ 18.8
All commodities	Week ending "	1,060,436	962,736	+ 10.1
Grain and grain products	" " "	48,906	48,799	+ 0.2
Coal and coke	" " "	195,863	207,867	- 5.8
Forest products	" " "	73,629	59,026	+ 24.7
-- Manufactured products	" " "	624,760	554,220	+ 12.7
Freight car surplus	3d Qtr. Sept.	59,008	57,430	+ 2.7
Per cent. of freight cars serviceable	Sept. 15	92.7	88.8	+ 4.4
Per cent. of locomotives serviceable	"	83.2	73.3	+ 13.5
Gross revenues	August	*\$561,456,699	*\$502,372,352	+ 11.8
Expenses and taxes	"	*\$454,115,177	*\$462,794,991	- 1.9
Rate of return on tentative valuation				
Eastern District	Year to Sept. 1	6.18	5.75	+ 7.5
Southern District	" " "	6.34	5.75	+ 10.3
Western District	" " "	4.23	5.75	- 26.4
United States as a whole	" " "	5.40	5.75	- 6.1

*Subject to slight revision.

New York, Monday, October 8, 1923

Vol. 22, No. 560

Ten Cents

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Liberty 3d 4½%, 1928.....	98.26 98.34	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
Liberty 4th 4½%, 1933-39.....	97.22 97.30	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C....Rector 6731
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In This Issue

	Page
Open Security Market.....	466
World Forces and Trends.....	467
Official Washington.....	468
Mexico's Lesson for Germany—By C. W. Van Law.....	470
Wisconsin's Dairy Marketing Experiment—By W. A. Freehoff.....	471
Review of Foreign Opinions.....	472
Industry in Japan Today—By Mercer Parsons.....	474
Foreign Securities in American Markets.....	475

	Page
The Week in Canada	482
How to Choose Among Investment Offerings.....	484
Federal Reserve Statements.....	485
New York Stock Exchange Transactions.....	486
Transactions on the New York Curb.....	487
Stock Exchange Bond Trading.....	488
Out-of-Town Markets.....	489
Dividends Declared and Awaiting Payment.....	490

World Forces and Trends



N the sense that mere passage of time brings nearer some solution of the central crisis of Germany, even last week's political chaos in that country may be considered an improvement in world conditions. The general character of the changes necessary to put Germany economically on her feet, to settle the reparation issue and to open the way for a healthy readjustment of world commercial relations is tolerably clear. Chancellor Stresemann and some of his advisers show signs of knowing not only the general line of the necessary action, but also some of the specific first steps to be taken. That the Socialist leaders are as clear-headed is not so evident.

Three lines of development from the present situation are theoretically possible:

1. Monarchist overthrow of the Government, and a new campaign of resistance against the French. Last week's revolts lend this idea a false plausibility, which has aroused apparently grave apprehension in France. Such a development is improbable for many reasons of internal German politics. If it occurred, it would at once be snuffed out by French military power. As a practicable solution it may be dismissed.

2. Separation of the Reich into a number of States. This is widely feared, and Lord Curzon last week presented it as a special bogey in the British official mind. It is unlikely to occur. The Bavarian turmoil is chiefly monarchist, rather than separatist for the sake of separation in itself. The sought-for prize in all these internal upheavals is control of Germany as a whole. That prize is great enough to force any revolution to found itself on the continued unity of the Reich.

3. Continuation of the present Government under President Ebert.

Practical alternatives under this head relate to the question of how the power of the present Government shall be applied and by whom.

The probable and the practical development is the essence of a dictatorship. This solution seemed to be on the point of accomplishment last week, only to be negated—or perhaps only postponed—by the patching up of the four-party coalition in renewed support of Stresemann.

It seems unlikely that the restored coalition will last long. The split came over the refusal of the Socialists to give up the eight-hour day. It is improbable that the Socialist leaders can hold their followers if they do surrender the short day.

It is also improbable, and might better be called impossible, for Germany to restore herself economically without abolishing the actuality for which the short day stands, namely, slackening and under-produc-

tion by the workers. The short day was forced on German industry by the revolution. American students of the short day in steel know that the short day in European steel plants has meant a great decline in the productivity of labor. The theory is humane; the results in Europe have been, economically, almost "impossible." This condition will have to be changed before Germany can come back economically. It seems unlikely that anything less than a dictatorship can produce the change.

The restored coalition may "carry on," but it can hardly succeed without taking on the quality, if not the form, of a dictatorship.

Ruhr conditions, locally, have improved, and bid fair to go further soon in the same direction. Voluntary resumption of payment of occupation charges by six Ruhr cities, including such former centres of resistance as Duesseldorf and Essen, marks the beginning of a "passive co-operation" with the French and Belgians which should soon give standing ground for negotiations between Stresemann and Poincaré. Stinnes's conference with General Degoutte points in the same direction, and is an encouraging sign.

Poincaré stands officially aloof, grimly suspicious of all things German. But he will presently lay plans for considering anew the schedule of reparations, and will apparently try to reach some understanding with Britain before the issues are again discussed in the open.

The British position on reparations will continue difficult. Premier Baldwin has finally told his people that he still dissents from the French theory. But he will soon have to deal with French facts, and that is a somewhat different matter.

French coolness, if not some slight hostility, towards Italy is becoming more evident, partly in consequence of the unwelcome exposition of Italy's Mediterranean ambitions in connection with the Greek and Jugoslav difficulties. France and Britain will confer on Tangier without inviting Italy to the meeting.

The British Imperial Conference gives little prospect of producing such a change in commercial relations with England as would materially relieve the latter of her burdens due to the dislocation of European trade and industry. Something will be accomplished in the direction of assisting a larger emigration from England to the colonies, and any sensible reduction of England's present excessive population will be a benefit. Proposed plans for interimperial currency are unlikely to be carried out.

In the United States business continues large, and will see some moderate seasonal increase in certain directions during the next few weeks.

Otherwise than in the clothing trades and some others to which the cooler weather has brought increased buying, the plain movement is toward a reduction of the volume of business. Holiday trade will

later bring some stimulus, but the whole course of current production and buying is very gradually downward.

No slump is in prospect. Production of pig iron and steel has visibly decreased, but the general output of industry has declined but little since July. Buying generally, though everywhere for early use, is on the whole reasonably brisk, and commodity prices here, as also in England, show a slight upward tendency—the mark of more active demand. Grain market prospects are somewhat better, and with these the outlook for the farm buying power. Credit and money conditions are comfortable. Cotton is in an unsettled condition, but the grower is assured of a high price. Employment shows no signs of sensible diminution.

Nevertheless, December, with the assembling of Congress, and the launching of many plans for mischievous legislation interfering with economic laws, and imposing greater tax burdens on the people, marks

a coming time of hesitation and business doubt. Among the reasons for the business boom of last Spring probably too little weight has been given to the fact that Congress was not in session. This next Winter we shall have Congress with us, and it bids fair to be a somewhat troublesome guest.

No immediate stimulus to American business from events in Europe seems even possible except with regard to copper. The copper market has been running down hill for six months under forced selling due to the fear that a much narrowed world consumption would be still further restricted by political events in Europe. Within a few weeks the Stremann economic measures have sharply reduced German takings. If, however, Poincare should make a certain sort of announcement about Franco-German industrial co-operation, the copper market would boom. Whether that announcement will be forthcoming is anybody's guess.

Official Washington : By RODNEY BEAN

Special Correspondence of The Annalist

WASHINGTON, Oct. 6.

 DEVELOPMENTS have justified the predictions made that President Coolidge would not call a special session of Congress at the urging of those who were demanding Governmental aid for the agricultural districts. Some now have the impression that the picture of conditions in the agricultural regions which was painted by those who demanded an extra session and price fixing of crops, if no other quick method of giving aid could be hit upon, was overdrawn and that, in most of the farming districts, conditions are gradually improving, with promise of better times ahead.

It did not pass without notice, for instance, that members of the Executive Council of the National Grange, the oldest of farm organizations, and the Legislative Committee of the American Farm Bureau Federation, probably the most powerful of the farm organizations, told the President that they were opposed to a special session of Congress. The position of the Federation committee was made known strikingly in an announcement after their visit to the President. It contained this statement:

"The farmers seemed to strike a responsive cord with the President when they told him that they did not believe in the Government fixing prices of agricultural commodities and he also agreed with the visitors in their remarks to the effect that there should be no extra session of Congress called."

The recent advances in the prices of corn, cotton and tobacco and even in wheat prices, served to weaken the position of those who have been demanding such uneconomic cure-alls as price fixing for crops. The Federal Reserve Board also has found that the position of the farmer, taken as a whole, is more favorable than last year, and it certainly is vastly improved over the conditions faced by the farmer in 1921.

The action of President Coolidge in requesting Eugene Meyer Jr., Managing Director of the War Finance Corporation, and former Representative Mondell of Wyoming, now a Director of the War Finance Corporation, to go to the Northwest and assist the farmers and bankers there in the organization of co-operative marketing associations to handle the distribution of the wheat crop, was one move in the program which the President and his advisers have mapped out to handle the situation on what they believe to be a common-sense basis. The fact that the Government has taken such action is almost certain to have a favorable effect on the wheat prices.

Just after receiving his instructions from President Coolidge Mr. Meyer expressed the opinion that the present wheat problem was largely a marketing problem. Prices would be sustained at more favorable and adequate levels, he thought, if the system of marketing was so perfected, possibly through co-operative marketing associations of producers, that the fear of a flood of wheat in excess of demand being suddenly dumped on the market could be removed.

Few documents published by the Government dealing with financial and economic problems have evoked more comment and debate in the press and in banking and business circles than the recent statement of the balance of international payments of the United States in 1922 prepared by the Department of Commerce. This analysis presented statistics concerning most of the more important "visible" and "invisible" items and showed a net debit of \$586,000,000. Apparently this has caused a great deal of unnecessary misapprehension and, in the minds of some students, has led to the mistaken belief that the United States "went in the hole" to that extent or, in other words, was exactly \$586,000,000 poorer as a result of the year's business. A closer study of the factors involved, however, shows that the nation did not lose any of its wealth and probably added to it by the end of 1922.

The table accompanying this article shows how the conclusions were reached in striking an international balance for 1922, and comparative statistics have now been prepared to illustrate at a glance the trend since 1919. The "visible items" for which exact information is obtainable include merchandise, silver and gold.

In a consideration of the conclusion that a debit balance of \$586,000,000 was faced in 1922 on the basis of the "visible" and "invisible" items presented, it is well to understand just what a debit balance means. It is simply that the amount of goods, services and securities received from foreigners exceeded the amount of goods, services and securities sent to foreign nations, so far as those items can be ascertained and expressed in statistics.

The most important item not included in the totals is the amount of our unfunded credit balances outstanding at the beginning of the year—that is, the excess of our bankers' and merchants' accounts and bills receivable from foreigners over their accounts and bills payable to foreigners. It is practically impossible to obtain exact figures concerning this net amount of the unfunded credit balances, as it is scattered among the intangible assets of thousands of American business concerns. Various estimates have been made by experts and they differed widely, but it is probably a conservative statement that, at the beginning of 1922, the aggregate amount of these unfunded credit balances was somewhat more than \$1,000,000,000. And it is almost as certain that the net debit balance of \$586,000,000 indicated in our international payments in 1922 represented largely a decline in this unfunded credit balance or, in other words, a liquidation of frozen credits, a payment by foreign debtors of their accounts or a substitution of bonds for short-time obligations.

This line of reasoning is strengthened by reports of 221 banks and 524 commercial houses, which showed between July 1, 1921, and July 1, 1922, a total decline in accounts receivable of \$313,000,000 and an increase in accounts payable of \$62,500,000. At the end of this period the reporting concerns, whose statistics cover, possibly, more than three-fourths of all international business operations, still had an excess of accounts receivable over accounts payable of \$398,000,000. This excess may be quite normal, as it is believed our exports are more largely on a credit basis than are our imports.

If the decline in receivables had been due to writing off bad debts, it would have been regrettable, but it is certain that that was not, to any appreciable extent, the case. The amount of receivables declined because they were paid off in one way or another, with the result that this country received in exchange a larger quantity of goods, services and securities than it otherwise would have done.

Taking it for granted that the 221 reporting banks and 524 commercial houses, to which reference has been made, represented only three-fourths of the international business operations, it is quite possible that the total decline in the unfunded credit balances in 1922 approximately equaled the estimated debit balance of \$586,000,000, indicated in the Government's calculations. There are students who believe also that the Commerce Department estimate of a \$586,000,000 debit is too large and that it may not have been in excess of from \$450,000,000 to \$500,000,000.

Many items used in reckoning the debit balance of our international transactions for 1922 are subject to a wide margin of error, and it is generally admitted that the true balance may be anywhere from \$400,000,000 to \$600,000,000. Estimates made by private financial interests have ranged from \$400,000,000 to about \$500,000,000, as compared with the Government's high figure of \$586,000,000. Whatever the exact figure may be, it is important to bear in mind that such a balance does not necessarily represent a loss, nor an indebtedness incurred by the United States; and in 1922 it is certain that no such loss or indebtedness was actually incurred. On the contrary, the statistics in the accompanying table show that it was possible for the

United States not only to lend abroad \$669,000,000 more than we borrowed from abroad, but also to remit to friends or relatives abroad or as outright charity the sum of \$400,000,000.

It is pointed out by experts, also, for example, that the excess of gold and silver imports over gold and silver exports appeared as a net debit of \$246,000,000 in 1922. How can this great addition to our supply of the precious metals be regarded as running into debt? Debtors pay out rather than receive hard money. Likewise, the fact that our imports of securities exceeded our exports of securities by \$669,000,000 is not a sign of financial decrepitude but a clear indication of our financial strength. Debtors give rather than receive promissory notes. These points again bring forward the question as to what use the net credit of the rest of the world estimated by the Government at \$586,000,000 in 1922 was put. Granted that it does not mean that this country ran behind in its international accounts in 1922, how did the rest of the world employ this net credit? This again brings forward the point, as indicated by the reports from the banks and commercial houses, that, in a large measure, it was devoted to paying off the unfunded indebtedness due our bankers and merchants at the beginning of 1922.

There are some strong arguments in the hands of those who contend that the net debit of the United States in the international account in 1922 did not greatly exceed \$450,000,000, as opposed to the figure of \$586,000,000 given in the Government estimate. In the table, for instance, under the heading: "We sold them," stocks, bonds, &c., are put at \$328,000,000. The item "stocks, bonds, &c." includes foreign loans matured and paid, put by the Government experts at \$78,000,000; foreign securities resold abroad, put at \$189,000,000, and American securities sold abroad, put at \$61,000,000.

Weight might be given to the contention that the item "foreign securities resold abroad," may well have totaled \$200,000,000 and that American securities sold abroad were at least \$75,000,000. Again, there are those who argue that the item "use of our capital" or, in other words, interest on American capital abroad, may well have been at least \$300,000,000 instead of \$227,000,000 as indicated in the table. If that is so, the debit balance of the United States is cut by about \$100,000,000, bringing the net debit well below the \$500,000,000 mark.

There are a number of controversial points, admittedly, but a close study of the situation in 1922, in which the unfunded credit balances are taken into consideration, must lead to the conclusion that the United States added to rather than gave up any portion of its wealth in that year, especially when it is remembered that the net import of stocks, bonds, &c., amounted to \$669,000,000 and the net imports of gold and silver to \$246,000,000.

When this is accepted as fact, the position of the United States in 1923 is of unusual interest. The net credit of from \$450,000,000 to \$586,000,000 in the balance of international payments enjoyed by for-

eign nations in 1922 probably was employed to pay off the excess of unfunded indebtedness due our bankers and merchants at the beginning of 1922, but that situation cannot again be counted on in 1923. It is also apparent that, whereas in the year 1922 there was a credit balance in merchandise exports and imports of \$754,000,000, exports and imports will about strike an even balance in 1923. In the first six months the United States faced an adverse merchandise trade balance of about \$140,000,000, but this is being cut into in more recent months, and by the end of the year there should be no material adverse or favorable merchandise balance. On the other hand, net imports of gold and silver, which reached about \$185,000,000 for the first eight months of 1923, may total \$250,000,000 by the end of the calendar year.

At first glance, this loss of a favorable merchandise trade balance of \$754,000,000 in 1923 as compared with 1922 would seem to forecast that the United States would face a debit balance of international payments of alarming proportions, inasmuch as the debit balance for 1922 was from \$450,000,000 to \$586,000,000. There are, however, a number of factors to be taken into consideration.

Probably the heaviest swing in "invisible items" in 1923 which will help to overcome the loss of the large favorable merchandise trade balance, will be found in the movement of capital. As shown in the table, importation of stocks, bonds, &c., in 1922 amounted to \$997,000,000, as compared with exportation of stocks, bonds, &c., of \$328,000,000.

On the credit side of the table, stocks, bonds, &c., represent foreign loans matured and paid, foreign securities resold abroad and American securities sold abroad. One estimate is that in 1923 this item, put at \$328,000,000 in 1922, will reach at least \$350,000,000 and possibly more. Interest on American capital abroad (use of our capital), another credit item, is expected to reach at least \$300,000,000 in 1923 as opposed to the \$227,000,000 estimated for 1922; use of our ships (freight payments receivable on exports) probably will advance to at least \$75,000,000, as against \$71,000,000 estimated for 1922, and receipts by the United States from foreign nations (which include payment by the British on the war-time debt) will advance to at least \$225,000,000, as compared with \$170,000,000 in 1922.

This would give a total of invisible items for 1923 favorable to the United States of approximately \$950,000,000, as compared with the estimates of \$796,000,000 for the same items in the calculations made by the Government for 1922, or a favorable swing of \$154,000,000. This, apparently, would not go very far toward overcoming the danger of a tremendous debit balance, with gold imports continuing and the favorable merchandise balance of \$754,000,000, enjoyed in 1922, wiped out.

The more definite swing must be looked for, therefore, in connection with the invisible items which were reckoned against us in 1922. First of these to be taken into consideration is the item "stocks, bonds, &c." In connection with the debit movement of invisible payments, this item includes new foreign bond issues in the United States (excluding refunding loans), which were estimated for 1922 at \$637,000,000; foreign securities issued abroad but sold to the United States, estimated in 1922 at \$326,000,000, and American securities formerly held abroad, sold to the United States, at \$34,000,000.

It now is estimated that new foreign bond issues (excluding refunding loans) in 1923 may not reach more than \$300,000,000, as compared with the \$637,000,000 in 1922. A recent estimate of these issues for eight months in 1923 has put them at \$194,000,000 and the estimate of \$300,000,000 for the year takes into consideration the probability of American investors participating in a \$100,000,000 loan to Japan. Foreign securities issued abroad but sold to the United States, it is estimated, may not reach more than \$300,000,000, as against \$326,000,-

Continued on Page 473



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Acceptances

How Do Foreigners Pay for What They Buy From Us?

In the year	1919	1920	1921	1922
<i>(in millions of dollars)</i>				
We sold them				
Merchandise	7,921	8,229	4,485	3,867
Silver	240	114	52	63
Gold	410	342	24	37
Stocks, bonds, &c.	606	674	329	328
Services				
Use of our capital	150	150	180	227
Use of our ships	93	203	90	71
	9,420	9,712	5,160	4,593
Add receipts by U. S. Government from foreign nations	273	57	90	170
	9,693	9,769	5,250	4,763
They sold us—				
Merchandise	3,904	5,279	2,509	3,113
Silver	89	88	63	71
Gold	250	392	691	275
Stocks, bonds, &c.	970	1,445	1,218	997
Services				
Use of their capital	100	100	100	100
Use of their ships	110	57	64	
Services to American tourists	50	150	200	300
	5,363	7,564	4,838	4,920
Add expenditures abroad by U. S. Government	2,648	362	140	29
	8,011	7,926	4,978	4,949
The balance due us was	+1,682	+1,843	+272	-186
Of which we remitted to friends and relatives abroad, or as charitable contributions	600	700	500	400
Leaving a current unfunded balance for the year	+1,082	+1,143	-228	-586

Mexico's Lesson for Germany

How She Put Gold in Place of Depreciated Paper

By C. W. VAN LAW



In view of all the discussion with regard to the German mark and its catastrophic fall, it has seemed very strange to the writer that no one has thought to present the parallel which occurred in the history of Mexican currency during the revolutionary period. A rather astonishing solution was found in the Mexican case. The German situation is so complex that any direct application is not attempted. Nevertheless, the Mexican experience may well have its illuminating value.

In the last years of the Porfirio Diaz regime Mexico had an ample circulating medium and a stable exchange. Its currency was on a gold basis, with bank bills freely redeemable in gold coin. Silver coinage was plentiful, and much of it was of a higher fineness and intrinsic value than is usual today. Exchange was at, or very near to, parity, with the peso worth 50 cents, U. S. currency. Fluctuations from par were insignificant.

Beginning with the early days of the Madero regime the disturbance of industry and balance of trade caused exchange rates with the outside world to increase, with a corresponding drop in the value of the peso. A little later the price of silver rose to a point where the bullion contained in the Mexican silver coin was worth more at the new rates of exchange than the face value of the peso itself. The immediate consequence was the melting down and the shipment from the country of a large part of this metallic currency. Laws were enacted prohibiting such exportation, but were ineffective, partly through connivance on the part of Government officials, who were making large sums out of the export. The gold stocks of the country were largely in the Treasury vaults or in the banks.

Successive assaults were made upon the gold reserves of the country until the last of them disappeared, being largely sent out of the country by one Government after another in payment for war supplies and other expenditures. The various State Banks (which had been banks of issue) collapsed, leaving nothing behind their currency. The "National" paper currency became of even less value.

The paper peso, without regard to the identity of the issuing Government, drifted down in value from the original 50 cents U. S. currency to 30 cents, and to 20 cents and 10 cents, finally, as in the case of the German mark, to a situation where drops of 50 per cent. or more in a single day were recorded. Printing presses were busy at Vera Cruz and in Mexico City turning out money in constantly increasing denominations; of constantly less value, regardless of denomination.

During the helter-skelter of rapidly succeeding revolutions it was current practice for each group which took possession of a town or district to publish decrees immediately invalidating the currency of its predecessors and making its own paper, fresh from the press, acceptable at the point of the gun. As during this period the stay of any one group in a given locality was apt to be very short, this created a "whip-saw" effect of astonishing efficiency.

The situation of merchants during this period became rapidly "impossible." Goods on their shelves, for which they had paid real value, were taken out, often literally at the point of the gun, in exchange for new paper currency in the hands of troops just arrived, with the strong chance that these troops would be chased out within a relatively few days, their currency declared worthless, and the process repeated by the next invading band. There were cases where alternations of this sort occurred several times within a few weeks. The merchants' stocks were drained to the vanishing point, leaving nothing of effective value in their place.

The wage earner was in almost the same position. Companies did their best to provide enough of whatever currency for the moment was valid, in order to meet their payrolls; and they increased the nominal wage rate in the endeavor to keep pace with the decrease of purchasing value. The cost of living on any basis became insupportable. Many mining companies issued a currency of their own, which was locally acceptable purely on the basis of the credit of the issuing company. It was totally illegal, but it served a most useful purpose, and the practice was not, to my knowledge, abused in any instance.

Under the natural operation of Gresham's Law, all sound money had by this time disappeared, either by export from the country or in buried hoards of small amounts, which existed all over the country, though their total was entirely unknown and thought to be insignificant. The country was wholly disorganized, mails were irregular or non-existent and newspapers hardly circulated at all, except in the

largest cities. A vast proportion of the working population was illiterate.

These conditions make what afterward happened all the more astonishing. The outcome represented the rejection of an impossible situation by a most primitive society as its only way to self-preservation.

There was no organized propaganda of any sort. There was almost no communication between districts. Yet almost simultaneously over the whole of the country a strike occurred, participated in by every class of labor and with the completest sympathy on the part of all classes. The laboring man suddenly said: "I will take no more paper currency at any price. Give me gold or silver, or I won't work." The merchants echoed by simultaneously refusing to sell any goods whatever over the counter except for metallic currency.

No one in Mexico had seen any metallic currency for many months. It was commonly believed to be non-existent. The situation was totally against every semblance of possibility. There was an almost complete deadlock, which lasted in some cases for several days, and which extended all over the republic. Naturally, there were disturbances—bread riots and mobs of all sorts, with no leadership. There was some looting of shops, but, strangely enough, disorders were small in the aggregate, so far as damage to life or property was concerned.

Then a very natural thing occurred. Totally unable to buy food and with increasingly hungry bellies, those who had hidden away a few metallic coins from the old days, began to dig them up and carry them to the stores. Their very scarcity made these coins very valuable. Their purchasing power was astonishing. It took only a few days to bring into circulation every particle of metallic coin which existed in the country. There was not 20 per cent. of what was required for the seemingly primal necessities of the country. This was all the worse, because all banking bills or commercial paper, checks, drafts, &c., had long since disappeared, so that there was literally nothing with which to do business except the wholly inadequate amount of hoarded metallic coin.

We have all heard fanciful stories in which a single \$20 bill, passed rapidly around a table, accomplished the payment of really large sums of money in the aggregate, and returned to the pocket of the man who started its journey. Under pressure of necessity, almost the same thing happened in Mexico. The measures taken by the company of which the writer was then manager, located in a Mexican city, will serve as a type.

We had at the time some 6,000 employes, and had been paying them weekly, on Saturdays. As soon as the new situation became evident, we split our men into six groups, each to be paid on a different day of the working week. On Sunday, by paying high premiums and exercising all possible energy and persuasion, we succeeded in gathering together from the merchants, on our own credit, an amount of metallic coin equivalent to one-sixth of our regular weekly payroll. All of this was paid out on Monday afternoon to the first group of workmen. We knew that within an hour after such payment, it would all have been passed over the counter in exchange for essential food and supplies. Within another hour, it was again back in our possession, to be used Tuesday for the second group, and so on throughout the week. Our credits with the merchants were discharged periodically by giving them our own drafts on New York or Europe for the payment of their obligations abroad in purchase of new food supplies, &c., a large part of which had to be imported.

The rapidity of movement of metallic coin for the next two or three months was astonishing. It was wearing itself out merely through the rapidity of passage from one hand to another. It represented a considerable cost to gather it up fast enough to enable the meeting of payrolls, &c., but it nevertheless gave a means for existence, which we had not formerly had. Paper currency of every description simply disappeared almost over night.

The Government in power was fairly well seated, but the change in the situation caught it wholly unawares. After the events described had actually taken place, it tardily got out a decree confirming the situation, and making it mandatory that all payments of whatever nature be made in gold. Silver was being passed and accepted through sheer physical necessity, but it had no value other than in its exchangeability for gold.

Obviously, the introduction of a large amount of gold circulating medium into the country was immediately necessary. The Government had absolutely no cash, and equally no credit. The banks were

Continued on Page 491

OCT

8

Wisconsin's Dairy Marketing Experiment

By W. A. FREEHOFF

It Throws Some Light on Co-operative Merchandising



ISCONSIN Dairying, Incorporated, was organized for the purpose of advertising Wisconsin milk and dairy products, and to extend the already great dairy industry of the Badger State. Probably nobody spent more time or money than the officers of the Wisconsin Bankers' Association in helping to organize this corporation; it is a conspicuous example of how the banks of a great Commonwealth got right down to brass tacks and studied with their farmer patrons the ways and means of improving the farmers' condition and markets. But the corporation, launched with so much faith and hope, is now floundering on the shoals and shallows of dissension, and there is real question as to whether or not it will finally survive in its present form.

The officers of the Wisconsin Bankers' Association admit that they have learned a lot about the psychology of the farmer, and also about co-operative marketing associations. When they entered into the campaign to get the work started they had high enthusiasm and a great vision of what could be accomplished. They knew of the tremendous success that the California and Florida fruit men had achieved, and felt that the same principles which held good in marketing fruit could also be employed in marketing milk and dairy products.

Where the various groups of men interested in the marketing of Wisconsin dairy products erred was in supposing that the whole problem would solve itself automatically through the spending of great amounts of money in advertising. The original plan was to spend a million dollars a year, or some such sum, in advertising Wisconsin milk, cheese, butter and ice cream. This money was to be put up by the farmers themselves, the banks of the State pledging themselves to lend the corporation the funds needed for the organization work. This was the first wrong move on the part of the banks; they were merely lending while the dairymen were asked to pay. The dairy farmers felt that the banks should allow their contribution to remain in the proposed corporation as capital stock, and the banks finally consented to this arrangement.

Whether or not Wisconsin Dairying, Incorporated, succeeds or fails, everybody connected with the movement has learned some deep and lasting lessons, and there is hope now that when the dairymen of Wisconsin finally do agree upon some plan of promotion and selling, the foundation will have been firmly laid.

First of all, Wisconsin dairy products are not like California oranges. Wisconsin dairy farmers have to compete with many States in the Union, whereas the California oranges are practically without competition. The relatively smaller volume of Florida oranges are no material factor in the market. But the dairy industry of Wisconsin, huge as it is, is but a drop in the bucket of the vast flood of milk produced elsewhere on the continent.

Second, the problem of what each dairyman who contributed directly to the promotion fund would get back directly in concrete financial returns had not been satisfactorily worked out. Here was a farmer who sold his milk to a condensery. When he learned that Wisconsin Dairying, Incorporated, could not promise him a definite increase in price for his milk as a result of the activities of the corporation, he necessarily hesitated to contribute another mite out of his already attenuated check. There was a farmer who shipped his milk to Chicago, but the proposed advertising campaign did not include market milk in the big cities.

Third, the promoters had forgotten that before you can profitably advertise a commodity, you must have it for sale. A million a year in advertising! Fine! Advertise what? Wisconsin milk! Too general entirely. The only possible large consumers of Wisconsin fluid milk were the people of Wisconsin themselves. The whole proposition whittled down to the fact that there were only two great dairy products which Wisconsin produced in sufficient volume to make a giant merchandising program possible, namely, butter and cheese. In cheese particularly the problem looked promising, for the State now produces 75 per cent. of the total amount of cheese in the country. If Wisconsin butter and cheese could be so advertised that the consuming public would not only consume more of them, but also pay higher prices, why, then, Wisconsin Dairying, Incorporated, would have achieved a noble piece of work.

All this comes back to the proposition that before you can profit-

ably advertise a commodity, you must have that commodity for sale in volume. But there is cheese and cheese. The statement has been made—I am not vouching for it, but it illustrates the point—that a goodly percentage of Wisconsin cheese is of inferior quality. Obviously, that kind of cheese could not be advertised to advantage. The cheese must first be graded, so that the good cheese could be put upon the market as such, with the Wisconsin label upon it; and the poor cheese must be sold through channels where Wisconsin dairymen could merely pray that its source of origin would remain undiscovered. Well, Wisconsin has a State Department of Markets, and strict cheese grading rules have been officially put into practice. And it was found that the really first-class cheese was quite inconsiderable in volume in comparison with the more inferior grades.

It was finally decided by the corporation to confine its efforts to pushing the products of the Cheese Producers' Federation and the Co-operative Creamery Association located in Northwestern Wisconsin at the gateway to the Twin Cities, and to extend the power and the scope of these associations. But here again there was a difficulty. There are hundreds of farmers selling milk to independent factories who have no financial interest in the co-operative companies. They howled loud and long when they understood that their money was to be used to assist what they considered competitors.

Perhaps a backward glance at some of the factors leading up to the effort of the Wisconsin dairy farmers to organize their advertising and promotion campaign will throw some light upon the course the movement took originally. It so happens that John M. Kelley, a New York advertising expert, owns a dairy farm near Baraboo, Wisconsin. Kelley is an enthusiast, and he has the happy faculty of making other men see his visions. Kelley conceived the idea that if Wisconsin dairy products were advertised like chewing gum, the nation would immediately consume more milk, cream, butter, cheese and ice cream. This would mean that consumption could catch up with production, that the over-supply of dairy products could be converted into under-production, and that the price would automatically increase in response to the age-old law of supply and demand. It was mainly Kelley's driving activity and enthusiasm which brought the Wisconsin Bankers' Association and the dairy farmers together. As the organization problems came up and were discussed, Kelley changed his point of view materially; he began to see that sheer, blind advertising alone would not do; that first of all a commodity had to be secured, and that this commodity had to be graded, standardized and named.

While it is possible that the officers and members of the Wisconsin Bankers' Association are not fully satisfied with the results they secured in this particular campaign, they have no reason to feel discouraged. The mere fact that a strong group of bankers, through an efficient organization, tried to help the farmers of their State to become more prosperous by giving financial and moral support to better merchandising methods, has resulted in a better feeling on the part of Wisconsin dairymen towards their bankers.

In agricultural States like Wisconsin it is manifestly impossible for any other business, and this includes banking, to be profitable unless the farmers are prosperous first. Financial statistics tend to show that during the depression several years ago business was on a better basis in Wisconsin than in any other State in the Union. Now if unorganized dairy farming can result in prosperity all around, how much more prosperous could not the State become if better merchandising methods would increase the net profits of the farmers?

The attempt to get the dairy farmers of any State, be it Wisconsin, New York, or California, together on a great selling and marketing campaign is a tremendous one. Bankers everywhere should co-operate in the effort. But it is useless to try unless the economic principles underlying the whole question are thoroughly understood. The attempt should have no connection, except a very indirect one, with the splendid work being done by the National Dairy Council to increase the consumption of milk and dairy products in general, through general advertising. Each State will profit if the general campaign succeeds, but they will profit additionally if the national consuming public asks for the brands of butter and cheese sold under the trademark of the respective States.

Professor Theodore Macklin, of the University of Wisconsin, who

Continued on Page 491

A Review of Foreign Opinions

Finance in Central Europe



RITING in the Austrian economic organ, Reconstruction (Vienna, Sept. 1), Dr. Franz Eidlitz, Secretary of the Lower Austrian Gewerbeverein, describes the relaxation of State control of money traffic in Central Europe, and the consequent amelioration of the financial situation:

In this connection he remarks:

"Step by step, though very slowly, the necessity of doing away with State interference in economic matters is gaining ground in the minds of the responsible political leaders of the Central European States, who are beginning to realize that State control of private commerce is a mere expedient for exceptional conditions of the war and post-war periods, which cannot be continued indefinitely in times of peace. Real recovery from economic weakness cannot be obtained through coercive measures, regulations and decrees. It must be the outcome of a sound promotion of the natural economic development of the country."

The writer then points out that until recently trade in foreign bills and currencies in most of the Central European countries was almost impossible, owing to the strict, but futile, regulations governing it, which, nevertheless, did not accomplish their purpose, and could not stay the downward course of currencies. A reversal of policy in all of these States is now apparent. Austria, for instance, where strict measures of control on foreign money traffic were taken in the worst of the currency crisis in July, 1922, has taken a distinct step forward in the restoration of economic liberty in this respect, and the same is noticeable in Hungary and Poland.

The Government decree of July 14, 1923, did much to free the Austrian money traffic. By this instrument, the free export of stocks and bonds up to the value of 500,000 kronen is allowed, the equivalent in foreign means of payment being delivered to the Austrian National Bank for all exports over this amount. Foreign means of payment resulting from the export of all other kinds of goods are left at the free disposal of the owner. Thus, states Dr. Eidlitz, the exporter is given full liberty to sell his foreign bills and currencies not only to the National Bank, but to any other banker he likes; or to use them for other transactions, such as the purchase of raw materials abroad. Special attention is drawn to a paragraph of the decree which makes it retroactive as regards exports made previous to the issue of the decree, providing the proceeds in foreign values for such exports had not at the time of promulgation been delivered to the National Bank. Exports of wood and timber effected previous to March 15, 1923, are not included in this exception, however.

The following observations regarding this decree are made by Dr. Eidlitz:

"The advantage of this stipulation for the exporter becomes evident when one considers that heretofore all exporting manufacturers and traders have been compelled to deliver the proceeds from their sales abroad in foreign values; that is to say, they were forced to sell their goods only against payment in currency of the buyer. This measure was justified as long as the Austrian currency was fluctuating, because, under the prevailing circumstances, sales in Austrian kronen might have had a depressing effect on the Austrian currency. When, however, thanks to the League of Nations' support, the krone had reattained a stable value, and some foreign currencies even showed a declining tendency as compared with the Austrian krone, it would have been much more to the advantage of the Austrian exporters to sell their goods in the stable Austrian krone rather than in currencies such as the Hungarian crown, the Polish or German mark, the dinar, the lei and, at times, even the Swiss franc. Sales based on kronen value, however, were only allowed on special permits issued by the National Bank. Such permits, it is true, were always granted, and in the end they had the character of mere formalities; but they were felt as irksome hindrances on business, all the more so as applications to the National Bank were not always answered with a desirable promptitude."

Under the new regulations, remarks Dr. Eidlitz, the exporter may sell his goods either in foreign currency or in kronen, as he may prefer. In the Viennese writer's opinion there is no danger in the latter case that the Austrian kronen will be influenced in an adverse way, because the foreign buyer is obliged to procure Austrian bills or currencies in which to pay his debt in his own market, and this cannot but influence the kronen quotation favorably. Failing this method of procedure, he must sell his own currency in Austria, thus causing an influx of foreign securities which, again, must improve the quotation of the krone and the Austrian balance of foreign payments.

It is felt, however, that the 500,000 krone limit alluded to above is too low for free export of stocks and bonds; in view of the high figures of quotation, trades below 10,000,000 or 15,000,000 kronen are rarely made on the Stock Exchange.

Another important feature of the decree freeing the economic

forces of the country is to be found in the permission given for credits to be taken or given in foreign currencies either abroad or at home. This affects Austrian industries closely because they are dependent largely on foreign raw materials. Prior to the decree under consideration, the Austrian merchant or manufacturer was obliged to secure a written permit from the Austrian National Bank before he could apply to his own banker or to a foreign business friend. By the new regulations, registered firms are at liberty to raise credits in foreign money with inland or foreign merchants, provided the creditor is an authorized dealer in foreign money. The method of procedure is described by the writer as follows:

"The credit taker, by means of forms issued by the Austrian National Bank, makes a declaration concerning the purpose for which he wants the credit and to the effect that he has no foreign money of his own available. This declaration, if the credit is taken abroad, is sent in by the credit taker, or by the credit giver himself if the credit is taken in Austria. This whole manipulation is, in itself, quite a useless remnant of red tape, but it is an improvement over the preceding regulations. A decided imperfection in this section of the new regulation lies in the circumstance that it refers only to registered firms, excluding from its benefits all private traders."

The new money regulations also benefit travelers, who are permitted to take with them out of the country without special formula as much as 4,000,000 kronen each. On production of their passports authorized bankers are permitted to sell travelers' checks or foreign currencies to a similar amount. The writer suggests that this loosening of vexatious regulations is probably meant as a stage on the road to full liberty of traffic.

The money-changing business has similarly benefited by the new decree. Formerly, the limit for sales of foreign currencies in the bureaux de change was 500,000 kronen. By the new regulations, as much as 10,000,000 kronen each per day in the equivalent American, English, Dutch, Scandinavian and Swiss means of payment may be sold. A limit of 5,000,000 kronen has been fixed for French, Belgian, Spanish, Italian and Czechoslovak currencies; the limit for depreciated currencies such as Bulgarian, Yugoslav, Rumanian, Hungarian and German was left at 500,000. Sales made on foreign letters of credit are permitted to double these amounts; and, at the same time, if the buyer can give sufficient reason for his desire to purchase, authorized bankers are allowed to sell up to the equivalent of 1,000,000 kronen without further formalities. Higher amounts must be sold and purchased through the National Bank as heretofore.

Turning to Hungary, Dr. Eidlitz makes the following statements:

"In Hungary the competent authorities apparently have realized that State control of money traffic does more harm than good to the public economy and to the currency of the country. It is being driven home daily that the control office, which hitherto, regardless of the requirements of trade and traffic, has worked only for the appreciation of the Hungarian crown abroad, has failed in its purpose. The Hungarian Finance Minister is, therefore, taking steps to restrict the sphere of action of this office."

The Viennese writer considers that the greatest mistake made by this office was the fixing of an arbitrary low quotation of foreign means of payment as compared to the appreciation of the Hungarian crown abroad. The immediate consequence was a growth of illicit traffic in such means of payment. Considerable increases in the official quotations have now been made.

Describing other efforts to readjust the dealings of this office, the Viennese writer makes the ensuing comments:

"Further activity of the Hungarian central office for foreign currency control is to be restricted to the control of import, and the accumulation of a State reserve of foreign means of payment to be procured by sales of Hungarian crowns abroad. The internal money traffic between the bankers and their customers, as also in commerce and industry, is to be left free, under the superintendence of State control offices, and on the basis of official quotations. These reforms, though far from perfect, nevertheless imply considerable progress as compared to the former state of things existing in Hungary."

Poland has been another of the sufferers from the irrational application of foreign currency regulations, which has caused great damage to the public economy, without checking the decline of the currency. Under a more reasonable conception of matters, the Polish State Bank and a number of authorized bankers are allowed to deal in foreign bills and currencies. All other banking firms may buy, but are not allowed to sell, foreign means of payment, all of which must be delivered to the State Bank or to one of the authorized bankers. The giving of foreign means of payment as security for loans is illegal, but, on certain conditions, credits in foreign means of payment may be raised. Owing to the fact that Upper Silesia is still in many ways

economically connected with Germany, special facilities are permitted to that country.

Dr. Eiditz sums up as follows:

"Earnest efforts are apparently being made in all countries to get rid of the remnants of war and immediate post-war laws concerning finance. Much is still left to be done, however, by the Governments of the several States, such as the abolition of import and export restrictions, passport coercion and frontier and customs vexations, leading in the end to the ideal state of free economic intercourse between all countries. For only the unhampered display of economic forces of all countries can lead to an increase of trade and traffic such as will heal the wounds which the war has inflicted on both the victors and the vanquished."

The situation of Hungary, which has been negotiating for a foreign loan since last Spring, is productive of more and more anxiety. In an article published by The Manchester Guardian Weekly (Manchester, Sept 21) Sir William Goode, financial adviser to the Hungarian Government, who lately acted in a similar capacity to the Austrian Government, states that Hungary is now in a position parallel to that of Austria last year. For some time a deadlock between the allied powers on the Reparations Commission prevented any assistance being given to Hungary; but this state of affairs is reported to be improving.

Comparing the situation of the two countries, Sir William points out that, while Austria is roughly 80 per cent. industrial, Hungary is 80 per cent. agricultural. Psychologically speaking, the Hungarian people have not shown the hopelessness which characterized the Austrians. Nevertheless, the present financial situation of Hungary is worse, in many respects, than was that of Austria. In this connection the British expert remarks:

"Few people realize this, and many Hungarians would indignantly deny it. Even relatively intelligent people, interested in economics and finance, are misled, and are likely to continue to be misled, because they see none of the outward signs which generally visualize national poverty or individual suffering. This misapprehension is largely due to the fact that the people have enough food. Those who can feed themselves are the last to kick over the traces. The supply of food and the absence of suffering on this account do not necessarily imply that Hungary is a self-supporting country, unless, of course, it is prepared to shut itself off from the outer world, repudiate all existing financial obligations and relapse into a purely peasant nation. In a country where the population of the capital is about a million, and where the industrial and social life is relatively highly developed, such an alternative is out of the question."

For the year ending June 30, 1923, according to the estimate of the Hungarian Finance Minister given to the Reparations Commission on May 4, the budget showed a total expenditure of 424,000,000 gold crowns, a total revenue of 335,000,000 gold crowns and a consequent deficit of 89,000,000. The trade balance for the year ended Dec. 31, 1922, at the average rate of exchange throughout the year, showed imports of 548,000,000, exports of 384,000,000 and a deficit of 214,000,000. Since then Hungarian currency has collapsed so as to make calculations difficult. Under these circumstances, says Sir William, an estimate of the budget for 1923-24 cannot be given; all that can be said is that the deficit will be larger. He points out that the estimates for 1922-23 were calculated with the crown at 0.23 centime Swiss, and that the unit has now fallen to 0.03 centime Swiss and under.

In the budget for 1922-23, however, it may be noted, according to the British writer, that expenditure exceeded revenue by 26 per cent. In the first Austrian budget estimate for 1923, issued by Commissioner Zimmerman, expenditure exceeded revenue by 38.5 per cent.

Referring to the question of trade balance, Sir William notes:

"The trade balance in 1922, it will be observed, shows a deficit of nearly 40 per cent., about 8 per cent. greater than the deficit of Austria for the same period. I fear there is little hope of improvement this year. One of the principal reasons for thinking that the position of Hungary is worse than was that of Austria is this trade balance deficit. It is actually worse than appears on the surface, because Hungary has practically no invisible trade, such as Austria gets by means of transit traffic, financial transactions, tourists, &c., which really reduces the adverse balance in Austria to much smaller proportions than appear from the figures. The principal items causing the Hungarian deficit are importations of cotton and wool goods, wood and coal. The principal exports are flour, cattle, machinery and wines. Artificial restrictions such as the Devizen Zentrale and prohibitions of export and import imposed to keep up the purchasing value of the crown and to keep down internal prices are doubtless contributory factors in the adverse balance. It is, however, an admitted fact that production can be greatly increased in Hungary, but until there is a stabilized currency the capital required for this increase is not likely to be forthcoming."

The most significant change in the 1922-23 budget figures is to be found in the circulation. On March 31, 1923, the circulation was 90,000,000 gold crowns, or, in paper, 82,000,000,000. The Aug. 15 statement of the bank of issue shows a total circulation of 314,000,000,000 paper crowns, approximately 90,000,000 Swiss francs. Thus, in four and a half months the paper circulation has been quadrupled. One hundred and twenty-four billions of paper crowns were issued in the last week of July and the first two weeks of August. The total circulation at the beginning of the year was 74,000,000,000.

Sir William states that this tremendous inflation was caused mainly by the necessity of paying increased salaries to State employees—owing to the rise in prices—and to meet the normal seasonal demand for currency needed to make grain purchases. He makes the following observation on the subject:

"The amazing thing to me is not that the Hungarian crown has fallen so much, but that it has withstood so well the battering of forces which drove the Austrian crown at one time to 385,000 to the pound, and the Polish mark to 1,200,000 to the pound, and the German mark to meaningless millions."

"The basic remedy is a foreign loan. No foreign loan of the size required can be raised unless the Reparation Commission suspend their charge on Hungary's revenues and permit the loan to be arranged through and supervised by the League of Nations."

The Hungarian Government has submitted a program to the Reparation Commission in anticipation of receiving a favorable answer to their appeal. This is as follows:

"A long-term loan of at least 550,000,000 to 650,000,000 gold crowns, to meet the deficit of the State budget in a transition period of at least five years, by the end of which it is hoped that the country will be able to attain approximate equilibrium in budget and trade balance. Stabilizations of exchange should automatically come from the outset of the long-term loan. Concurrently with the long-term loan, a reorganization of interior finances on the following lines:

"Economies in administration, considerable reduction in the number of State employees, and improvements in the management of State undertakings, particularly the abolition of the deficit in the State railways.

"Increase in State revenues by means of more effective application of taxation and by higher tariffs.

"Simultaneously with this reorganization of the finances of the State, the existing restrictions on economic life, namely, the Devizen Zentrale, export taxes, prohibition of increased house rents, &c., to be abolished.

"Creation of a bank of issue, to which the Government will not be allowed to have recourse for their own requirements."

Sir William Goode reiterates his conviction that the only hope of averting a complete collapse of Hungary is a repetition of the experiment of Austria, with the necessary local variations. In his opinion, a loan obtained and expended on these broad lines would strengthen the economic position of Hungary to the point where she could subsequently float such internal loans as she might require to meet the seasonal and other demands of State finance.

Official Washington

Continued from Page 469

000 estimated in 1922. American securities formerly held abroad, sold to the United States, are expected to drop from \$34,000,000 to not more than \$25,000,000. This gives a total of \$625,000,000 for 1923, as opposed to \$997,000,000 estimated for 1922, in connection with the item "stocks, bonds, &c."

Of the other invisible debit items, "use of their capital," or interest payable on foreign capital in the United States, probably will remain at \$100,000,000; "use of their ship," or freight payable on imports, may increase from \$64,000,000 in 1922 to \$75,000,000 in 1923. American tourists' expenditures, it is believed, will fall from \$300,000,000, estimated in 1922, to \$250,000,000 in 1923, and may be less; the item "expenditures abroad by United States Government" may be eliminated, as they are believed to be equalized. There also is evidence that remittances to friends and relatives abroad and charitable contributions (principally immigrants' remittances) will be reduced from \$400,000,000, estimated for 1922, to \$300,000,000 in 1923. This gives a total of \$725,000,000 as representing these four invisible debit items in 1923 and must be added to the total of \$625,000,000 representing the estimated debit movement of invisible capital items, giving a total of \$1,350,000,000.

Thus, if the favorable invisible items for 1923 are to be estimated at \$950,000,000 and the unfavorable invisible items at \$1,350,000,000, there would apparently be a prospective debit of invisible items for 1923 of \$400,000,000. But to this must be added \$250,000,000, the debit for the visible item represented by the net importation of gold and silver in 1923, thus giving a total prospective debit balance of \$650,000,000 for 1923, in the event of an evenly balanced merchandise trade.

Estimates of this nature made now may be of little value, but they show, at least, that a plausible argument can be made that, because of the shifting of invisible items, the debit will not be much greater for 1923 than the \$586,000,000 debit estimated for 1922, despite the fact that a favorable merchandise trade balance of \$754,000,000 will be wiped out in 1923. In fact, the shift in invisible items in 1923 will probably be greater than indicated by the figures here given. There have been reports, for instance, that foreign interests are increasing their investments in American securities and that other movements of capital are going on which will help to reduce materially whatever debit may exist at the close of 1923.

Industry in Japan Today

By MERCER PARSONS



N view of recent reports that Japan will seek a loan of considerable proportions in the United States, a study of the financial and economic position of the Japanese, just completed by the Far Eastern Division of the Department of Commerce, has attracted much attention. It was believed that Japanese industry undoubtedly had been struck a serious blow by the earthquake and that the disaster would have an unfavorable effect on international trade. The Commerce Department experts, however, take a decidedly optimistic view of the situation, and believe the Japanese will rapidly recover.

The statement is made, in fact, that "Japan's industrial position has been little affected by the earthquake." The great industrial centres of the country, the Government experts point out, lay outside of the affected area and were practically untouched. The only major manufacturing industry damaged to any extent was cotton spinning. The latest reports are that the number of cotton spindles destroyed will reach a little over 500,000, between 10 and 15 per cent. of the total. But it also is a fact that the overexpansion in this industry in the war period and immediately after has necessitated a curtailment in output which worked a hardship on many of the smaller concerns. The destruction of half a million spindles tended to eliminate the margin of overexpansion and will permit the remaining mills to run full time. Some highly efficient spinning establishments were destroyed, however.

As to the food situation, it was reported as normal in Japan prior to the earthquake. The new rice crop will commence coming in around November, if not a little earlier, and in anticipation of this stocks were not great. Since the supply on hand was distributed throughout the empire, only a small part of it suffered and, except for emergency supplies in the affected area, only the normal food imports will be required. The rice crop suffered little from the disaster, but owing to adverse weather conditions the crop estimate in Japan proper places this year's yield at a little under that of a normal year. The Korean crop is in excellent condition and the yield will be about 20 per cent. greater than last year.

The Commerce Department experts find that with the exception of the loss of about 40,000 bales of raw silk in Yokohama and the destruction of the machinery used in testing and handling silk shipments, the silk industry suffered little loss. The producing areas which are to the north and west of the devastated region were only slightly touched and the filatures are said to be practically unharmed. The only damage done is, therefore, of a temporary nature. Silk shipments will be resumed in a short time from the port of Kobe, which, with the exception of silk testing equipment, it said to be almost as well equipped for this work as was Yokohama.

The reports show that at the time of the disaster stocks of silk in Yokohama were unusually large, amounting to about 50,000 bales, owing to light shipments to the United States in the ninety days preceding the earthquake. Out of this total from 8,000 to 10,000 bales were saved, leaving the loss at perhaps 40,000 bales. This represents somewhat more than a month's supply for the United States, which uses about 32,000 bales each month. Raw silk prices in Japan have increased about 25 per cent. as a result of the loss of this supply and this will tend to repay the industry for its losses. It is further reported that steps have already been taken to rush the new silk crop to market and the net shortage of a little more than one month's production may not be fully felt by the consuming market until the end of the present silk year next June.

"The greatest economic loss to Japan, therefore," say the Commerce Department experts, "aside from the appalling loss of life, is confined more or less to the material losses in and around Tokio and Yokohama, which is officially stated to be a little less than \$1,000,000,000. This loss distributed over the Japanese empire will mean a per capita loss of only \$13 which together with the already existing normal debt of Japan will still leave the nation in an enviable position in this respect. As fully 75 per cent. of this insured value will be represented by labor in rebuilding, the increased effort of the Japanese will compensate largely for the loss."

The financial position of the country just prior to the disaster is pictured as most favorable by the experts. Money was plentiful, all flotations both on the domestic market and abroad were quickly taken up and taxes were moderate. The comparative ease with which the year-end settlements in December, 1922, were made at a time when money was required for financing the Spring silk crop is presented as strong evidence of the soundness of the country's finances. Most of the financial difficulties which were faced in the country following the

slump in the early part of 1920 had been overcome, leaving Japan's finances in a position equalled by few countries today.

"The successful flotation of all issues offered on foreign markets," a Commerce Department analysis states, "has proven the faith of other nations in Japan's stability, and the money obtained has added in no little way to that stability. The taxes of the country, while they have been criticized as overburdening by various interests are, nevertheless, so distributed that they do not prove unduly burdensome and in comparison with nations that suffered heavily from the war, taxes in Japan are unusually light."

Other facts in connection with Japan's present financial ability to face the work of rehabilitation made necessary by the disaster are summarized. The total outstanding National debt of Japan, including both domestic and foreign obligations, stood on May 31 of this year at \$1,913,233,584, or a per capita debt of less than \$25. This compares very favorably with the per capita National debt of the United States, amounting to \$211, and \$733 for Great Britain.

Japan's gold holdings on August 1 aggregated \$890,000,000 of which \$228,000,000 was being held abroad, principally in New York. This was largely meant to redeem Japanese bond issues coming due in 1925. The outstanding note issue on Aug. 1 amounted to 1,472,753,000 yen (the yen equals \$0.4985). Reports indicate that no gold was destroyed by the earthquake but that several million yen of paper currency was burned. This was not enough, however, to have any effect on the currency circulation and immediate steps were taken by the Osaka mint to issue new currency.

"In contrast to the note inflation that has occurred in many other nations during the last few years," the Commerce Department adds, "Japan has carried out a program of deflation that has kept its exchange on a very even keel, showing less fluctuation on the New York market than the currency of any other large industrial nation in the world. At no time has it varied as much as 10 per cent. either above or below par. Even in the present crisis, Japan's exchange has shown little weakness in spite of pessimistic predictions coming from various quarters."

As to foreign trade conditions, the immediate effect of the disaster, it is held, will be considerably to increase imports, especially of building materials, such as lumber, iron and steel and foodstuffs. Japan's foreign trade since the first of the year has been generally satisfactory, in spite of several adverse factors. Total exports of the first seven months of 1923 up to Aug. 1 amounted to 833,507,000 yen, a slight decline from the same period last year, when the total was 880,613,000 yen. This dropping off was accounted for, the Commerce Department finds, by a decline in exports of raw silk and cotton yarn, the two principal items of Japan's foreign trade. The decline in raw silk exports is attributed to the high prices demanded. American purchasers, who take the bulk of Japan's raw silk, held off buying in the belief that the price would break but, in spite of the light demand, prices held remarkably steady.

This situation accounted for the very light stocks on hand in the United States at the time of the earthquake and for the large silk supplies in the warehouses at Yokohama. The reason for the decline in cotton exports was attributed principally to the boycott in China against goods of Japanese origin. The effect of this boycott is shown in the trade returns of Japan for the first six months of this year, when exports of cotton yarn to China were only 236,774 piculs, as compared with 397,554 in the same period last year. Since China takes more than half of Japan's total exports of this commodity, the boycott is a serious matter. There are indications, it is stated by the Commerce Department experts, that the movement in China is losing ground, as its purchases of Japanese yarn in the last two months showed substantial increases.

"The reaction of the Chinese merchants in Shanghai upon receiving news of the disaster may be taken as an indication of further improvement in Sino-Japanese relations and may have far-reaching effects," the Department's experts hold. "As soon as the extent of the disaster was realized in that place, Chinese merchants immediately contributed 125,000 Mexican dollars for the purchase of 200 tons of supplies. The services of a steamer was contributed by a Chinese navigation company for transporting the shipment to the stricken area and 400 coolies contributed their services loading the steamer."


In the last few years the United States has been by far the best customer of Japan and has, in turn, supplied more of Japan's needs than any other country. For the first seven months of this year we took 50 per cent. of the exports of that country and sold Japan 25 per cent. of their total imports. In view of this fact, the Commerce De-

Continued on Page 495

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Foreign Securities in American Markets—Uruguay



URUGUAY holds a distinctive position among the South American republics. It is the smallest republic on that continent, yet, from a financial and credit standpoint, it ranks with Argentina and Chile at the top. In the matter of business ethics and methods it is well developed and approaches the standards recognized in the United States. Its currency and bank of issue are among the soundest in South America—if not the very best. Yet its small size and the popular but erroneous linking of its name in a sort of "twin" relationship with Paraguay have served to obscure or discredit the country's accomplishments. Paraguay is probably the least developed and its Government the least stable in South America. Uruguay is one of the most modern, with a population of practically pure European stock, as contrasted with the mixed and Indian stock of Paraguay. The Uruguayan external loans are, therefore, sounder, perhaps, than they appear to the casual observer. There are two dollar loans actively quoted on the American market—one of the National Government and one of the National capital.

The \$7,500,000 Republic of Uruguay external loan twenty-five-year 8 per cent. sinking fund gold bonds are dated Aug. 1, 1921, and mature Aug. 1, 1946. They were offered to obtain money to fund floating indebtedness. The bonds are payable in New York City in United States gold coin of present standard of weight and fineness, free of all Uruguayan taxes. Denominations are of \$1,000 and \$500 in coupon form; interest dates, Feb. 1 and Aug. 1. The bonds are a direct obligation of the Government, which agrees that this loan shall have prior charge over any revenues pledged to the service of any future issue except in the case of mortgages on public utility properties in certain instances and local assessments levied for the construction of public works, &c. As a sinking fund, the Government is to provide in the first ten years \$300,000 annually, payable in quarterly instalments dating from Nov. 1, 1921, and in the last fifteen years an annual sum sufficient to retire each year at least one-fifteenth of the funds outstanding on Aug. 1, 1931. In the first five years, sinking fund moneys are to be applied up to 100 and interest and in the next five years up to 105 and interest by purchase in the open market. Unapplied payments in this period revert to the Government. In the last fifteen years, sinking fund payments are to be applied in the market up to 105 and interest, but the unapplied balance is to be used to call the bonds by lot at 105. The bonds are noncallable for ten years, but on Aug. 1, 1931, and any interest date thereafter they are callable as a whole at 105. The bonds were offered to yield 8.20 per cent., whereas the present price of 101½ yields 7.88 per cent. The range in 1921 was 104-98¼; in 1922 the record high of 103¾ was reached in March with a low of 100¾, and in the current year to date the range has been 107-101.

The \$6,000,000 City of Montevideo 7 per cent. sinking fund gold bonds are dated June 1, 1922, and mature June 1, 1952. The purpose of the issue was to obtain funds for revenue-producing public works and other municipal purposes. The bonds are payable in New York City, in United States gold coin, free of any taxes of Uruguay or Montevideo. Denominations are of \$1,000 and \$500 in coupon bonds; interest dates, June 1 and Dec. 1. The bonds are a direct obligation of Montevideo and a specific charge on the receipts from the sanitation, lighting and paving taxes, subject to a prior charge in favor of a London loan outstanding to the amount of about \$4,765,000 and an annual service of approximately \$372,000. The average annual five-year receipts from these sources are about \$1,148,000 as compared with maximum charges on this loan for the first fifteen years of \$480,000 per annum. An annual sinking fund is provided, sufficient to retire the bonds by maturity. In the first fifteen years the sinking fund operates in the open market at par, and in the last fifteen years by purchase or call by lot at par. They are non-callable for fifteen years, but on June 1, 1937, and any interest date thereafter, the bonds are callable as a whole at par and interest. The offering price was 97, to yield 7.25 per cent. as compared with a present price of 85½, to yield about 8.35 per cent. It is evident that the bonds were priced too high as compared with the National Government loan. The low price last year was 89 and the range in 1923 to date 91½-85. Both this and the Government issues are now close to their record lows.

Uruguay is the smallest of the South American republics, and is situated south of Brazil on the Atlantic Ocean, and is bounded on the south by the Rio de la Plata and the Republic of Argentina. It has an area of 72,153 square miles and had a population, at the end of 1920, of 1,496,000. This compares with a population in 1908 of 1,042,686.

Montevideo City, the capital of the republic, is the largest city in the republic, with a population of 361,950 in 1920. The climate of Uruguay is temperate, without extreme heat and without the snows of the colder countries. This circumstance is propitious to the development of agriculture and stock raising, the principal industries of the country.

The Oriental Republic of Uruguay was formerly a part of the Spanish vice royalty of Rio de la Plata, and subsequently a province of Brazil. It declared its independence in 1825, and was recognized as an independent republic in 1828. The Constitution as last amended came into force on March 1, 1919. Uruguay has proportional representation and universal male suffrage for all over eighteen years of age. The legislative power is vested in a two-house Parliament which meets in annual session from Feb. 15 to July 15, while in the interim a permanent committee of two Senators and five Representatives assumes control of the executive power. The executive power is divided between a President, elected for a four-year term, and a National Administrative Council. The Administrative Council consists of nine members, six from the majority and three from the largest minority party. Administratively, the country is divided into nineteen departments, which are self-governing with wide control over local expenditures, taxation and public works.

Uruguay is essentially a pastoral country, 60 per cent. of the land being devoted to stock raising and 6 per cent. to agriculture in 1916. Since that time agriculture has made some further progress, although lack of population has been a deterrent. Cattle, sheep, hides, salt and agricultural products are the chief source of wealth, with the chief commercial interests centring about cattle breeding and its allied industries, including sheep raising. In 1916 there were 7,802,442 cattle and 11,472,852 sheep. The wool produced is said to be of superior quality, the merino being second only to that of Australia. Minor products are wine, tobacco, olives, gold, silver, copper, lead, magnesium and lignite coal. Manufacturing is on a small scale, and devoted to local needs, such as the production of alcohol, cloth, cement, leather goods, clothing, bricks, hardware, &c.

Uruguay normally produces about enough agricultural produce for its own needs with occasional exportable surpluses of wheat, the production of which in 1921-22 was 270,627 metric tons. Other cereals are barley, oats and linseed.

The railway system is largely in the hands of British capital, which controls all of the 1,625 miles of railway except the 139 miles owned by the Government. One thousand and sixty miles are under State guarantee, however. The principal railway system is that which includes the Central, the Midland and the Northwestern, aggregating 1,421 miles. The roads include 2,240 miles of national highways and 3,100 miles of departmental roads. There are 170 miles of tramway, 4,819 miles of telegraph lines and 995 Post Offices. Much of the transportation is carried out by river traffic, especially with Buenos Aires.

Uruguay normally has an export balance of trade, although in the last three years there has been a reversal of the balance. In the 1914-1919 period, exports increased from 58,248,469 pesos to 147,251,078 pesos, and imports from 37,234,877 pesos to 75,745,070 pesos. The import balances in the years 1920, 1921 and 1922 are largely accounted for by the world depression and curtailment of European purchasing power. There was marked improvement in 1922 as compared with the previous year, however. Exports amounted to 77,485,046 pesos as compared with 70,265,252 pesos, while the corresponding imports were 81,778,640 pesos and 93,855,260 pesos.

Uruguay has a greater per capita trade than the United States, and the value of its foreign commerce is exceeded in South America only by that of Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

The chief articles of import are raw materials, food, iron, steel and paper manufactures, textiles and fuel; while the chief exports are wool, meat, meat products and hides. The United States and England are Uruguay's most important customers.

Although no gold coins are in circulation, Uruguay is on a gold standard with the peso nacional as the theoretical unit of value. The peso contains 1.697 grams of .917 fine gold, with a par value in United States currency of \$1.03422. Foreign gold coins, especially those of England, France and Argentina, are legal tender. The Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay (National Bank of the Republic) has the exclusive note-issuing privilege. Its President and Board of Directors are appointed by the Government. This bank issues notes of a "major" circulation of ten pesos and up and a "minor" circulation of less than ten pesos denomination. The bank is authorized to issue

Continued on Page 492

Transportation



LTHOUGH total carloadings for the week ending Sept. 22 fell off slightly from those of the preceding week, they nevertheless exceeded the normal by a substantial margin, and the cumulative total for the year maintains the margin above normal of nearly 19 per cent. that has become standard since April last.

Grain and grain products declined by over five thousand cars from the preceding week's figure, but this was to be anticipated, as the seasonal decline in this commodity generally appears several weeks earlier than it has this year.

Live stock movement, on the other hand, remained at a high figure.


Coal and coke shipments, while showing a substantial rise over the preceding week, have not yet quite recovered from the setback due to the cessation of mining operations in the anthracite field; but the resumption of work in that field, which occurred during the week under review, may be expected to show effects in a return to a more nearly normal movement during the ensuing weeks.

Manufactured products also showed a decline of five thousand cars from the preceding week. With limited information as to the commodities in which the decline occurred it is not possible at this time fully to explain the cause of the falling off. As the decline was entirely in the class of heavy goods, covering such commodities as brick and structural iron and as there has been a consistent decline during

recent weeks in forest products, it may be fairly assumed that there has been a slackening of orders for building material, especially as such a condition might reasonably be expected at the approach of the Winter season.

A decline of ten thousand in the number of serviceable surplus freight cars in the third quarter of September may be considered normal in this period of consistent million-car weeks, and the healthy margin of 59,000 surplus cars on hand holds good hope that the next five or six weeks, which are likely to be those of the heaviest traffic of the year, may be met without the appearance of any serious shortage.

The National Freight Movement



Car Loadings by Weeks, 1923

The "norm." line in this chart, marked with the zero (0), represents the average of the carloadings for corresponding weeks in each of the four years 1919-1922, both inclusive. The curves present the loadings of each week as percentage departures from this normal. The method of calculating corrects the curves for seasonal variation.

Gross Railroad Earnings


	Fourth Week In Sept.	Third Week In Sept.	Second Week In Sept.	Month of July, 1923.	Month of July, 1922.
1923.....	\$9,279,523	\$17,569,049	\$19,482,178	\$535,813,616	\$3,632,736,354
1922.....	8,826,593	16,741,845	18,379,315	443,840,164	3,057,969,064
Gain or loss..	+\$452,930	+\$834,204	+\$1,102,863	+\$91,973,452	+\$574,767,290
	+5.13%	+4.98%	+20.72%	+18.79%	

Summary of Idle Cars and Car Loadings

	AMERICAN RAILWAY ASSOCIATION					
	Aug. 31.	Aug. 22.	Aug. 15.	Aug. 7.	July 31.	July 22.
Idle cars	82,852	91,210	107,409	103,173	103,707	105,992
Car loadings.....	1,060,436	1,060,580	928,858	1,092,567	1,069,932	1,035,741

Facts and Figures of Business Import

Curve of the Food Cost of Living



An index number is a means of showing fluctuations in the average price of a group of commodities. The Annalist Index Number shows the fluctuations in the average wholesale price of twenty-five food commodities selected and arranged to represent a theoretical family food budget.

Average of Wholesale Prices

Last Week.	Previous Week.	Range for 1923.	Same Week.
Hogs, medium to heavy, per cwt....	\$7,9125	\$8,275	\$8,275
Steers, good to choice, per cwt....	10,675	10,90	12,50
Beef, salt, per 200 lbs.....	15,50	15,00	15,00
Pork, salt, per 200 lbs.....	25,75	25,75	30,00
Flour, Spring patents, per bbl.....	7,80	6,97%	8,30
Flour, Winter straight, per bbl.....	5,80	5,32%	7,00
Lard, Middle West, per lb.....	.13025	.1247%	.13025
Bacon, short, lean sides, per lb.....	.11625	.1212%	.12125
Cats No. 2 and No. 3 white.....	.4425	.475	.490
Potatoes, white, per bushel.....	.4500	.475	.525
Beef, fresh, per lb.....	.0975	.1475	.1600
Mutton, dressed, per lb.....	.1250	.1250	.1500
Sheep, wethers, per 100 lbs.....	7.75	8.00	9.875
Sugar, refined granulated, per lb.....	.09375	.0902%	.10075
Codfish, Georges, per lb.....	.0875	.0875	.0875
Rye flour, special patents, W. St.....	4.1125	4.15	5.2875
Cornmeal, export, per 100 lbs.....	2.625	2.45	2.625
Rice, extra fancy, per lb.....	.0745	.0775	.0775
Beans, medium, per bushel.....	.405	.405	.405
Apples, extra, per lb.....	.10375	.11375	.11275
Prunes, 67-70s, per lb.....	.07375	.07375	.1100
Butter, creamery, per lb.....	.4600	.4625	.5030
Sutter, dairymilk, per lb.....	.575	.575	.5225
Cheese, State, whole milk, per lb.....	.2750	.2675	.2450
Coffee, Rio No. 7, per lb.....	106875	106875	10625

Comparison of Week's Commercial Failures (Dun's)

Week Ended Oct. 4, 1923.	Week Ended Oct. 5, 1922.	Week Ended Oct. 6, 1921.	Week Ended Oct. 7, 1920.	Week Ended Oct. 8, 1919.	Week Ended Oct. 9, 1918.
Total, Over \$5,000					
East.....	124	77	118	67	40
South.....	100	41	115	59	43
West.....	93	54	100	54	70
Pacific.....	40	20	50	19	41
U. S.	357	192	383	209	353
Canada	85	45	57	26	60

The Annalist Index Number

(Base—Averages 1890-99=100 Per Cent.)

Weekly Averages

Oct. 6, 1923..... 174.205 Oct. 7, 1922..... 195.569

Sept. 29, 1923..... 176.970 Oct. 8, 1921..... 170.480

Yearly Averages

*1923.....	178.557	1917.....	261.796
1922.....	186.290	1916.....	175.720
1921.....	174.308	1913.....	139.980
1920.....	282.757	1896.....	80.096
1919.....	295.607	1890.....	109.252
1918.....	287.680	*Year to date.	

Week's Prices of Basic Commodities

	Current Price.	Range, 1923.—High. Low.	Mean Price 1923.	Mean Price of Other Years 1922. 1921.
Copper: Electrolytic, per lb.....	\$0.1300	\$0.17375	\$0.1300	\$0.128125
Cotton: Spot, middling upland, per lb.....	.2920	.3120	.2245	.21625
Cement: Portland, bulk, at mill, bbl.....	20.00	21.00	19.50	17.00
Wool: Ovis & Pa. half blood combing, per lb.....	.54	.54	.48	.5250
Pine: Nor. Car. Roofers 6 in., per 1,000 ft. 30.50	36.00	30.50	33.25	.4600
Hides: Packer, No. 1 native, per lb.....	.1500	.2025	.1400	.1750
Petroleum: Pennsylvania crude at well, bbl.....	2.50	4.00	2.50	.1275
Pig Iron: Bessemer, at Pittsburgh, per ton. 28.00	32.47	28.26	30.32	.4750
Rubber: Up. river, fine, per lb.....	2,000	3,450	2,450	.2950
Silk: Japan, Shinshu, No. 1, per lb.....	7.55	9.40	7.00	.7300

*Last quotation; market nominal.

Failures by Months

Number Liabilities	September.....	1923.....	1922.....	1921.....
.....	1,226	1,569	13,500	13,507

Building Permits (Bradstreet's)

August.....	1922.....	1923.....	July.....	1922.....	1923.....	June.....	1922.....
150 Cities. \$239,272,427	150 Cities. \$212,508,595	167 Cities. \$224,078,090	167 Cities. \$206,359,985	153 Cities. \$225,000,818	153 Cities. \$234,296,872	153 Cities. \$234,296,872	153 Cities. \$234,296,872

Alien Migration

Inbound.....	June, 1923.....	May, 1923.....	April, 1923.....	March, 1923.....	Feb., 1923.....	Jan., 1923.....	Dec., 1922.....	Nov., 1922.....
.....	44,165	52,809	52,433	43,888	30,118	28,717	43,084	49,814

Outbound..... Gain or loss..... +38,751 +47,057 +47,921 +39,278 +27,360 +24,485 +25,154 +42,737

OCT


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Stocks



HE development of an "oversold" condition within the market itself, often a reflection of an unsatisfactory technical condition which, of necessity, must correct itself, served to give the market a moderately firm tone last week. On one day

the advance was from two to three points in the speculative leaders, to the accompaniment of a volume of turn-over which exceeded 1,000,000 shares. The market's improvement came out of a clear sky and surprised no one more than the professionals who had sold stocks heavily for the decline. It had been preceded by a long series of trading days in which no progress had been made on either side, in which the markets were dull, narrow and generally uninteresting affairs. Evidently, however, the "short side" of the market became temporarily overcrowded. A few large traders started to cover their commitments and added impetus was given by the few professionals who have been converted to the constructive side of the market. At any rate, something of a scramble developed for leading stocks and prices advanced robustly and vigorously. The markets of



In the upper portion the black line shows the closing average price of fifty stocks, half industrial and half railroads. The black area shows for each week the highest and lowest daily average price of the twenty-five industrials, and the white area the corresponding figures for twenty-five rails. In the lower portion the height of the black area shows total weekly volume of sales, and the height of the white area beneath it the weekly volume of the fifty stocks used in the preparation of this chart.

Shares Sold on New York Stock Exchange

Week Ended Oct. 6, 1923.

	1923	1922	1921
Monday	612,620	663,363	544,045
Tuesday	541,600	921,432	509,752
Wednesday	1,078,946	1,130,399	527,470
Thursday	802,900	1,343,939	494,972
Friday	610,437	1,289,715	521,905
Saturday	323,550	517,661	279,575
Total for week	3,970,053	5,866,509	2,877,719
Year to date...	178,787,502	198,369,822	128,754,378

Twenty-Five Railroads

	High	Low	Last	Net Change	Same Day Last Year
Oct. 1.....	57.25	56.55	56.98	+ .38	67.42
Oct. 2.....	57.31	56.84	57.04	+ .06	68.33
Oct. 3.....	58.20	57.16	57.95	+ .91	68.46
Oct. 4.....	58.23	57.62	57.74	— .21	68.51
Oct. 5.....	57.91	57.39	57.71	— .03	68.43
Oct. 6.....	58.56	57.76	58.42	+ .71	68.35

Twenty-five Industrials

	High	Low	Last	Net Change	Same Day Last Year
Oct. 1.....	101.63	100.55	101.31	+ .38	106.06
Oct. 2.....	101.86	101.05	101.60	+ .29	107.75
Oct. 3.....	103.83	102.01	103.75	+ 2.15	108.83
Oct. 4.....	104.18	103.07	103.43	— .32	109.59
Oct. 5.....	103.40	102.62	102.99	— .44	109.27
Oct. 6.....	103.05	102.69	102.84	— .15	109.41

Combined Average—50 Stocks

	High	Low	Last	Net Change	Same Day Last Year
Oct. 1.....	79.43	78.55	79.14	+ .38	86.74
Oct. 2.....	79.58	78.94	79.32	+ .18	88.04
Oct. 3.....	81.01	79.58	80.85	+ 1.58	88.64
Oct. 4.....	81.20	80.34	80.58	— .27	89.05
Oct. 5.....	80.65	80.00	80.35	— .23	88.85
Oct. 6.....	80.80	80.22	80.63	+ .28	88.88

Yearly Highs and Lows

	High	Low	High	Low
*1923....	92.52 Mar.	77.27 July	1917....	90.46 Jan.
1922....	93.06 Oct.	66.21 Jan.	1916....	101.51 Nov.
1921....	73.13 May	58.35 June	1915....	94.13 Oct.
1920....	94.07 Apr.	62.70 Dec.	1914....	73.30 Jan.
1919....	99.50 Nov.	69.73 Jan.	1913....	79.10 Jan.
1918....	80.16 Nov.	64.12 Jan.	1912....	85.83 Sep.

*To date.

the next few days, in consideration of this development, will be watched with particular interest for indications of its sequel. It might find reflection in further advances due to public participation attracted to stocks by their advances; it might prove the starting point for further declines in case the market does not assimilate well these short sales which again will be made. It is well to note that the stock market at present is almost entirely professional, and that most of the professionals are bearish, and will not abandon their position until stocks have demonstrated more fully that they can make and hold advances of impressive sort.


Looking at the stock market from another angle, it is in an excellent position to respond quickly to any constructive developments of importance in connection with Autumn trade. Brokers' loans are extremely low at the moment. There has been heavy liquidation of securities by institutions since mid-June. Probably less stock is now being carried on margin and in bank loans than at any other time this year. Doubtless the answer to this curious situation is to be found in the fact that strong interests have accumulated stocks on the declines, and that these interests are sufficiently well backed to take up their purchases and remove them from the floating supply, which does not appear to be exceptionally large. If this has been the case—and there now appears to be very little doubt that it is—the purchases have been made by the simple tactics of putting bids below the market and merely biding time until the stock wanted declined to that point. Purchases of this sort are not calculated to put a market up; rather, they represent merely the formative or accumulative stage, the full effects of which may be a month, six months or a year away.

Professional pools, formed to advance stocks, have done poorly in the last ten days or so. One of them organized to distribute a block of Jones Bros. tea stock actually ran on the rocks, and its breakdown was reflected in the failure of a Stock Exchange house which had been "making the market" in it. Several other cases, in all of which the pools were able to get out from under, resulted in sizable losses. The market does not appear to respond to manipulation at all, and for this reason has been let entirely alone by many strong interests who usually are identified with one side or the other. Possibly this accounts, in large measure, for its recent lifelessness and narrowness.

It has been suggested many times in recent weeks that such markets as have been the rule do not fulfill their usual and proper function of forecasting future conditions. It is more likely, it has been said, that having nothing to say about the industrial future, as yet, the market merely says nothing or, in other words, gives no unmistakable indications of actual conditions which may be anticipated three or four months ahead.

With a few exceptions, which, however, are sufficiently important to give the entire picture of industrial conditions a spotty aspect, the fourth quarter of the year has been entered by most corporations in good shape. Operations in such basic lines as iron and steel, in the automobile industry, in copper and many other important industries, although considerably below the early Spring ratio of operations, still manage to keep well ahead of the ratios for the same time last year. Consumption continues to run at an abnormally high rate, as most barometers indicate, and there is but a small measure of surplus, in most commodities, between the producer and the consumer. The advent of Fall has proved a powerful stimulant to sales

Continued on Page 483.



Trend of Bond Prices—Average of 40 Issues.

Bonds



THE bond market last week gave evidence of a firmer tone than has been seen in a good while. The situation in Europe was believed by many to be gradually assuming a form which should eventually permit a final and complete adjustment of present differences. It is difficult accurately to estimate the effect on the bond market of this more hopeful attitude, but it has given the prospective investor an opportunity to withdraw his attention from that aspect of affairs long enough to appraise the values which the market offers among domestic issues. Rates for money were practically unchanged from the previous week, so that strength cannot be ascribed to that source. The substantial advances in the stock market in the mid-week sessions undoubtedly encouraged the purchase of the higher yielding obligations, but perhaps the greatest stimulus was given by the dearth of new issues, which, until the closing days of last week, has been one of the noteworthy features of the last two months. There can be little doubt that the vast total of new issues floated in the current year, which were of sufficient volume to make the first nine months in 1923 a record in that line, had materially slowed up the normal working of the market, but light offerings in September and finally a week in which there practically was none because the syndicates could not get the advertising facilities of the daily press through which to place their wares before the public, gave the dealers a chance to work off their unsold balances of early issues. Thus, the demand for securities caught up to the supply for the time at least, and investors had to look to the older issues for their requirements.

The turn for the better immediately encouraged further offerings of new issues, and from Wednesday on new issues assumed heavy proportions. One of the outstanding successes in new offerings was the Canadian Government. A 5 per cent. internal loan was opened in the Dominion in the preceding week, and it was expected that of the \$200,000,000 needed possibly half would be taken care of internally with the balance placed in England or the United States. The encouraging early subscriptions continued to come in, however, and it was reported early last week that the entire amount had been oversubscribed in the Dominion. That undoubtedly had a noteworthy effect on the tone of our local market, as it removed at least one of the large impending flotations which were known to be overhanging the market. In the local field, the week's largest offering was \$17,340,000 New York Central Equipment Trust 5s, due serially 1924 to 1938. Prices ranged from 5.25 per cent. for the earliest maturity to 5.50 per cent. for those due 1929 to 1933, while for the last five maturities the yield was 5.45 per cent. In this issue the syndicate reported an enthusiastic reception, with the subscription books closed immediately after the opening.

In the market for municipal obligations a much improved sentiment was evident. Dealers generally report a better demand for their issues and the belief is widespread that the recent scarcity of new issues, combined with the late revision of prices, has been successful in stimulating activity. Important investment bankers now feel that the market is better prepared to assimilate the large new offerings which are due in the immediate future. These include an additional \$21,000,000 State of Illinois 4½ per cent. Soldiers' Bonus Bonds and a large block of Federal Farm Loan Bonds. Guesses as to the rate the latter will bear vary from 5 per cent. bonds at 101 to the public, to 4¾s at par. That the question of price is still an important factor in the demand for bonds of this class is clearly demonstrated by the total bids of \$515,000 received for the proposed issue of \$4,000,000 City of Philadelphia 4½ per cent. School District Bonds. It is also reported that no acceptable bids were received for \$5,000,000 State of West Virginia 4½s.

Liberty bonds lost ground rather heavily, and the new Treasury 4¼s, due 1952, closed around 98.20, the last mentioned selling below 99 for the first time since last March. The growing expectation that Federal soldiers' bonus legislation will go through in the course of a few months, and the belief that a large new Government loan will be necessitated thereby are generally believed to be the cause for the recent weakness in these issues.

The railroad list was stimulated by further encouraging reports

of earnings as well as by general strength displayed by their stocks. The latter had a direct effect on the convertible issues, but the second grade and speculative issues added further gains to their advances of the previous week. The resumption of dividends on Baltimore & Ohio common stock and the excellent improvement in earnings which that action implies, were reflected in steady advances in that road's bonds, the 6s due 1929 gaining 1½, to 101¾. Several of the income bonds fell off, but that was attributable to the fact that they went "ex interest." Keokuk & Des Moines 1st 5s held firm around 66 even after it was definitely announced that funds were not available to meet their maturity on the first of the month. A committee has been formed to protect the interests of these bondholders, but it is a matter of conjecture as to what disposition will be made of the road, on which they hold a first lien. This road is small, only about 163 miles in length, but its strategic position in the heart of the Rock Island's territory is believed to be strong.

High-grade industrial and public utility issues were firm in inactive trading. Prices among the more speculative class were irregular, reflecting specific developments. Interboro Rapid Transit 6s gained 1, and the 5s 1½ points, though there was little in the way of news to account for the advance. Rapid Transit Securities 6s, which have long been selling on a "when issued" basis, made fractional gains when it was announced that the actual securities were available for delivery. American Writing Paper 1st 6s dropped 4 points on Friday following announcement of the appointment of a receiver.

The foreign list was rather sluggish. European issues showed a tendency to react somewhat from the gains registered in the enthusiasm attendant upon Germany's announcement of its intention of calling off its program of passive resistance in the Ruhr. South American issues were steady but inactive, and Japanese 4s and 4½s registered a slight recovery of their losses sustained immediately following the earthquake.

Par Value Sold on New York Stock Exchange

Week Ended Oct. 6, 1923.

	1923	1922	1921
Monday	\$13,475,500	\$8,574,200	\$16,907,600
Tuesday	10,996,300	11,028,550	17,110,550
Wednesday	9,306,500	12,266,600	17,863,500
Thursday	8,516,250	11,764,200	20,185,550
Friday	10,302,900	12,910,200	17,878,750
Saturday	4,644,150	9,020,450	9,073,500
Total for the week	\$57,241,600	\$65,564,200	\$99,019,450
Year to date.....	2,121,432,030	3,305,704,257	2,453,548,495

In detail the bond dealings compare as follows with the corresponding week last year:

	Oct. 6, 1923.	Oct. 7, 1922.	Changes.
Corporations	\$26,787,500	\$34,621,500	-\$7,834,000
United States Government.....	23,542,500	21,097,200	+ 2,445,300
Foreign	6,887,600	9,790,500	- 2,902,900
State			" "
City	24,000	55,000	- 31,000
Total all.....	\$57,241,600	\$65,564,200	-\$8,322,600
	Same Week	Same Week	Same Period
Last Week.	Last Year.	to Date.	Last Year.
Average net yield of 10 high-priced bonds.....	4.732%	4.470%	4.699%
New security issues.....	\$43,232,000	\$60,072,000	\$1,861,158,900

Average 40 Bonds

	Close	Net Change	Same Day 1922	Close	Net Change	Same Day 1922	
Oct. 1.....	75.69	+.10	81.41	Oct. 4.....	.75.75	+.11	82.05
Oct. 2.....	75.58	-.11	81.58	Oct. 5.....	75.74	-.01	81.98
Oct. 3.....	75.64	+.06	81.85	Oct. 6.....	75.94	+.20	81.91

Yearly Highs and Lows

	High	Low	High	Low
*1923....	79.43 Jan.	75.59 Sep.	1917....	89.48 Jan.
1922....	82.54 Aug.	75.01 Jan.	1916....	89.48 Nov.
1921....	76.31 Nov.	67.56 June	1915....	87.62 Nov.
1920....	73.14 Oct.	65.57 May	1914....	87.42 Feb.
1919....	79.05 June	71.05 Dec.	1913....	92.31 Jan.
1918....	82.36 Nov.	75.65 Sep.		85.45 Dec.

*To date.

Foreign Government Securities

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year to Date.	Same Week 1922.
British Cons. 2½s.....	58½@ 58%	58½@ 58%	59%@ 55%	57 @ 56½
British 5%	102%@ 102%	102%@ 102%	103%@ 99%	99%@ 99½
British 4½%	98%@ 97%	97%@ 97%	99%@ 95	96%
French rentes (in Paris) ..	56.95@ 56.05	57.40@ 56.95	59.80@ 55.60	59.75@ 59.50
French W. L. (in Paris) ..	75.50@ 74.90	74.05@ 72.45	76.76@ 72.00	76.76

Money

	Call Loans.	Time Loans 60-90 Days.	6 Months.	Com. Dis. 4-6 Months.
Last week.....	6 @4	5½	5½	5¾@5¼
Previous week.....	5½@4½	5½	5¾@5½	5¾@5¼
Year to date.....	6 @3½	5¾@4½	5¾@4½	5½@4¼
Same week, 1922.....	5 @4	4¾	5 @4¾	4½@4¼
Same week, 1921.....	5½@4½	5½@5¼	5¾@5½	6 @5¾

Bank Clearings

Entire country, estimated from complete returns from cities representing 92.3 per cent. of the total. Percentages show changes from preceding years:

	1923.	P. C.	1922.	P. C.
Last week.....	\$8,584,000,000	- 0.3	\$8,610,000,000	+ 22.9
Week before.....	7,063,000,000	- 4.2	7,372,000,000	+ 4.7
Year to date.....	300,542,000,000	+ 3.6	296,099,000,000	+ 9.8

Bar Gold and Silver

	Bar Gold in London.	Bar Silver in London.	Bar Silver in N. Y.
Last week	90s 09d@ 90s 04d	32½d@31¾d	64½c@63¾c
Previous week	90s 07d@ 90s 02d	32½d@31¾d	65¼c@64c
Year to date.....	91s 04d@ 87s 01d	33½d@30½d	68¾c@62½c
Same week, 1922.....	94s 00d@ 93s 01d	35½d@35½d	69¾c@69¾c
Same week, 1921.....	110s 06d@108s 07d	42½d@41½d	70¾c@69¾c




NUMBER of bankers in important centres, who are close students of the money situation and whose fingers are daily on the pulse of the country's industrial and agricultural life, expressed themselves last week as believing that money will work gradually up to a 6 per cent. market before the first of November. This theory is based on the increased demand for funds reported from all sections of the country; from the

fact that both business and agriculture are moderately large borrowers at the moment and from a study of the Liberty Bond market, generally a good indicator of the future of the money market, which unquestionably is working in the direction of higher yields. Under such conditions, and with higher money a possibility, the money market—and this applies, of course, to period funds—is not particularly active or broad. Both prospective borrowers and lenders appear content to wait until the forecasts made have come true or have been entirely disproved. It is likely that all of the factors which would enter into an advance of this character in the open market rates for money have not yet put in an appearance. It is difficult for bankers and business men exactly to gauge their demands for fresh capital between this time and the first of the year, because Fall trade is slow in unfolding and because recent conditions in the business and industrial fields have not been of a character which makes the forthcoming periods easy to forecast.


In any event, rates for all classes of money are now firm, with the 5½ per cent. figure most frequently heard on new business of most sorts. This, in itself, represents an advance of one-half of 1 per cent. from the market rates prevailing in the earlier Fall and reflects accurately the increased demands which have developed, not overnight, but by the slow and, at times, hesitant process of gradual improvement. Call money touched 6 per cent. in the Stock Exchange market last week, the highest rate since Sept. 13, but this represented, in the main, the usual month-end flurry, necessitated by disbursements of all sorts, for which it was necessary to make arrangements in advance. The sharp advance in the call rate could be easily traced to this cause, for by mid-week it had declined a full 2 per cent., to 4 per cent. as the funds paid out at the month-end began to dribble back to the banks and were once more loanable. The ruling rates on commercial paper were 5½ to 5¾ per cent. for the best names and 5¾ per cent for others. Bankers' acceptances were quoted at 4½ to 4 per cent. for sixty to ninety days, 4¾ to 4½ per cent. for four

Potential Supply



The Dotted line is 1922.

Ratio of total reserves of the Federal Reserve System to deposits and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined.



Range of the Time Loan Rate.

months and 4½ to 4¾ per cent. for six months. Call loans against acceptances were quoted at 4½ per cent.


The Federal Reserve System statements do not show any considerable change from week to week, except in that they reflect increased institutional uses of these facilities as business tends to expand in many sections of the country. For the system as a whole, discounts increased by \$20,000,000 last week, reserves declined by \$5,000,000 and circulation increased by \$25,000,000, all of these figures undoubtedly representing business expansion. The ratio of total reserves to deposit and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined declined from 76.4 per cent. in the previous week to 75.8 per cent. last week, while the decline in the ratio of the New York bank was to 82.8 per cent. from 83.7 per cent. in the previous week. The New York bank's discounts decreased by \$1,000,000, its reserve was about \$5,000,000 lower and its circulation \$5,000,000 higher, all of these changes being more or less inconsequential.

The outstanding developments in the statements of the Bank of England and the Bank of France last week were a decline of £2,013,000 in public deposits in the Bank of England, no doubt a reflection of the unemployment situation there, and an increase of 200,000,000 francs in the advances by the Bank of France to the State, probably another reflection of the cost to France of the maintenance of her army of occupation in the Ruhr. An advance of 904,000,000 francs in circulation brought it up to the year's highest point, now totaling 38,529,636,000 francs. The largest circulation figure given by the Bank in 1922 was 37,514,493,000 francs. This record, too, was established in the first week of October and, doubtless, is a seasonal and anticipated increase.

Three shipments of gold, aggregating approximately \$5,000,000 were received in New York last week, a total slightly larger than the average of weekly shipments for the last two or three months. American bankers are active participants in the "gold auction" in London and these shipments merely represent successful bids, with a profit accruing to the bankers on completing the shipments. The transactions are entirely commercial and private and not for the account of any exporting country. Such shipments have about ceased. Bankers do not anticipate any extended resumption of the gold movement to the United States this year; neither do they anticipate any outward movement of importance in the metal. India has been a rather heavy buyer of silver in the New York market during the last week.

Foreign Exchange

Week's Range		
	Sterling	Francs
High.....	\$4.56½	6.09
Low.....	\$4.53½	5.82
Closing....	\$4.54¾	5.90



The Range of Discount on Sterling and Francs.



LIGHT demand for any of the currencies marked the opening of last week in the foreign exchange market. This was due to traders awaiting further developments in the situation in Germany, which loomed ominously then. Sterling opened the week off ¾ of a cent, at \$4.54. Tuesday showed a further downward movement to \$4.53¾, owing to heavy selling by foreign speculators. Many bankers look for still lower rates for this exchange in the next few weeks, because cotton and grain bills, which usually flood the market about this time of the year, have been absent and will probably come along with a rush shortly. Thursday saw an improvement to \$4.54¾, the best price in more than a week, following the favorable statement of the Bank of England. Saturday's close was \$4.54¾.

The French franc opened the week at 6.03¾ and later fell to 5.93½. A similar lack of demand and the fact that Poincaré's regular Sunday "sermon" showed no evidences of a conciliatory spirit served to depress the market. Francs were bought on a limited scale, because it is the belief of traders that the franc will remain around the six-cent point for some time to come, or, at least, until real developments come in the reparations tangle. Thursday's low opening rate of 5.82 was a reflection of the statement of the Bank of France, which disclosed increase in circulation of 904,000,000 francs and increases in loans to the State of 200,000,000 francs. The former, it was later realized, however, is a regular seasonal occurrence in order to meet commercial requirements at the end of the quarter. For example, the same week last year showed an increase in circulation of 911,000,000 francs. Loans to the State were largely for the maintenance of the Ruhr Army of Occupation, an expense which, it is hoped, will soon be

at an end. Early depression on Thursday gave way to the news of improved conditions in Germany. The week's close was 5.90.

Heavy offerings caused a decline in Belgian francs early last week to 4.98. The week's close was 5.01 1/4. The Italian lira sold around 4.50 most of the week and closed at 4.50 1/2. German marks established three new lows for all time, selling early in the week at 370,000,000 for one dollar, later dropping to 500,000,000, and, on Thursday, touching 555,000,000. Swiss francs, Dutch guilders, Spanish pesetas and Norwegian kroner opened the week off a few points. Swedish kroner, on the other hand, improved a point to \$2.649 in early sales. Norwegian and Danish exchanges were reactionary later on but Swiss francs and Swedish kroner were firm. Central Europeans were reactionary, with Polish marks establishing a new low of \$0.0000021 1/8. Fluctuations in Austrian kronen are anticipated shortly when the Devinszentrale, which controls the dealings in foreign exchange, is abolished. The Greek drachma went lower to \$0.0154.

The Canadian dollar showed a marked gain to 98.44 early in the week, later moving still further up to 98.55. This is a usual seasonal rise, due to payments for wheat exports and, probably, also, to the success of the new Canadian bond issue, which was largely oversubscribed.

Japanese yen touched \$49 (par \$4985) on Tuesday. Bombay rupees, Hongkong dollars and Shanghai tael moved slightly lower early in the week and then remained practically unchanged for the remainder of the week.

The peso of Buenos Aires, which closed the preceding week at \$759, opened the week up four points, \$763, but later on declined to \$748 1/2. Rio de Janeiro milreis were down five points from the preceding week, at \$0.0975. Other South American exchanges were practically unchanged.

Iron and Steel

The Situation to Date	End of Sept., 1923	End of Sept., 1922	End of Aug., 1923	End of Aug., 1922
United States Steel orders, tons	*5,414,663	*5,950,105	*5,910,763	*5,776,161
Daily pig iron production, tons.	104,120	67,466	111,274	58,408
Pig iron production, tons.....	3,123,611	2,024,008	3,448,886	1,810,665
Pig iron, Bessemer, at Pitts., ton	\$27.77	\$35.12	\$28.26	\$26.76

*Aug. figures. †July figures. ‡Revised figures.



Moderate decreases in the ratio of production of most iron and steel manufacturing plants in the country continued in September and, while the market gives every appearance of sound underlying conditions, buying on a satisfactory and broad scale has yet to develop. Complete returns of the rate of operations in September show that the production of iron decreased about 6 per cent. in September as compared with August, which in turn decreased 6 1/2 per cent. from July. Pig iron production in the month of September was 3,123,611 tons, or 104,120 tons per day, as compared with 111,274 tons per day in August. After having reached a daily rate of 124,000 tons in May, the output of pig iron is now back to approximately the

January rate of production. There were 255 blast furnaces in operation at the first of the month as compared with 270 furnaces at the first of the preceding month.

The spotty conditions which prevail in the trade are emphasized by the fact that there is a wide difference in the ratio of operations between the various companies. The United States Steel Corporation, for instance, is operating at between 87 and 88 per cent. of capacity, while the ratio of operations for the independents as a whole is not much in excess of 70 per cent., although a few of the better known of the independents are above that figure. The fact that new buying has not come in at the rate anticipated has had the natural effect of bringing about a further softening in prices here and there, although there has been no definite revision schedules. The composite price of fourteen representative iron and steel products, as compiled by one trade authority, was placed at \$44.23, which compares with \$44.47 in the previous week and \$44.70 in the preceding week. For the eleventh consecutive week the composite price of finished steel remained at 2.775 cents per pound.

Main dependance of many of the manufacturers for a broadening of the buying later in the year is placed on railroad demand, which has formed the background for much of the trade's activity this year. The Chesapeake & Ohio purchased 30,000 tons of steel rails, and there are inquiries in the market for more than 100,000 tons for the Missouri Pacific, the Chicago & Northwestern, the Nickel Plate, the Santa Fe, the Rock Island, the Missouri, Kansas & Texas, the Cotton Belt and the Pennsylvania. It is estimated by some of the trade authorities that new car buying this quarter will aggregate 75,000 cars. The Union Pacific and Southern Pacific are expected to order about 18,000 cars each, while the Pennsylvania Railroad is reported to be in the market for approximately 15,000 tons.

Considered as a whole, railroad buying, the buying of oil country supplies, of structural steel and of sheets for export continue to be the features of the iron and steel trade. Automobile buying is slower, in consideration of the revised schedules of output which most manufacturers have put into effect.

Japanese buying, principally of materials for temporary repair work, was large last week. The Japanese Government has suspended the import duty on galvanized sheets and structural steel, and while the firm orders for sheets in hand total only about 25,000 tons, the Japanese Government itself is attempting to buy an additional 60,000 tons of galvanized sheets. Heavy inquiries have been received from Japan, too, for wire nails. The tin plate market is active and robust, and September orders were nearly double those of August. Much of the output at present is being shipped to the Far East.

At the moment, the principal interest in the trade centres in the pig iron market and its apparent weakness. Prices for this material are practically the lowest of the year and buyers are not paying any attention to the market. A deadlock has developed between buyers and manufacturers and, from present indications, unless the market for this material quickly revives, additional furnaces will be blown out. One producer remarked last week that "prices for pig iron are not only scraping bottom—they are digging up the bottom." The fact that inquiry is slight has naturally brought confusion in prices and some independent sellers were reported last week to have shaded their prices in order to move materials to a level dangerously close to

Foreign and Domestic Exchange Rates

The week's range of exchange on the principal foreign centres last week compared as follows:

Normal Exchange.	DEMAND.						CABLES.											
	Last Week. High.	Last Week. Low.	Prev. Week. High.	Prev. Week. Low.	Year 1923. High.	Year 1923. Low.	Same Wk., 1922. High.	Same Wk., 1922. Low.	Last Week. High.	Last Week. Low.	Prev. Week. High.	Prev. Week. Low.	Year 1923. High.	Year 1923. Low.	Same Wk., 1922. High.	Same Wk., 1922. Low.		
4.8665—London	4.56 1/4	4.53 1/2	4.56 1/2	4.54 1/2	4.72 1/2	4.50 1/2	4.42%	4.38 1/2	4.56 1/2	4.53%	4.56%	4.55	4.72%	4.50%	4.43	4.38%		
19.28—Paris	6.09	5.82	6.30%	6.12 1/2	7.44	5.42	7.63	7.56%	6.09 1/2	5.82%	6.31 1/2	6.13	7.44%	5.42%	7.63 1/2	7.57		
19.28—Belgium	5.08	4.97 1/2	5.43	5.22	6.82 1/2	4.31 1/2	7.15 1/2	7.10%	5.08 1/2	4.98	5.43 1/2	5.23 1/2	6.83	4.32	7.16	7.11		
19.28—Switzerland	17.89	17.82	17.91	17.81	18.95	17.05	18.73	18.66	17.91	17.84	17.93	17.85	18.97	17.07	18.74	18.67		
19.28—Italy	4.54 1/2	4.44	4.65	4.56	5.24	4.21	4.31	4.25 1/2	4.55	4.44 1/2	4.65 1/2	4.58 1/2	5.24 1/2	4.21 1/2	4.31 1/2	4.26		
40.29—Holland	39.32	39.26	39.35	39.27	39.70	38.98	38.85	38.62	39.36	39.30	39.39	39.31	39.75	39.03	38.90	38.67		
19.30—Greece	1.76	1.60	1.90	1.75	5.00	1.08	3.00	2.85	1.79	1.63	1.93	1.78	5.63	1.11	3.03	2.88		
19.30—Spain	13.60	13.40	14.32	13.66	15.82	13.24	15.23	15.11	13.62	13.42	14.34	13.72	15.84	13.26	15.24	15.12		
26.28—Denmark	17.82	17.60	18.05	17.79	20.61	17.22	20.58	20.23	17.84	17.62	18.07	17.81	20.63	17.24	20.26	20.25		
26.80—Sweden	26.53	26.47	26.55	26.50	27.02	26.37	26.56	26.38	26.55	26.50	26.57	26.52	27.04	26.39	26.58	26.40		
26.80—Norway	15.84	15.74	16.03	15.87	19.04	15.74	17.74	17.24	15.86	15.76	15.89	19.06	15.76	17.76	17.26			
51.41—Russia*02 1/4	.02	.02 1/4	.02	.03 1/4	.01 1/2	.15	.10	.07 1/2	.05	.07 1/2	.05	.15	.05	.03	.02 1/2		
48.66—Bombay	30.90	30.63	30.81	30.66	33.25	30.20	28.75	28.38	31.02	30.75	30.93	30.78	33.375	30.32	28.875	28.50		
48.66—Calcutta	30.90	30.63	30.81	30.66	33.25	30.20	28.75	28.38	31.02	30.75	30.93	30.78	33.375	30.32	28.875	28.50		
78.00—Hongkong	52.38	52.00	52.63	52.38	56.50	51.75	57.37	57.06	52.50	52.12	52.75	52.50	56.625	51.875	57.50	57.18		
...—Peking	74.25	74.00	74.875	74.62	81.25	72.25	80.625	80.25	74.37	74.12	75.00	74.75	81.375	72.375	80.75	80.375		
108.82—Shanghai	70.38	70.38	71.25	71.13	76.75	69.50	77.00	76.37	70.50	70.50	71.375	71.25	76.875	69.625	77.125	76.50		
49.83—Kobe	48.75	48.56	48.63	48.57	49.19	48.25	48.00	48.00	48.87	48.68	48.75	48.69	49.31	48.375	48.125	48.125		
49.83—Yokohama	48.75	48.56	48.63	48.57	49.19	48.25	48.00	48.00	48.87	48.68	48.75	48.69	49.31	48.375	48.125	48.125		
50.00—Manila	49.25	49.25	49.25	49.25	50.75	49.25	50.00	50.00	49.50	49.50	49.50	51.00	49.375	50.25	50.25			
42.44—Buenos Aires	33.50	33.15	33.50	33.40	37.95	32.50	35.80	35.50	33.62	33.27	33.60	33.50	38.00	32.60	35.85	35.55		
33.35—Rio	9.80	9.80	9.80	9.75	11.80	9.20	11.75	11.65	9.85	9.85	9.80	11.85	9.25	11.80	11.70			
23.83—Germany00000042	.00000010	.00000088	.00000048	.0143	.00000010	.05%	.04%	0.0000042	0.00000010	0.00000088	0.00000048	.0143	.00000010	.06%	.04%		
20.46—Austria0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2	.0014 1/2		
23.83—Poland0003	.0001 1/2	.0003	.0003	.0058	.0001 1/2	.00116	.0110	.0003	.0001 1/2	.0003	.0003 1/2	.0058	.0001 1/2	.0121	.0116		
26.26—Czechoslovakia	5.00%	2.97 1/2	3.01%	3.00	3.09	2.78	3.40	3.11	3.00%	2.97 1/2	3.01%	3.00	3.09	2.78	3.41	3.12		
19.30—Yugoslavia	1.16	1.14	1.19	1.12 1/2	1.38	.70	1.55	1.36	1.16	1.14	1.19	1.12 1/2	1.38	.70	1.56	1.37		
19.30—Finland	2.69	2.67	2.69	2.67 1/2	2.80	2.48	2.28	2.22	2.71	2.69	2.68%	2.67 1/2	2.80	2.48	2.29	2.23		
19.30—Rumania46%	.46	.43%	.46%	.59%	.38	.62%	.61%	.46%	.46	.48%	.46%	.59%	.38	.63	.61%		
20.31—Hungary0055	.0054	.0058	.0055	.04%	.0040	.05	.05	.0055	.0054	.0058	.0055	.04%	.0040	.05%	.05%		

*The figures given under "demand" are offered and bid prices for 500-ruble notes, while those under "cables" are the 100-ruble notes.

the point of production cost. The bright spots in the market continue to be standard rails, steel pipe and wrought iron pipe.

Copper sold in the New York market at 13 cents per pound last week and even this new low price for the year was nominal because of lack of business, and buyers do not appear to be interested even at present quotations. The slow manner in which copper is moving and the gradual improvement in the employment situation has had the effect of increasing the surplus supply above ground, bringing further demoralization to the market. However, there is no hint from the producers that operations are to be curtailed. Most of them express the opinion that the slack will be taken up later in the year through a gradual improvement in foreign and domestic inquiry. Germany has practically dropped out of the metal market because of the extreme difficulty of arranging payment. Considerable irregularity has cropped out in the zinc and lead markets, which are under the same influences of repression as are the other metals. Tin, however, was in better demand last week and prices advanced from one-half to one cent per pound.

Cotton

Week's Price Range

	High	Low	Closing	Net Change
October.....	29.55	27.80	28.03	-1.22
December.....	29.35	27.52	27.70	-1.25
January.....	28.87	27.00	27.20	-1.18
March.....	28.83	27.00	27.16	-1.14
May.....	28.85	27.05	27.22	- .97
July.....	28.18	26.50	27.60	+ .05



HE cotton market last week was a particularly violent one, moving up and down rapidly in response to two sets of figures issued on the same day by two departments of the Government, which were interpreted in the trade to be exactly at variance with each other. Speculation in the market was large but, taken altogether, cotton futures held well around the 28 and 29 cent mark despite these violent fluctuations.

The Census Bureau announced at the first of the week that the cotton ginned to Sept. 24 showed a total of only 3,315,000 bales, against 3,866,000 bales at the same time last year. These figures brought an instant response in the market, but it had not gone far when the final official condition report by the United States Department of Agriculture was issued. This reflected a cotton crop larger by 1,500,000 bales than last year, based on a condition of 49.5 per cent. of normal, indicating a yield of 11,015,000 bales. The forecast as to condition was almost exactly in line with unofficial forecasts heretofore made, but the estimate of total production of 11,015,000 bales was from 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 bales greater than the trade anticipated. The result was a perpendicular decline in cotton, which not only wiped out all of the gains built up on the Census statement, but which aggregated the largest total loss for any single day of the year. The two reports had the effect of putting the cotton trade in a state of even greater confusion and nervousness than has been evident for several weeks.

This situation was heightened at the end of the week by announcement by the Amoskeag Mills that they would close down for an indefinite period because of unsatisfactory conditions in the trade. The announcement was something of a shock and was immediately reflected in the market. It was pointed out that raw materials advanced about five cents a pound over last year and labor 12½ per cent., and that an advance in the price of finished goods commensurate with these increased costs is not now possible because of poor conditions in the finished goods trade. It is expected that a few other mills will follow this lead until conditions improve in the finished goods market, although anything like a general closing down is not anticipated. Doubtless, a more moderate course will be taken by many manufacturers, that is, through curtailment of production to probably a four-day week.

Weather conditions in the belt were not particularly satisfactory for cotton last week. Rains in many sections of the belt are reported to have interfered with picking, and there is still a great deal of complaint about the shortage of common labor in most sections of the South. Cotton is working into the shipping centres rapidly, according to reports from the South, although there probably will be more cotton held by the co-operative marketing associations this year than ever before. Reports filtered into the financial district last week that one of these large associations in the South set a price of 35 cents on its cotton now held in warehouses, and plans to hold it until this price is reached. Considered generally, however, cotton is coming to market at about the same pace as it did last year, for many of the small independent growers have been obliged to liquidate their profits

immediately to meet obligations. Plans for next year's crop are still in an embryonic state; nevertheless, sales of fertilizer to be used in connection with next year's crop are reported to be increasing.

The outstanding feature of the situation so far as the market for cotton is concerned continues to be the scarcity of contracts for future delivery. There is keen competition, particularly in the South, between domestic and foreign spinners for the first movement of the new crop, and for this reason such cotton as comes to market from day to day weighs very lightly on the market. With the New York stock of certified cotton down to approximately 350,000 bales, and with only 66,000 bales in Liverpool, compared with 525,000 bales two years ago at this time, the quantity of actual cotton at these centres upon which to transact the present large volume of trading in contracts for future delivery remains abnormally small.

Textiles

Week's Price Range

Spot Printcloths	Open	Close
39-inch 68-72s	*11½c	†11½c
38½-inch 64-60s	*9½c	9¾c



NDEFINITE curtailment of production by two prominent manufacturing concerns in widely different lines—cotton and silk—was the outstanding feature of last week's happenings in the textile trades. In one case, that of the cotton goods concern, the statement was frankly made that the shutdown was due to the present condition of business. The silk firm said that its curtailment was due to the uncertain condition of the raw silk market, which promises to continue for a long time. Up to the time of writing, no other large concern in either field had followed suit.

Of particular interest in the closing down of the cotton mills of the company in question is the fact that they are among the largest producers of ginghams and kindred fabrics in the country. Only a few weeks ago prices were named on Spring lines of this merchandise at levels which showed no change from those effective during the Fall season. This was considered a commercially courageous step on the company's part, in view of the fact that buyers had been expecting reductions. Business in ginghams, however, has for some time been off key and, although some improvement has been noted of late, it is still an open question whether the demand is anything like normal. It is probable that it is not, and that the concern does not feel warranted in operating without actual orders in hand. Manufacturing conditions, especially as to wages and working hours, the high price of cotton and local taxation are all said to have combined in influencing the concern in the action it has taken. Regarding the shutdown, one of the points raised in this market is how it will affect similar merchandise in the hands or on the books of competitors.

Also of interest in the cotton goods last week was the naming of 19 cents as the October-November delivery price on one of the best-known lines of standard 4-4 bleached muslins. This was a rise of half a cent a yard from the last previous price. In the gray goods trading was none too active, largely due to the lack of change in cotton as a result of the October report on the condition of the crop. At the close, spot 38½-inch 64-60 printcloths were quoted at 9¾ cents.

The last of the important lines of corporation dress goods was priced for Spring near the close of the week at levels which, for the most part, were the same as those quoted for Fall. Where advances were made, they ranged from 1½ to 2½ cents a yard. The response on the part of buyers was immediate. Dress fabrics generally continued more active than men's wear goods, and significant in connection with this is the fact that the dress goods mills of the concern which announced the closing of its cotton goods division continue in operation. No especial change took place in the raw material.

The curtailment on the part of the silk firm mentioned was not so marked as that of the cotton goods concern. In this case, it amounted to a change from a six-day-a-week schedule of operations to one of four days a week. It was openly said to be due to the existing raw silk situation, and no indication was given as to how long the shortened schedule would continue in operation. The indications were, however, that it would be for some time. Certain it is that there has been no lessening of the tension regarding raw silks, either here or abroad. Despite reports to the contrary, the movement of silks now in Japan is confined entirely to those previously contracted for, and new business is not only lacking, but impossible. Imports into this country dropped nearly 8,000 bales in September.

The week in the linens field differed very little from the week before. Calls for household goods continued active, and the movement of dress linens was more notable than usual at this season of the year. Despite obvious attempts to make business in that branch

of the industry appear better than it really is, there is no denying the fact that it is extremely good.

Spot burlaps were again scarce and high in this market, and there was little disposition on the part of holders to sell these goods. The same was true of afloat goods to arrive within the next thirty to forty days, but contracts could be bought without difficulty. The further off the shipment wanted, the easier the goods were to be had.

Grain

Week's Price Range

	WHEAT		CORN		OATS	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Sept.....	1.07½	1.04¼	.99	.90
Dec.....	1.10½	1.04¾	.76¾	.71½	.44½	.42
May.....	1.13¾	1.09	.76¾	.70½	.46½	.44½
July.....	1.09¾	1.05¼	.76½	.71½	.44¾	.44½



THE outstanding development in the grain trade is the evident determination of the Administration to give the wheat farmer some aid, and it is generally conceded that this has been the strongest factor in the grain market in the past fortnight, tending to stimulate prices until the exact details of the aid are ascertained. The belief is expressed, however, that it will be through a revival of the Government's machinery, established during the war, for handling grain, and will not be through a price-fixing subsidy or through a special session of Congress. Doubtless, this will eventually turn out to be aid furnished through relaxation of terms by which advances are made on the crops, and through a campaign of education in the raising of less wheat but of an improved quality. It is to be doubted, too, that there will be any change in the duty on grain imported into this country, despite the fact that a great deal of pressure has been brought to bear upon the President to make use of the flexible provisions of the new tariff law to advance the rate of duty on wheat from its present level of 30 cents to 45 cents per bushel. The trade believes, however, that such a development would be unjustified at this time. However, the pressure on

the President and other Administrative leaders for definite help for the wheat farmer is evidently succeeding.

Although a great deal of irregularity cropped out last week at intermittent periods as profits were taken, the main trend of the grain market continued upward, with two or three bulges, which quickly absorbed the surplus contracts offered and which put not only wheat but corn and oats up rapidly. These advances, however, were not sustained and were always followed by the irregularity born of profit-taking. December wheat continues to range around the \$1.08 per bushel point, corn around 95 cents, and oats around 43 cents. These prices are higher than the corresponding prices for last year at this time, despite the fact that the world's exportable surplus of wheat is nearly 50 per cent. larger than the probable demand. It is to be noted that current prices of wheat are approximately 5 cents to the bushel higher than those at this time last year; that the prices of corn are from 25 to 30 cents higher per bushel, and oats from 3 to 5 cents per bushel higher.

The foreign demand is neither impressive nor sustained. Shipments have been larger as the crop has come to market, and the export trade in domestic wheat is mediocre. Both foreign buyers and American exporters are proceeding with caution until the proposed Government aid to the wheat farmer has developed. Although preliminary forecasts on the probable out-turn of European grain crops now are fully recognized as too high, it appears that more grain will be produced in Europe this year than last. Although Germany is reported to be getting considerable grain from Russia, she has about disappeared as a factor in our markets because of the difficulties which surround the purchase of grain in German marks. The Indian crop is turning out to be poor in quality. Last reports from France indicate that she will fare better than other near-by countries, so far as grain is concerned, and that she will import but a small amount of wheat this year.

Weather conditions were good throughout the belt last week, although here and there rains interfered with the harvest. Corn made particularly good progress toward maturity. The seeding of Winter wheat is progressing rapidly throughout the Central Valley States, and good progress is reported from the Middle and North Atlantic Coast States, this work being nearly completed as far South as Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Harvesting of all grain crops made good progress in the Middle Atlantic Coast States last week under favorable weather conditions.

The Week

Special Correspondence of The Annalist.

Toronto, Oct. 6.

SUCCESS of a most gratifying character attended the flotation of the Dominion Government loan of \$172,471,000, required to refund the Victory Loan of that amount maturing Nov. 1. With a view to "feeling out" the market, Minister of Finance Fielding sold, on Sept. 19, an issue of \$50,000,000 5 per cent. 20-year bonds to a syndicate of Canadian brokers. Immediately on being offered to the public, this amount was oversubscribed to the extent of about \$12,000,000. This, in turn, induced the Minister of Finance to undertake the flotation of the total amount required for the necessary refunding. The issue was offered in two maturities of 5 and 20 years respectively, the former at 99 and interest and the latter at 98½ and interest, with interest at 5 per cent. in each instance. The organization which undertook the marketing of the issue with the public consisted of 220 banking and financial houses. Within seven or eight days not only had subscriptions for the desired amount been received but \$28,000,000 besides, bringing the total up to \$200,000,000, at which point the books were closed. It is understood the Government will accept the excess amount subscribed and use it for the repayment of certain temporary loans. A feature of the campaign was the generous subscriptions of insurance companies, banks and commercial and industrial corporations, and in several instances the purchasing was made with new money. Among the institutions subscribing, three were American—the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, New York, \$5,000,000; Prudential Insurance Company, Newark, N. J., \$2,500,000, and the Travelers' Insurance Company, Hartford, Conn., \$2,500,000. The largest individual subscription was that of the Sun Life Assurance Company, the amount being \$10,000,000. Next in order were the subscriptions of the Bank of Montreal and the Bank of Commerce, each taking \$5,000,000.

The report of the curator dealing with the affairs of the defunct Home Bank was made public on Wednesday of this week. Unfortunately, it shows the finances of the institution to be in fully as bad a condition as many anticipated. The liabilities of the bank are placed at \$18,486,978 and total assets at \$15,848,400. Much of the latter, however, are of the "frozen" description, while the face value of the assets

in Canada

available for ordinary creditors, through the intervention of preferred claims, is estimated at \$12,842,974. Between the end of June last and the failure of the bank, a shrinkage of approximately \$4,000,000 took place in the value of assets. The curator recommends a preliminary payment of 2½ per cent. to depositors, said payment to be made through other chartered banks, who are to be furnished with security against possible loss. The failure of the bank is clearly due to bad management, which is particularly reflected in the nature of a number of the commercial and other loans, although some of them were made prior to 1910, when the institution advanced from that of a loan and savings company to a full-fledged chartered bank. Specific losses of this kind exceed \$12,000,000. Among them is a loan of \$1,143,334 to the South New Orleans Railway, Light and Power Company, \$97,214 to the estate of the late general manager (who died a few weeks ago), and \$31,237 to the President's private secretary. Notwithstanding the deplorable condition of the bank's affairs, dividends were paid for the last fiscal year, which ended May 31. Concurrently with the publication of the curator's report, warrants were issued by both Federal and Provincial authorities for the arrest, on the charge of signing false statements, of President H. J. Daly, the directors and the chief accountant. It may be taken as a foregone conclusion that the shareholders, in addition to losing their investment, will be called upon to pay double liability as demanded in such cases under the Canadian Banking act.

Further conferences between the various interests concerned failed to bridge the difficulty in respect to the lake shipments of grain from the elevators at Fort William and Port Arthur owing to the refusal of the American Shipowners' Association to participate in the trade under the rate-filing conditions stipulated by the new Canadian law. In the meantime, in order to compensate in part for the non-participation of the usual American fleet, private concerns have secured steamers of Norwegian registration and the Canadian Government merchant marine has allocated a few of its ocean-going boats for the service. It is asserted that several American vessels will later in the month be available, but so far only three or four are actually engaged in the trade, whereas under normal conditions nearly one-half of the grain is shipped from the head of the Great Lakes in American bottoms. Up to the present a sufficient number of vessels is engaged in the service to keep the "wheels moving," but, owing to the lateness of the crop, receipts at the elevators are not as heavy as

is usual at this time of the year. The testing time will come later, and in the meantime a great deal of concern undoubtedly exists. Matthew Snow, a member of the Grain Board, expresses the opinion that in the event of the American vessel owners persisting in their present attitude, something like 150,000,000 bushels of wheat will be found in the hands of the farmers when navigation closes.

Manufacturers of woolens and knit goods in Canada have started an agitation for a modification of the preferential tariff on their products. Even before the preferential rates were increased by the legislation of the last two sessions of Parliament, Canadian manufacturers of these lines experienced difficulty in meeting the competition of the British product, owing to the lower cost of production of the latter. As a preliminary step, the Canadian manufacturers are urging the Government to send a special officer to Great Britain to study rates of wages obtaining in the woollen industry there and particularly their relation to cost of production of the finished products. Naturally, by the evidence thus obtained, the Canadian manufacturers hope to strengthen their case for the restoration of higher protective duties on woolens and knit goods. In the meantime, imports from Great Britain are increasing. In tweeds, for example, there was an increase of over 138 per cent. in value in the first four months of the current fiscal year compared with the corresponding period of 1922, while in socks and stockings, in the manufacture of which the Canadian mills

have made remarkable headway of late years, an increase of over 66 per cent. was experienced. Although agitation for the modification of the preferential duties occupies the centre of the stage at present, a movement appears to be gathering momentum for a general revision of the tariff upward. Naturally, the leaders in the movement are the members of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the President of which, speaking in Montreal a few days ago, urged that the customs tariff on finished products be immediately and substantially increased. This accomplished, an effort should be made to increase Canada's export trade by "making preferential tariff arrangements, based on the principle of bargaining with other countries, and particularly countries within the British Empire."

Canada's new law relating to patents of invention differs in certain important respects from that which it supersedes. There is, for example, no restriction on importation, whereas formerly a year had to elapse from the date of a patent. Another change is one that allows the holder of a patent three years in which to manufacture, instead of two years, as formerly obtained. It is held that, under the new law, inventors and manufacturers will be given a better opportunity to develop inventions to a commercial stage than was afforded by the old law. The new law also obtains for Canada membership in the International Convention, which, in turn, gives a Canadian patent a year's protection in thirty-five associated countries.

Review of Recent Books

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC FINANCE. By Hugh Dalton, M. A., D. Sc. (Econ.). London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.

WHILE we admit disagreement with many of Mr. Dalton's views, it would be ungracious not to acknowledge his services to students and business men by the publication of his timely and highly interesting book. He is modest enough to designate his work a textbook, but the force with which he expresses his sentiments on many of the serious questions of the moment makes us think that there is something in the way of motive in his expositions—more, indeed, than is usual in a work intended for classes of young people. When, for instance, Mr. Dalton expresses himself in favor of a levy on wealth, and justifies it on the ground that sufficient taxation was not imposed during the war on the British people—for he is writing for our English cousins—we are of the opinion that he is traveling outside the limits imposed on a "Reader of Commerce" even by so liberal a Faculty as that of the University of London. Our author says that a full discussion of the application of such a levy would tend to dissipate "vague apprehensions." If we know anything of the men to whom it is suggested that this novel form of collection is to be applied, we are sure they will resent legislation enforcing it and in no uncertain manner. It may be that a Labor Party in power might indulge in the sequestration of wealth, and we observe that Mr. Dalton's extended views of the operation are issued by the Labor Publishing Company and not by Messrs. Routledge!

For the rest, Mr. Dalton's explications of public finance may be studied with advantage for their logic and clarity. His language is well chosen and always vigorous, and while most of the subjects of which he treats have been commented on from time to time by American economists with more or less soundness, Mr. Dalton's addition to the library of popular economics will be welcomed in the circles to which he appeals. He clears away fallacies with a sureness and a swiftness quite unprofessorlike, and there is a bluntness in his dealing with some old-fashioned theories which will be hailed by young readers. We would especially commend the chapters analyzing the effects of taxation on production, the sources of public income, some characteristics of a good tax system, the incidence of taxation, the tax system from the point of view of economy and the income from public property and public enterprise. The whole question of taxation is dealt with most exhaustively, and reasons are given for the desirability of new kinds of imposts and for the justification of those already in existence.

FISCAL FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS. By John M. Chapman, Ph. D. New York: The Ronald Press Company.

PROFESSOR H. PARKER WILLIS of Columbia University has written an admirable introduction to Mr. Chapman's book and it covers the latter's labors with precision. He commends the work, and those who follow the author from his account of the early fiscal history of this country down to his description of war finance will agree with the professor as to the value and interest of "Fiscal Functions." The public services accomplished by the Reserve Banks, not the least of which is the effort to stem reckless speculation, are related by Mr. Chapman, and the more intricate of their operations are dwelt on with necessary detail. He meets the criticism directed against the Federal Reserve system and points out the advantages in a masterly summary. The most important characteristic indicated in the new system is its superiority over the old Sub-Treasury plan in that the funds of the Government have not been hoarded in the United States Treasury or in the Federal Reserve Banks to the extent of causing a shortage of funds in the money market. Mr. Chapman thinks, and we agree with

him, that any shortage of funds that may have existed has been due to other causes.

In a paragraph headed "Should Government Deposits Be Protected by a Reserve?" Mr. Chapman urges that the same reserve should be required against Government deposits as against deposits of private individuals, firms and corporations, and he says: "This would be an incentive for closer and better examinations and supervision of the banks and should in the end strengthen our banking system. The Government would cease to be a preferred depositor. There is no basic reason why the Government should expect to be specially favored by the banks any more than private depositors." Mr. Chapman is of opinion, furthermore, that the Government should pay the same rate for funds it borrows from banks that business men pay. Mr. Chapman's suggestions are worth consideration. He is a theorist, but his theories have sound, practical value. His book will be found of service to readers who desire to become acquainted with banking and investment conditions before, during and since the great war, the way in which the Liberty loans were managed by the Reserve Banks and their action in connection with the floating debt. They will obtain accurate information, conveyed in simple terms understood by all, of the banks' relations with depositaries of Government funds and of their influence on the money market and prices of commodities. "Fiscal Functions of the Federal Reserve Banks" deserves a place in the business library, where it may be consulted with advantage.

Stocks

Continued from Page 477.

and, doubtless, this will continue so long as outdoor operations are possible.

One of the developments which won many friends for the stock market last week was the action of first-class railroad shares. The market for these issues, sadly neglected for several years, was brighter and snappier than it has been for a long while, and such issues as Baltimore & Ohio, on which the 5 per cent. dividend has been resumed, New York Central, Canadian Pacific, Union Pacific, Atchison and many of the "small rails," including Southern, Wabash and Texas & Pacific sold at new high prices for the year. Banking and professional activity indicates a widespread desire to revive speculative and investment interest in the first-class railroad stocks, until industrial shares have had the opportunity to adjust themselves to new sets of conditions which now obtain in many lines. Many times in the past this effort to divert attention from the industrial shares and into the railroad shares has proved a rank failure. With a background of splendid earning figures for the first nine months of the year and with car loadings maintaining their remarkably high level, there is a good basis for the belief that these attempts may be more successful this year than in the past.

The market continues to ignore totally the foreign situation, paying attention only to its reflection found in the foreign exchanges, and often even ignoring violent movements in the exchanges. Speculative attention and investment attention are sharply focused on our own industrial situation and in the development of Fall trade; on the possibilities arising from the forthcoming session of Congress and such important measures as relief for the farmer, the revival of agitation for a soldiers' bonus and the possibility of an early revision of the tax schedules. To these the market is disposed to pay instant attention.

How to Choose Among Investment Offerings

The Annalist's Complete Index and Guide to Current Issues



LOW will be found a complete list of securities, including preferred stocks, common stocks, bonds and notes offered to the public in the week ending October 6. In the issue of each subsequent Monday a complete list of security offerings in the preceding week will be published in a similar manner. Information as to the name of the offering, the amount, the rate and date of interest payments, the dates of issue and maturity, the offered price and the yield at this price will be given. For quick reference the list has been arranged by classification and in alphabetical form.

Quarterly, in the initial issue of each three months, this weekly information will be assembled into a complete Index of Security Offerings. The list will be supplemented by the publication as well of such display announcements as may have appeared in The Annalist in the last quarter, containing facts indicative of the strength, safety and special features of the issues.

While The Annalist will not discriminate among securities nor advise as to the wisdom of investments, it is prepared, through its service department, to provide additional detailed information for those desiring it.

Here is the list of last week:


BONDS

AMOUNT.	NAME AND DESCRIPTION.	MATURITY.	DATE OFFERED.	OFFERED AT	YIELD.	DIVIDEND DATES.
\$1,000,000	Akron, Ohio, School District 5½s.....	\$50,000 Oct. 1, 1925 to 1944 inc., annu.	Oct. 4	4 75%
300,000	Brewster County, Texas, Road 5½s.....	\$12,000 annu., Feb. 1, 1929 to 1953 inc.	Oct. 6
2,000,000	Cincinnati Terminal Warehouse Co. Closed First Serial Gold 6½s.....	Aug. 1, 1926 to 1938 inc.	Oct. 3	Par & Int.	F. & A.
\$1,600,000	Coal & Iron Bldg. Corp., Cleveland, Ohio, First Leasehold Gold 6½s.....	April 1, 1924 to 1942 (semi-annually)	Oct. 1	Par & Int.	A. & O.
550,000	Commercial Exchange Bldg., Los Angeles, Cal., First (Closed) Serial Gold 7s.....	July 1, 1925 to 1939 inc.	Sept. 25	Par & Int.	J. & J.
400,000	Crescent Apartments, Tampa, Fla., First Serial Gold 7s....	Aug. 1, 1925 to 1935 inc.	Sept. 28	Par & Int.
500,000	Detwiler Corp. First Sinking Fund 6½s.....	1943	Oct. 4
Block	First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank 5s.....	July 1, 1953; opt. '33	Oct. 3
650,000	Florida, State of, Everglades Drainage District Gold 6s.....	July 1, 1932 to 1941 inc.	Oct. 3	5.40%
Block	France, Republic of (Int. Loan) Treas. 6s.....	May 20, 1926, at par; May 20, 1929, at 103; May 20, 1933, at 108.	Oct. 2	M. & N. 20
4,050,000	Fruit Growers' Express Co. Equip. Trust Gold 5½s (Ctfs.) Series C.....	\$270,000 (annu.) Oct. 15, 1924 to 1938 inc.	Oct. 5	100.19 & divd. to 98.50 & divd.	About 5.30% About 5.65%	A. & O. 15
146,000	Gary, Ind., School Dist 4½s.....	Oct. 1, 1943	Oct. 1	101.62 & Int.	4.625%
Block	Greensboro Joint Stock Land Bank 5s.....	April 1, 1953; opt. '33	Oct. 3
1,800,000	Hawaii, Territory of, Public Improvement Gold Coupon 4½s	Oct. 1, 1953	Oct. 4	101.25 & Int.	4.40% plus
75,000	Hawaii, Territory of, Home Lands Gold Coupon 4½s.....	Oct. 1, 1953	Oct. 4	101.25 & Int.	4.40% plus
371,000	Kansas City, Kan., Improvement 5s.....	\$37,000 annu. Aug. 1, 1924 to 1933 inc.	Oct. 3	4.75%
533,000	Keokuk, Iowa, Independent School District School Building 5%.....	May 1, 1925 to 1943, serially	Oct. 2	4.75% to 4.65%
110,000	Lakeview Apartments, Atlanta, Ga., First Real Estate Gold 6½s.....	Sept. 1, 1926 to 1931, serially	Oct. 3	M. & S.
1,315,000	Little Rock, Ark., 1-Yr. Municipal Notes.....	Sept. 25, 1924	Oct. 1	5% to 5.25%
200,000	Live Poultry Transit Co. Equip. Serial Gold 6½s, Series N.....	\$10,000 semi-annu. Oct. 1, 1924, to April 1, 1934	Oct. 6	Par & Int.	A. & O.
2,199,000	Newark, N. J., Gold 4½s.....	Serially Oct. 1, 1924 to 1963 inc.	Oct. 3	4.50% to 4.40%
2,800,000	New England Power Co. First 5s.....	July 1, 1951	Sept. 27	96 ¼ & Int.	5.25%
700,000	Newman (I.) & Sons, Inc., New Haven, Conn., 10-Yr. Debenture Sinking Fund Gold 7s.....	Oct. 1, 1933	Oct. 1	Par & Int.	A. & O.
17,340,000	New York Central R. R. Equip. Trust Gold Ctfs., 5s.....	June 1, 1925 to 1938 (annually)	Oct. 4	5.25% to 5.45%	J. & D.
1,000,000	North Dakota, State of, Gold 5s.....	\$300,000 Jan. 1, 1934; \$200,000 Jan. 1, 1939; \$500,000 Jan. 1, 1949	Oct. 2	5%
300,000	Oregon-Washington Bridge Co. First Serial Gold 7s.....	March 1, 1926 to 1938, serially	Sept. 25	Par & Int.	M. & S.
400,000	Ouachita Parish, La., Direct Obligation Court House & Jail 5s	Aug. 1, 1924 to 1963	Sept. 28	Par & Int.
150,000	Palm Beach County, Fla., General Obligation, Ctfs. of Indebtedness, 5½s.....	Sept. 1, 1935 to 1963, serially	Oct. 1	5.25%
500,000	Philadelphia, Pa., 3½s.....	July 1, 1931	Sept. 29	96.3817 & Int.	4.05%
Block	Pleasant Valley Coal Co. First Gold 5s.....	July 1, 1928	Oct. 2	6.25%
1,000,000	Porto Rico, Govt. of., Public Improvement Gold 5s.....	\$250,000 (annu.) Jan. 1, 1945 to 1948 inc.; opt. Jan. 1, 1944	Oct. 4	4.55% to opt. date; 5% thereafter
5,000,000	Public Service Co. of Colorado First & Ref. Gold 6s, Series A	Sept. 1, 1953	Oct. 4	93 & Int.	About 6.55%	M. & S.
2,000,000	Queens Borough Gas & Electric Co. Refunding Mtge. Gold 6s	Sept. 1, 1953	Oct. 3	99 ½ & Int.	6% plus	M. & S.
280,000	St. Louis, Troy & Eastern R. R. Equip. Trust Ctfs., Series A, 6s.....	April 1, 1924, to Oct. 1, 1930, semi-annually	Sept. 28	5.50% to 6%	A. & O.
6,000,000	Republic of Salvador, Customs First Lien, Sinking Fund Gold 8s, Series A.....	July 1, 1948	Oct. 4	Par & Int.	8.20%	J. & J.
220,000	Shoreham Apts., Chicago, First Serial Gold 7s.....	Ser. Sept. 15, 1924 to 1933 inc.	Oct. 5	Par. & Int.	M. & S. 15
2,500,000	Standard Gas & Electric Co. Gold 7s.....	April 1, 1925	Oct. 4	Par & Int.	A. & O.
614,000	Yonkers, N. Y., Gold 4½s.....	Ser. Oct. 1, 1924 to 1963 inc.	Oct. 3	4.20%

STOCKS

AMOUNT.	NAME AND DESCRIPTION.	PAR VALUE.	DATE OFFERED.	OFFERED AT	YIELD.	DIVIDEND DATES.
\$2,000,000	Washburn-Crosby Co. Sinking Fund Cumul. Pfd. 7%.....	\$100	Oct. 2	Par & Divd.	F., M., A. & N. 1 (quarterly)
200,000	American Magnestone Corp. of California, 8% Cumul. 2% Part. Convertible Pfd.....	\$100	Sept. 27	Par & Divd.
450,000	Lounsbury-Soule Co., Inc., Stamford, C. a., Class A Pfd. and 2,250 Shares Com.....	Pfd. \$100 Com. no par	Units of 2 sh. pfd. & 1 sh. com.
600,000	Northern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. Class A 7% Pfd.....	Oct. 3	\$300 a unit
			Sept. 29	\$98.50

Federal Reserve Gold Holdings and Total Stock of Gold



The space between the base line and the broken line represents the cash reserves required, that between the broken line and the light line the excess reserves, or free gold, and the whole space between the base line and the heavy line represents the total stock of gold. The supply is computed monthly, so that the record can never be brought to the date of publication. The chart records the last figures published.

By Telegraph to The Annalist

Bank Clearings

Week Ended Saturday, Oct. 6

	Last Week		Year to Date		Last Week		Year to Date	
	1923	1922	1923	1922	1923	1922	1923	1922
Central Reserve Cities								
New York	\$4,651,957,070	\$4,725,039,093	\$163,374,370,846	\$166,810,408,472	Other Cities:			
Chicago	616,658,947	641,211,419	23,964,418,321	21,125,505,407	Buffalo	\$51,793,935	\$47,984,499	\$1,790,051,536
Total 2 C. R. cities	\$5,268,616,017	\$5,366,250,512	\$187,338,789,167	\$187,835,913,879	Cincinnati	60,786,000	60,600,000	2,244,632,085
Increase	*1.8%		*0.3%		Columbus, Ohio	17,610,000	16,283,400	351,309,800
Other Federal Reserve cities:					Denver	22,510,509	22,011,647	797,896,865
Atlanta	\$56,015,296	\$61,697,869	\$1,060,352,264	\$1,556,927,015	Louisville	28,616,744	27,029,514	1,195,258,774
Boston	376,000,000	386,000,000	14,671,000,000	12,061,000,000	Milwaukee	40,825,777	36,471,821	1,433,649,303
Cleveland	114,699,446	100,534,990	4,290,457,494	3,449,362,874	New Orleans	57,174,375	53,190,013	1,975,810,036
Kansas City, Mo.	138,680,388	146,109,217	5,314,178,864	5,113,624,123	Omaha	38,703,153	45,680,124	1,638,578,631
Minneapolis	84,633,037	89,774,081	2,753,771,291	2,444,600,007	St. Paul	38,818,329	37,840,674	1,345,723,136
Philadelphia	501,000,000	484,000,000	18,833,000,000	16,613,000,000	Seattle	39,872,701	33,626,176	1,467,877,533
Richmond	53,674,000	51,822,000	1,913,718,000	1,665,083,294	Washington	22,373,163	22,122,962	838,899,162
San Francisco	194,200,000	160,000,000	6,167,900,000	5,480,700,000	Total 11 cities	\$419,084,750	\$402,300,830	\$15,750,503,366
Total 8 cities	\$1,518,902,167	\$1,463,938,157	\$55,904,357,913	\$48,404,297,313	Increase	4.1%	15.5%	
Increase	3.7%		15.4%		Total 21 cities	\$7,206,602,934	\$7,232,489,499	\$258,903,650,446
Total 10 cities	\$6,787,518,184	\$6,830,188,669	\$243,243,147,080	\$236,340,211,192	Increase	*0.3%	3.6%	
Increase	*0.6%		2.5%		*Decrease			

Actual Condition

Statement of the Federal Reserve Banks

Oct. 3.

Dist. 1,	Dist. 2,	Dist. 3,	Dist. 4,	Dist. 5,	Dist. 6,	Dist. 7,	Dist. 8,	Dist. 9,	Dist. 10,	Dist. 11,	Dist. 12, San
Boston.	New York.	Philadelphia.	Cleveland.	Richmond.	Atlanta.	Chicago.	St. Louis.	Minneapolis.	Kansas City.	Dallas.	Francisco.
\$293,185,000	\$973,578,000	\$253,696,000	\$320,457,000	\$81,529,000	\$549,044,000	\$62,189,000	\$72,520,000	\$84,274,000	\$57,276,000	\$27,013,000	
Rediscos.	19,489,000	136,459,000	33,432,000	29,044,000	17,332,000	53,002,000	23,250,000	27,584,000	4,087,000	27,059,000	
Bills on hand..	62,032,000	229,333,000	70,726,000	81,778,000	76,540,000	79,685,000	145,474,000	75,764,000	28,475,000	55,340,000	99,362,000
Due members..	129,472,000	700,065,000	119,909,000	157,165,000	62,037,000	52,083,000	288,220,000	65,957,000	48,701,000	79,500,000	147,295,000
Notes in circ'n.	229,712,000	474,894,000	213,198,000	241,581,000	92,738,000	131,892,000	415,011,000	74,717,000	50,219,000	63,063,000	239,546,000
Ratio, &c.....	82.1%	82.8%	79.4%	80.7%	53.3%	53.3%	80.5%	49.9%	67.5%	60.2%	74.0%

Federal Reserve Bank Statement

Statement of Member Banks

Oct. 3.

	Oct. 3, 1923.	Sept. 26, 1923.	Oct. 4, 1922.								
RESOURCES—											
Gold and gold certificates.....	\$357,185,000	\$359,664,000	\$270,158,000								
Gold settlement fund—Federal Reserve Board.....	643,874,000	641,647,000	568,241,000								
Total gold held by banks.....	\$1,001,059,000	\$1,001,311,000	\$838,399,000								
Gold with Federal Reserve agents.....	2,055,663,000	2,061,965,000	2,194,932,000								
Gold redemption fund.....	59,108,000	53,328,000	55,949,000								
Total gold reserves.....	\$3,115,830,000	\$3,116,604,000	\$3,089,280,000								
Reserves other than gold.....	72,160,000	76,094,000	123,725,000								
Total reserves.....	\$3,187,990,000	\$3,192,698,000	\$3,213,005,000								
Non-reserve cash.....	72,354,000	74,248,000	*								
Bills discounted: Secured by United States											
Government obligations.....	400,158,000	402,141,000	156,318,000								
Other bills discounted.....	481,503,000	459,867,000	277,878,000								
Bills bought in open market.....	172,902,000	172,124,000	235,458,000								
Total bills on hand.....	\$1,054,563,000	\$1,034,132,000	\$669,654,000								
United States bonds and notes.....	89,628,000	87,737,000	233,042,000								
United States certificates of indebtedness.....	5,514,000	4,148,000	320,299,000								
Municipal warrants	317,000	317,000	15,000								
Total earning assets.....	\$1,150,022,000	\$1,126,334,000	* \$1,153,010,000								
Bank premises.....	55,173,000	55,028,000	44,522,000								
Five per cent. redemption fund against Federal Reserve Bank notes.....	28,000	28,000	3,852,000								
Uncollected items.....	663,548,000	616,211,000	631,701,000								
All other resources.....	13,118,000	13,717,000	14,604,000								
Total resources.....	\$5,142,233,000	\$5,078,259,000	\$5,060,694,000								
LIABILITIES—											
Capital paid in.....	\$109,669,000	\$109,657,000	\$106,220,000								
Surplus	218,369,000	218,369,000	215,398,000								
Deposits, Government.....	307,065,000	306,279,000	14,901,000								
Member bank—reserve account.....	1,884,046,000	1,851,790,000	1,842,508,000								
Other deposits	22,126,000	22,044,000	20,288,000								
Total deposits	\$1,936,237,000	\$1,930,073,000	\$1,877,697,000								
Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation.....	2,272,308,000	2,247,830,000	2,274,651,000								
Federal Reserve Bank notes in circulation—net liabilities.....	485,000	492,000	44,726,000								
Deferred availability items.....	583,742,000	550,527,000	518,334,000								
All other liabilities.....	21,423,000	21,311,000	23,868,000								
Total liabilities	\$5,142,233,000	\$5,078,259,000	\$5,060,694,000								
Ratio of total reserves to deposit and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined.....	75.8%	76.4%	77.4%								
Contingent liability on bills purchased for foreign correspondents	\$34,276,000	\$33,794,000	\$31,966,000								
*Not shown separately prior to January, 1923.											

| | Sept. 26. | Sept. 19. | Sept. 26. | Sept. 19. |
</tr
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

New York Stock Exchange Transactions

Week Ended Saturday, October 6, 1923

Total Sales 3,970,053 Shares

Stock and	Net				1923	Stock and	Net				1923	Net				1923	Stock and	Net						
High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividends.	Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividends.	Rate.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chge.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividends.	Rate.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chge.		
High.-Low.	Low.	Sales.	Dividends.	Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividends.	Rate.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chge.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Dividends.	Rate.	High.	Low.	Last.	Chge.		
\$2 50	400 All Am EXPRESS (5)	40% 68	CS 68	1/2 + 2%	62 24	22	66,500 Conden Company	28%	25% 27	+ 1%	26 18	18	14,800 Montgomery Ward	+ 2%	23 21	22	23	+ 1%	26 24	22	23	+ 1%		
54% 31	4,00 Advance Rumely of (3)	31 31	31 31	-	109 85	85	300 Do pf (7)	90%	89% 89	+ 1%	29% 23	23	7,000 Moon Motors (73%)	-	23% 23	23	23	-	14 74	44	Moth Lode Coalition (1)	+ 1%		
72% 56	600 Air Reduction (4)	64 63	64 64	+ 1	84 57	57	20,400 Crucible Steel (4)	63	58% 60	+ 1%	14 74	44	400 Moto Body	-	8% 8%	8%	8%	-	10 15	15	15	+ 3%		
14% 56	2,500 Ajax Rubber	54 54	54 54	-	94% 87%	100	Do pf (7)	86	86	-	29% 10%	-	1,400 Mullins Body	-	10	15	15	-	14 74	44	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-		
5% 56	1,100 Alaska Gold Mines	56 56	56 56	-	84 88	86	7,600 Cuba Cane Sugar	13%	12% 12%	+ 2%	11 44	75%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-	89	87	89	+ 3	11 44	75%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-		
1% 36	400 Alaska Jumeau	56 56	56 56	-	64 33	33	9,700 Do pf	49%	47% 48	- 1%	18% 8%	8%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-	89	87	89	+ 3	18% 8%	8%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-		
100% 95	400 All Am Cables (6)	96 95	95 95	x96 + 1%	37 23	23	13,800 Cuban-Am Sugar (3)	31%	30% 30%	+ 1%	48% 48%	48%	4,300 Nat Biscuit (6)	-	47%	46%	46%	+ 1%	48% 48%	48%	4,300 Nat Biscuit (6)	-		
80% 59	45,000 Allied Chem & Dye (4)	64 64	64 64	-	102 92	92	100 Do pf (7)	97	97	+ 1%	100% 10%	100	160 Nat Conduit & Cable	-	14	14	14	-	100% 10%	100	160 Nat Conduit & Cable	-		
51% 37	1,900 Allis-Chalmers Mfg (4)	41% 41	41 41	+ 1%	12 3	3	900 Cuban Dom Sugar	5%	5 5	-	42% 34%	42%	500 Nat Dept Stores	-	39%	38	39	+ 1%	42% 34%	42%	500 Nat Dept Stores	-		
36% 19%	7,000 Am Alclic Chem	55% 55	55 55	+ 2%	58 30	30	100 Do pf	33	33	- 1%	120% 108	120%	2,400 Nat Enam & Stamp (6)	-	52%	52%	52%	-	120% 108	120%	2,400 Nat Enam & Stamp (6)	-		
68% 20%	7,000 Am Alum (6)	36 34	34 34	- 2%	60 34	34	1,600 Cuyamel Fruit (4)	63%	61 62	+ 2%	2,300 Nat Lead (8)	-	122% 112	122% 112	122% 112	+ 1%	122% 112	122% 112	122% 112	+ 1%				
99% 77	500 Am Bank Note (5)	89 86	86 86	+ 4	72 22	22	16,600 DAVISON CHEM	51%	41 49	+ 6%	114% 75%	114%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-	89	87	89	+ 3	114% 75%	114%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-		
55% 50%	160 Am Do pf (3)	54 54	54 54	+ 1%	73 36	36	700 Deere & Co pf (3)	63	61% 62	+ 1%	114% 107%	114%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-	89	87	89	+ 3	114% 107%	114%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-		
49% 25%	4,400 Am Beet Sugar	37 34	34 34	+ 1%	124 42	42	1,500 Del & Hudson (9)	100%	107 109%	+ 1%	114% 107%	114%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-	89	87	89	+ 3	114% 107%	114%	400 NASH MOTORS (6)	-		
60% 25%	1,300 Am Bosch Magneto	30% 28	28 28	- 2%	111 36	36	3,000 Detroit Edison Co (8)	102%	102 102	+ 1%	115% 82%	115%	5,200 Nevada Consol Copper	-	84%	84%	84%	+ 1%	115% 82%	115%	5,200 Nevada Consol Copper	-		
83% 60%	500 Am Brake & Fdy (5)	70% 70	70 70	-	44 36	36	100 Do pf	39%	38 38	- 1%	41% 20%	41%	2,400 New Orl Tex & Mex (7)	-	87%	86	87%	+ 1%	41% 20%	41%	2,400 New Orl Tex & Mex (7)	-		
100% 73%	135,400 Am Can (5)	94% 88	88 92	+ 1%	141 11	11	500 Douglas-Pectin (1)	5%	5 5	-	4,600 N.Y. Air Base (4)	-	37%	36%	36%	+ 1%	4,600 N.Y. Air Base (4)	-	37%	36%	36%	+ 1%		
115% 100%	700 Am Do pf (7)	107 106	106 107	- 1%	148 106	106	100 Duoluth S S & At pf	4%	4 4	-	100 Do pf	-	3,900 N.Y. Central (7)	-	102%	101	101	+ 1%	3,900 N.Y. Central (7)	-	102%	101	101	+ 1%
22% 11%	1,400 Am Car & Fdy (12)	150 153	153 155	+ 3%	138 102	102	20 Fidelity-Ph F Inc (6)	113%	113 113	+ 1%	100% 10%	100%	3,000 N.Y. Central (7)	-	102%	101	101	+ 1%	3,000 N.Y. Central (7)	-	102%	101	101	+ 1%
13% 20%	600 Am Chain, Class A (2)	22 21	21 21	+ 1%	31 20	20	500 Exchange Buffet (2)	21	20 21	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	5,000 Exchange Buffet (2)	-	102%	101	101	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	5,000 Exchange Buffet (2)	-		
13% 13%	200 Am Chile	11% 11	11 11	-	115 58	58	2,900 EASTMAN KOD	(7%)	100 107	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	100 Do pf (6)	-	99%	97	99	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	100 Do pf (6)	-		
38% 14%	3,100 Am Do pf	20% 18	18 18	- 2%	107 55	55	2,700 Eaton Axle & Sp (2,60)	21%	20% 20%	+ 1%	21% 14%	21%	1,400 N.Y. N. & Hart	-	13%	11	13	+ 1%	13% 11	13%	1,400 N.Y. N. & Hart	-		
7% 4%	2,600 Am Druggist Syndicate	6 5	5 5	-	97 45	45	1,500 Holk Royal Coal	(4%)	100% 107	+ 1%	114% 100%	114%	1,400 N.Y. N. & Hart	-	13%	11	13	+ 1%	13% 11	13%	1,400 N.Y. N. & Hart	-		
143% 90%	2,000 Am Express (6)	94% 90	90 94	+ 4	94 42	42	100 Hoyle Coal	(3%)	100% 107	+ 1%	117% 100%	117%	1,400 N.Y. N. & Hart	-	13%	11	13	+ 1%	13% 11	13%	1,400 N.Y. N. & Hart	-		
13% 4%	300 Am Hide & Leather	7% 7	7 7	-	118 111	111	100 Do pf (7)	114%	114 114	+ 1%	124% 117%	124%	1,400 N.Y. N. & Hart	-	13%	11	13	+ 1%	13% 11	13%	1,400 N.Y. N. & Hart	-		
74% 29%	1,400 Am Do pf	41 38	38 41	+ 1%	100 91	91	100,000 Foundation Co (6)	100%	100 100	+ 1%	21% 16%	21%	1,200 Orpheum Circuit	-	18%	17	18	+ 1%	18% 17	18%	1,200 Orpheum Circuit	-		
111% 87%	800 Am Ice (7)	92% 91	91 92	+ 1%	275 15	15	100 Do pf	24	23 23	+ 1%	81% 54%	81%	10,000 Northern Pacific (5)	-	57	54	56	+ 1%	57	54	10,000 Northern Pacific (5)	-		
88% 78%	800 Am Ice (7)	91% 91	91 91	-	180 105	105	100 Do pf	17%	16 17	+ 1%	29% 14%	29%	3,000 Nova Scotia S & C (1)	-	19	14	17	+ 1%	19	14	3,000 Nova Scotia S & C (1)	-		
12% 11%	1,400 Am International	88 86	86 88	+ 1%	31 20	20	500 Exchange Buffet (2)	21	20 21	+ 1%	10% 8%	10%	400 Nunnally Co (1)	-	8%	8	8	-	8%	8	8	400 Nunnally Co (1)	-	
13% 10%	2,400 Am La Fire Eng (1)	111 104	104 111	+ 1%	111 55	55	100 FAIRBANKS CO	5	5 5	-	10% 6%	10%	200 OHIO BODY & BLOW	-	2%	2%	2%	-	10% 6%	10%	200 OHIO BODY & BLOW	-		
38% 16%	2,000 Am Linseed	18% 16	16 18	+ 1%	71 40	40	1,000 Gen Am Tanx Car (3)	43%	40 43	+ 1%	67 31	31	300 Ohio Fuel Supply (24)	-	31	31	31	-	67 31	31	300 Ohio Fuel Supply (24)	-		
60% 17%	2,100 Am Sumatra Tobacco	21% 19	19 21	+ 1%	74 25	25	8,600 General Asphalt	31%	30 30	+ 1%	20% 15%	20%	2,000 Ontario Mining	-	4%	4%	4%	-	20% 15%	20%	2,000 Ontario Mining	-		
123% 114%	7,100 Am Tel & Tel (9)	125% 122%	122 125	+ 3%	125 30	30	1,000 Do pf (7)	100%	99 99	+ 1%	21% 14%	21%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-	1%	1%	1%	-	21% 14%	21%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-		
161% 140%	5,700 Am Tel & Tel (12)	121% 118	118 121	+ 3%	123 30	30	100 Do pf (7)	100%	99 99	+ 1%	21% 14%	21%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-	1%	1%	1%	-	21% 14%	21%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-		
100% 100%	600 Do pf (7)	100% 98	98 100	+ 2%	102 30	30	100 Do pf (7)	100%	99 99	+ 1%	21% 14%	21%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-	1%	1%	1%	-	21% 14%	21%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-		
44% 27%	2,300 Am Water Wks & Elec (3)	37 30	30 37	+ 1%	110 104	104	100 Do pf (7)	107%	107 107	+ 1%	100% 100%	100%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-	1%	1%	1%	-	100% 100%	100%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-		
93% 83%	100 Do pf (7)	91 90	90 91	+ 1%	101 91	91	100 Do pf (7)	100%	99 99	+ 1%	100% 98%	100%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-	1%	1%	1%	-	100% 98%	100%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-		
105% 97%	500 Am Sugar Refining	65% 61	61 65	+ 1%	100 91	91	100 Do pf (7)	100%	99 99	+ 1%	100% 97%	100%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-	1%	1%	1%	-	100% 97%	100%	1,400 Ontario Prod & Ref	-		
3% 3%	200 Am Writing Paper pf	6% 3	3 6	-	90 78	78	100 Do pf (6)	83	82 83	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
19% 7	200 Am Zinc L & S	8 8	8 8	-	102 96	96	100 Do pf (7)	100%	99 99	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
58% 26%	100 Am Zinc	15% 15	15 15	-	104 95	95	100 Do pf (7)	104%	103 103	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
22% 11%	1,400 Am Do pf cumulative (7)	90% 87	87 90	+ 1%	104 91	91	100 Do pf (7)	104%	103 104	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
111% 100%	100 Do pf (7)	100 99	99 100	+ 1%	104 91	91	100 Do pf (7)	104%	103 104	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
122% 103%	1,500 Am Booth Fishers	112% 109	109 112	+ 2%	111 95	95	100 Do pf (7)	111%	110 111	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
65% 42%	100 Brit Emp Stuf pf (7)	60 60	60 60	-	111 74	74	100 Do pf (7)	111%	110 111	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
60% 38%	100 Brit Emp Stuf pf (7)	60 60	60 60	-	112 74	74	100 Do pf (7)	112%	111 112	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
26% 16%	300 Do pf (2)	19 18	18 19	+ 1%	112 74	74	100 Do pf (7)	112%	111 112	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
121% 104%	2,800 Bklyn Edison Elec (10)	100% 100	100 100	-	100 74	74	100 Do pf (7)	113%	112 113	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-		
16% 6%	400 Bklyn Rap Tran	16% 15	15 16	-	100 74	74	100 Do pf (7)	113%	112 113	+ 1%	100% 8%	100%	1,400 Owen's Bottles (3)	-	8%	8%	8%	-	100% 8%	100%	1,400			

Stock Exchange Bond Trading

Week Ended Saturday, October 6, 1923

Total Sales \$57,241,600 Par Value

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT LOANS.

(Figures after decimal represent 32ds of 1 per cent.)									
Range, 1923	High	Low	Sales	Net	Range, 1923	High	Low	Last	Ch'ge
101.30 59.5	2047	Lib 3½s, 1932-47.	90.15	99.15 + 2	93 87½ 1	Do Cal & Ariz 4½s,	92 91½ 91½	91½	-
101.25 99.8	20% Lib 3½s, 1932-47.	reg.	98.8	98.8 - 16	86% 72% 3	Do Trans S L 4s, 1958.	82% 81%	82%	-
98.23 96.12	19 Lib 2d 4s, 1927-42.	97.14	97.6 - 26	69% 65% 3	Do Atl & Birn 4s, 1933.	69% 67%	69% + 1%	-	
98.10 96.18	3 Lib 2d 4s, 1927-42.	reg.	99.8	99.8 - 16	100 96 1	Do Atl & C Air L 5s, '44.	B. 97½ 97½	97½	-
98.28 96.21	38 Lib 2d cv 4½s, 1932-47.	reg.	97.00	97.00 - 29	89% 82% 4	Do Coast Line 1st 4s, 1932.	82% 82%	82%	-
99.6 96.22	671 Lib 1st cv 4½s, 1932-47.	reg.	97.20	97.3 - 6	108% 100% 5	Do unified 4½s, 1964.	85% 85%	85%	-
98.26 96.20	35 Lib 1st cv 4½s, 1932-47.	reg.	97.20	97.3 - 6	93% 87½ 1	Do L & N col 4s, 1952.	81% 80%	81%	+ 1%
99.3 96.24	1777½ Lib 2d cv 4½s, 27-42.	97.19	97.3 - 16	90% 96% 3	Do L & N col 4s, 1952.	81% 80%	81%	+ 1%	
98.28 96.21	38 Lib 2d cv 4½s, 1932-42.	reg.	97.17	97.5 - 19	103 100% 2	BALDWIN LOCO 5s, 1940. 100% 100% 100%	100% 100%	100%	-
99.6 97.25	1243½ Lib 3d 4½s, 1928.	98.26	98.5 - 16	95% 93% 1	Balt & O pr Lin 3½s, '25.	96% 95%	96%	+ 1%	
99.1 97.17	14 Lib 3d 4½s, 1928.	reg.	98.18	98.6 - 19	81% 74 4	Do prior lien 3½s, reg.	94% 94%	94%	-
99.6 96.27	4213½ Lib 4th 4½s, 1933.	reg.	97.22	97.4 - 14	101% 95% 1	Do gold 4s, 1948.	79% 78%	79%	+ 1%
99.00 96.28	316½ Lib 4th 4½s, 1933.	reg.	97.17	97.6 - 24	87% 73% 3	Do gold 4s, 1948, reg.	78 78	78	-
100.1 98.1	1941% Treas 4½s, 1947-52.	99.16	98.19	98.20 - 28	Do ev 4½s, 1933.	83 81%	83%	+ 1%	
	Total sales			\$23,542,500	Do ev 4½s, 1933, reg.	82 82%	82%	-	

FOREIGN BONDS.

Range, 1923	High	Low	Sales	Net
High Low Sales	High	Low	Last Ch'ge	
85½ 77% 3 ARGENTINE 5s, 1945.	.80%	.80%	- 2	99½ 95% 88%
103% 100 127 Do 7s, '27.	101% 101% 101% + 4	100 97% 1	Do ext 5s, 1926.	101% 100% 100%
93% 85 262½ Aust'n Gov s f 7s, '43, cfs	88% 88% + 1%	100% 96% 44	Do f 6s, 1920.	95% 95% 95%
52% 41 23 CHINESE GOVT RYS	5s, 1951	43 41% 43 + 1	Do Tocin 4s, 1959.	65% 64%
113½ 108 3 City of Berne 8s, 1945.	.108% 108% + 1%	100% 97% 1	Do up money 5s, 1936.	89% 88% + 1%
113 99 58 City of Copenhagen 8s, '45.	108% 108% + 1%	97% 91% 2	Do 5s f 6s, 1948.	97% 96% 96%
92% 88 36 City of Christiania 8s, '45.	108% 108% + 1%	88% 82 5	Do 5½s, 1948, cfs.	82% 82% + 1%
82% 65 44 City of Gr Prague 7½s, '52	70% 75% 76% + 1%	105% 95% 1	Do ext 5s, 1926.	97% 97% 97%
83% 69 50 City of Lyons 8s, 1934.	80% 80% + 1%	100% 97% 2	Do up money 5s, 1936.	89% + 1%
91% 85 38 City of Montevideo 8s, '52	86% 86% + 1%	93% 87 22	Do cts of dep.	97% 96% 96%
90% 93 3 City of P Alegre 8s, '61	96% 96% + 1%	98% 94 44	Do 5½s, 1948, cfs.	88% 88% + 1%
97 90 18 City of Rio de Jan 8s, '46	91% 90% + 1%	96% 92 42	Do 7s, 1921, cts of dep	89% 88% + 1%
97 90 32 Do 8s, 1947.	91% 90% + 1%	95% 92 42	deposit, stamped	84% 84% + 1%
99% 95% 6 City Sao Paulo 8s, '52, rec'ts	96% 96% + 1%	92% 78 74	Do 7s, 1921, cts of dep	84% 84% + 1%
77% 65 53 City of Tokyo 5s, 1952.	108% 108% + 1%	85 79 3	B'klyn Edison 5s, 1941.	87 87 + 1%
114 108% 8 City of Zurich 8s, 1945.	108% 108% + 1%	85 79% 5	B'klyn Edison 5s, 1941.	90 90 + 1%
96% 75 47 Czechoslovak Rep 8s, '51	94% 93% + 1%	117% 107% 1	B'klyn Edison 5s, 1941.	93% 92% - 1%
100% 106% 14 DANISH M s f 8s, '46.	108% 108% + 1%	105% 100% 1	Do gen 6s, 1930.	103 103 + 1%
90 75 62 Dept of Seine 7s, 1942.	86% 85% + 1%	100% 95% 4	Do gen 6s, '30.	103 103 + 1%
91 84 8 Dom Rep 7½s, 1942.	86% 86% + 1%	97% 91% 2	Do 7s, C. 1930.	106 106 + 1%
101 99 82 Dom of Can 5s, '26.	99% 99% + 1%	100% 97% 1	Do gen 7s, D. 1940.	108% 107% 107%
102½ 106% 63 Do 5s, '31.	100% 100% + 1%	100% 97% 2	Do gen 7s, D. 1940.	108% 107% 107%
99% 94 6 Dom 5s, '31.	100% 100% + 1%	98% 95% 2	Do cts of dep.	72% 72% - 1%
90% 97 136 Do 5s, '31.	100% 100% + 1%	97% 94% 2	Do 5s, 1945.	80% 80% + 1%
98% 92 167 Dutch East Indies 8s, '47	97 96% + 1%	96% 92% 2	Do 5s, 1945.	88% 88% + 1%
97 92 169 Do 6s, 1962.	96% 96% + 1%	95% 92% 2	Do 6s, 1921, cts of dep	89% 88% + 1%
94% 87 104% 5 Do 5½s, '53.	92 91% + 1%	92% 78 74	deposit, stamped	84% 84% + 1%
93% 83% 20 FRAMERICAN I D 7½s, 1942.	89 88% + 1%	117% 107% 1	Do 7s, 1950, stamped	79% 79% + 1%
101 88 589 French Govt 8s, 1945.	90% 90% + 1%	105% 100% 1	Do 7s, 1950.	79% 79% + 1%
96% 80% 308½ Do 7s, 1941.	95% 94% + 1%	101 99% 2	Do 7s, 1950.	80% 80% + 1%
92 78% 8 HOLLAND-AMER s f 6s, 1947.	82% 82% - 7%	97% 94% 1	Do 7s, 1950.	80% 80% + 1%
93% 90% 129 7-10 JAPANESE 4½s, 1925.	93 92% 93% + 5%	101% 99% 1	Do 7s, 1950.	80% 80% + 1%
93% 90% 235 Do 4½s, 2d ser.	91% 91% 91% + 1%	81 74	Cent of Ga, Chatl Div, 4s, 1951.	84% 84% + 1%
83 75% 153 Do 4s, sterling loan, 31	78% 78% + 1%	97% 94% 1	Cent of Ga, Chatl Div, 4s, 1951.	84% 84% + 1%
84% 74 100 Jurgens(A) Un Margarine Wks 6s, 1947.	83 82% + 2%	97% 94% 1	Cent of Ga, Chatl Div, 4s, 1951.	84% 84% + 1%
98% 93% 54 KING OF BELG 6s, '25.	96% 96% + 1%	99% 97% 4	Cal G & ELEC 5s, '37.	96% 96% + 1%
103% 93 100 Do 7s, 1945.	100% 100% + 1%	108 103% 1	Calif Pe 6½s, '35.	96% 96% + 1%
100% 91% 82 Do 8s, 1941.	102 100% + 1%	105% 102% 5	Cambridge St 5s, '42.	93% 93% + 1%
110% 107% 17 Do 8s, 1941.	104% 104% + 1%	91% 91% 2	Can Gen Elec Deb 6s, '42.	101% 101% + 1%
104% 100% 18 Do 8s, 1946.	104% 104% + 1%	92% 91% 2	Central Leather 5s, 1925.	97% 97% + 1%
95% 90 10 Rep of Colombia 6s, '27.	91% 91% + 1%	115 112 2	Central Leather 5s, 1925.	97% 97% + 1%
93% 92 23 Rep of Cuba 8s, 1944.	96% 96% + 1%	80% 76% 2	Central Term 5s, 1952.	85% 85% + 1%
99% 91 52 Do 5½s, 1953.	96% 96% + 1%	84 78% 3	Chester 5s, 1946.	91% 91% + 1%
97 92 68 King of Italy 6½s, 1925.	96% 96% + 1%	102 97% 1	Do gen 5s, 1939.	91% 91% + 1%
95% 96% 107 King of Norway's 4½s, 1961.	96% 96% + 1%	90% 86% 2	Do ev 4s, 1946.	88% 88% + 1%
112% 100 31 Do 8s, 1940.	110 110% + 1%	86% 80% 2	Do ev 4s, 1946.	88% 88% + 1%
100 95 53 Do 6s, 1952.	95% 95% + 1%	80% 76% 2	Do fund 5s, 1929.	95% 95% + 1%
78% 53% 105 King of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 8s, 1962.	60% 60% + 1%	80% 76% 2	Do gen 5s, 1939.	95% 95% + 1%
106 103% 41 King of Sweden 8s, '39.	104% 104% + 1%	80% 76% 2	Do gen 5s, 1945.	95% 95% + 1%
93% 88% 22 ORIENT DEV deb 6s, '53 certificates	90% 88% + 1%	80% 76% 2	Do gen 5s, 1945.	95% 95% + 1%
97% 95 2 PAULISTA RY ref 7s, '42	95% 95% + 1%	80% 76% 2	Do gen 5s, 1945.	95% 95% + 1%
78% 63% 137 Paris-L-M R R 6s, 1958.	73% 72% + 1%	97% 94% 1	Central Leather 5s, 1925.	97% 97% + 1%
94 86 61 REP OF BOLIVIA 8s, '47	87% 87% - 6%	108 103% 1	Central Leather 5s, 1925.	97% 97% + 1%
97 93% 70 Do 7s, 1942.	94 94% + 1%	105% 102% 5	Central Leather 5s, 1925.	97% 97% + 1%
100% 104% 17 Do 8s, 1941.	94 94% + 1%	90% 85% 4	Do reg 5s, 1987.	104% 104% 104%
104% 100% 23 Do 8s, 1941.	104% 104% + 1%	97% 95% 7	Do reg 5s, 1987.	104% 104% 104%
104% 100% 18 Do 8s, 1946.	104% 104% + 1%	81% 76% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
95 90 10 Rep of Colombia 6s, '27.	91% 91% + 1%	80% 76% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
99% 93 23 Rep of Cuba 8s, 1944.	91% 91% + 1%	79% 76% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
99% 91 52 Do 5½s, 1953.	96% 96% + 1%	78% 75% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
95% 81% 42 Do 4½s, 1949.	85 84% + 1%	76% 73% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
98% 80% 43 Do 4½s, 1949.	85 84% + 1%	74% 71% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
97% 95% 15 Rep of Haiti 6s, '52.	92 91% + 1%	72% 69% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
107 101 27 Rep of Uruguay 8s, '46.	101% 101% 101% + 1%	70% 67% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
102% 100% 103 STATE QNSLSD 6s, '47.	101% 101% 101% + 1%	68% 65% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
100% 105% 23 Do 7s, 1941.	100% 100% 100% + 1%	66% 63% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
100 93 4 State of Rio Grande do Sul 8s, 1946.	96 96% + 1%	64% 61% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1%
100% 95% 34 Swiss Confed s f 8s, '40.	96 96% + 1%	62% 59% 2	Central Ohio 4½s, 1930.	91% 91% + 1

Stock Exchange Bond Trading—Continued

Range, 1923	Net						Range, 1923	Net						Range, 1923	Net										
	High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last Chge		High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last Chge		High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last Chge					
102 96 51	Manati Sug s f 7½s, '42	98	97½	97½	97½	- 1%	102 98½ 31	Nor States Pow ref 6s, '41	100	99½	100	+ 1%	102 92½ 101	Sinclair Oil 7s, -	93	92½	93	92½	93	92½					
64% 55% 18	Manhattan cr vs, 1900...	56	55½	55½	55½	- 1%	93 87% 27	Do 1st ref 5s, '41	90	89½	89½	- 1%	93 85½ 135	1938, temp. -	87	85½	85	85	85	85					
98% 97% 6	Manitoba S W col 5s, '34	98	97½	97½	97½	- 1%	103% 107% 42	N W Bell Tel 7s, '41	107½	107%	107½	+ 1%	93 85½ 135	Sinclair Crude Oil 7s, '25	90½	90	90½	90	90½	90					
98% 90% 4	Manila Elec 1st ref 7s, '42	98½	98½	98½	98½	- 1%	105% 99% 6	OHIO PUB SER 7s, '41	101	100	101	-	92 87½ 17	Do pur 5s, '28	95½	94½	95	95	95	95					
96% 90% 4	Market St Ry cr vs, 1924	96	96	96	96	- 1%	106 102% 2	Do 7½s, '41	104	104	104	-	92 87½ 17	Do pur 5s, '28	95½	94½	95	95	95	95					
107% 98% 16	Maryland Oil 8s, 1931...	101½	100	101	+ 1	96½ 93½ 9	Ohio River gen 5s, '37	94½	94	94	-	93 77½ 32	So Pacific col 4s, '48	83	81½	83	81½	83	81½						
101% 91% 13	Do 7½s, 1931	100½	99	100	+ 1	96½ 93½ 9	Oil Power Co s f 5s, '43	95	95	95	-	93 77½ 32	Do pur 5s, '28	95½	94½	95	95	95	95						
160% 100% 1	Do 8s, 1931 with war...	115	115	115	+ 3	89 84% 3	Ore Ry & Nav 4s, '46	86½	86½	86½	+ 1%	93 92½ 10½	Do pur 5s, '28	95½	94½	95	95	95	95						
166 97% 14	Merch & Mfrs s f 7s, '42	105	105	105	-	100 98% 11	Ore & Cal 1st 5s, '27	99	98	99	- 1%	88½ 83½ 22½	Do ref 4s, '15	85½	84½	85	84½	85	84½						
92% 95% 9	Met Edison ref 6s, '42	92	92½	92½	92½	+ 1%	104½ 99% 40	Ore S Line gtd con 5s, '46	101	100	100	- 1%	91 88% 3	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91					
86% 85% 2	Do 1st & ref 5s, '43	95	95	95	-	93% 90% 35	Do ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	- 1%	91 88% 3	Do 1st con 5s, '46	100	99	100	- 1%	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
96% 94% 4	Met Power ref 6s, 1935...	105	105	105	-	104½ 100% 5	Do 1st con 5s, '46	100	99	100	- 1%	83½ 71½ 7	Ore-W R R & N 1st 4s, '61	79	78	79	+ 1%	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
109½ 103% 20	Metx Petrol s f 8s, 1936...	103½	103	103	-	82 75% 119	Ore-W R R & N 1st 4s, '61	79	78	79	+ 1%	83½ 71½ 7	Ore-W R R & N 1st 4s, '61	79	78	79	+ 1%	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
84 70% 1	Mich Cent 3½s, 1932...	96	96	96	-	101 96% 12	Ore Steels r 8s, '41	97	97	97	-	82 71% 66	Ore Steels r 8s, '41	97	97	97	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
88½ 85% 21	Mich Cent 4½s, 1940...	96	96	96	-	95 90% 3	Ore Steels r 8s, '41	97	97	97	-	82 71% 66	Ore Steels r 8s, '41	97	97	97	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
100% 99% 7	Mich State Tel 5s, '24	90½	90	90	-	93% 88% 19	PAC GAS & ELEC 5s, '42	89½	88½	88½	- 1%	60½ 66½ 128	Ore Steels r 8s, '41	97	97	97	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
91½ 84% 7	MidVal Steel col tr 5s, '36	86	85½	85½	-	94 89% 3	Pac Pow & Lt ref 5s, '30	92	92	92	- 1%	60½ 66½ 128	Pac Pow & Lt ref 5s, '30	92	92	92	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
92½ 88% 12	Mil El Ry & Lt 5s, '51	90	89½	89½	-	92 88% 3	Pac Tel & Tel 5s, '52	90	89½	89½	- 1%	88½ 83½ 22½	Pac Tel & Tel 5s, '52	90	89½	89½	- 1%	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
89½ 81% 11	Do 1st tem 5s, B, '61	81	81	81	-	104 102% 2	Pan Am P & Tel 7s, '30	101	102	103	+ 1%	101 92% 99	Pan Am P & Tel 7s, '30	101	102	103	+ 1%	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
90½ 98% 1	Do con 5s, '52	98	98	98	-	104 102% 2	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
92% 87% 5	Mil & Nor ext 4½s, '34	91	91	91	+ 1½	92 88% 3	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
89 84% 5	Mil Spa & N W 1st 4s, '47	85	85	85	-	104 102% 2	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
94½ 92% 3	Milwaukee Gas ds, '27	93	93	93	-	92 88% 77	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
40 16 10	Minn & St L 1st ref 4s, '49	19	19	19	-	100% 98% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
76 58	Minn & St L 1st ref 4s, '49	19	19	19	-	100% 98% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
100% 97% 10	Minn & St L 1st ref 4s, '49	19	19	19	-	100% 98% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
40 14 12	Do 1st ext 4½s, '60	16	15½	15½	-	100% 98% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
90% 84% 2	Mo & St P & SS M cr 5s, '58	98	98	98	-	100% 98% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
103 101% 5	Mo 6s, '53	102	101½	101½	+ 1½	101% 100% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
80% 73% 19	Mo, Kan & T 1st 4s, '49	74	73½	73½	+ 1½	101% 100% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
83% 74% 21	Mo, Kan & T 1st 4s, '49	74	73½	73½	+ 1½	101% 100% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
67% 61% 17	Mo, Kan & T 1st 4s, '49	74	73½	73½	+ 1½	101% 100% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
61% 55% 11	Mo, Kan & T 1st 4s, '49	74	73½	73½	+ 1½	101% 100% 19	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
104 100% 1	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
77% 72% 19	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
81% 76% 14	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
88½ 84% 14	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
103½ 101% 18	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
84 70% 16	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
88½ 84% 16	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
84% 80% 12	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
88½ 84% 14	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
80 74% 12	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
82% 78% 6	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
87% 84% 6	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
82% 78% 4	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	88½ 83½ 22½	Penn R R gen 4½s, '60	95	95	95	-	103½ 101% 2	Do 1st ref 4s, '29	92½	91	92	91	92	91
87% 84% 4	Mo, N Y Air Brake 1st 6s, '28	102	101	102	- 1%	101% 98% 30	Penn R R gen																		

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets

Boston.

MINING.

Sales.		High	Low	Close
930	Anaconda	44	38	39 $\frac{1}{2}$
125	Arcadian	1%	1%	1%
300	Arizona Commercial	8%	8%	8%
101	Calumet & Arizona	47	47 $\frac{1}{2}$	47 $\frac{1}{2}$
1,561	Calumet & Hecla	20%	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$
220	Chino Copper	16	16	16
10	Chile Copper	26%	26%	26%
2,730	Carson Hill Gold	3%	2%	3%
891	Copper Range	26%	25	25 $\frac{1}{2}$
900	Davis-Daly	2%	2%	2%
210	East Butte	5%	5	5
210	Franklin	1	1	1
50	Intermountain Copper	23%	25 $\frac{1}{4}$	25 $\frac{1}{2}$
400	Indiana Zinc	23%	20	20
572	Island Creek Coal	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	102
85	Do pf	92	92	92
20	Iste. Royale	20	20	20
60	Keweenaw	1	3%	3%
163	Lake Copper	1%	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
25	La Salle	1%	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
50	Mason Valley	1%	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
360	Mayflower Old Colony	2%	2	2
110	Montana Consol	1%	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
37	Michigan	1%	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
342	Mohawk	38%	37	38
375	New Cornelia	18	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	17 $\frac{1}{2}$
98	Nipissing	5%	5	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
39	New River Coal pf.	78	78	78
165	North Butte	1%	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
85	Old Dominion	16%	15%	15%
145	Pocahontas	14%	14	14
305	Quincy	24 $\frac{1}{2}$	24	24
150	Rancharosa Copper	8	8	8
40	Shattuck Arizona	5	5	5
153	Star City & Lead	39 $\frac{1}{2}$	33	33
1,000	Shannon	.60	.45	.60
200	Superior & Boston	.99	.97	.99
110	Trinity	.30	.28	.29
45	Tuolumne Copper	1	1	1
182	U S Smelt II & M pf.	42	41	41
285	Utah Apex	3	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
150	Utah Consol	1%	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
810	Utah Metals	.65	.50	.50
69	Wolverine	6%	6%	6%
	RAILROADS.			
179	Boston & Albany	148	147	148
139	Boston Elevated	77 $\frac{1}{2}$	77	77 $\frac{1}{2}$
5	Do pf	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	93 $\frac{1}{2}$	93 $\frac{1}{2}$
147	Do 1st pf.	117 $\frac{1}{2}$	116	116
191	Do 2d pf.	96 $\frac{1}{2}$	93	96

and pf 3
ont & Mass 7

Sales.		High.	Low.	Last.
354 Boston & Maine.	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	12	
17 Boston & Providence.	138	138	138	
250 Boston & Worcester Elec.	10	10	10	
94 East Mass Ry.	24	22 $\frac{1}{2}$	23	
28 Do pf	60	60	60	
30 Do pf B	55	55	55	
10 Do adj	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	
275 Do adj cts	35	35	35	
14 Maine Central	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	26 $\frac{1}{2}$	
3 Norwich & Worcester pf.	86	86	86	
412 N. Y. N. H. & H.	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	
65 Old Colony	68	68	70	
715 Rutland pf	32	24	32	
15 Vermont & Mass.	72	72	72	
MISCELLANEOUS.				
62 Am Agrl Chemical	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	12	12	
100 Do pf	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	34 $\frac{1}{2}$	
195 Am Pneu Service	2	2	2	
115 Do 2d pf	15	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	
5 Am Sugar	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	
40 Do pf	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	61 $\frac{1}{2}$	
2,215 Am Tel. Tel.	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	12 $\frac{1}{2}$	
100 Am Woolen	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	72 $\frac{1}{2}$	73 $\frac{1}{2}$	
343 Do pf	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	100	101	
785 Amoskeag	76 $\frac{1}{2}$	70 $\frac{1}{2}$	70 $\frac{1}{2}$	
57 Do pf	76	74 $\frac{1}{2}$	74 $\frac{1}{2}$	
43 Boston Con Gas pf.	106	105 $\frac{1}{2}$	105 $\frac{1}{2}$	
330 Eastern Mfg	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1,200 Eastern Steamship	83	80	80	
12,700 Elder Corp	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1,058 Edison Electric	159	156	158	
10 Galveston-Houston Elec.	8	8	8	
122 General Electric	171	169 $\frac{1}{2}$	170	
100 Ga Ry & Electro	117	117	117	
85 Gray & Davis	8	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	
100 H. C. Field Tap & Dis.	17	16 $\frac{1}{2}$	17	
115 Hood Rubber	55 $\frac{1}{2}$	54	54	
61 Int'l Cotton Milling	57	54	54	
290 Int'l Products	1	%	%	
100 Island Oil & Trans.	12	12	12	
2,094 J. T. Connor	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	21 $\frac{1}{2}$	
220 Libby, McNeil & Libby	7 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1,261 Loew's Theatre	10	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	10	
747 Mass Gas	81	80 $\frac{1}{2}$	80 $\frac{1}{2}$	
109 Do pf	68 $\frac{1}{2}$	68	68	
101 Mergenthaler Linotype	160	155	159	
275 Mexican Investment	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 $\frac{1}{2}$	
200 Mexican Tel. & Tel.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	
100 Do pf	3	3	3	
72 Mississippi River Power	21	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	19 $\frac{1}{2}$	
4 Do pf	80	80	80	
205 National Leather	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	
425 National Prod. Co.	10	10	10	

Montreal

STOCKS.

Sales.		STOCKS.	High.	Low	Last.
1,545	Abitibi		63	62	64 1/2
25	Atlantic Sugar		164 1/2	164	166
130	Asbestos		45 1/2	44	45 1/2
123	Bell Telephone		124 1/2	124	124
537	Brazilian Trac		43	41 1/2	42 1/2
1,000	Bromley P.		42	40 1/2	40 1/2
227	Brown Eng. Steel		5	4	4
695	British Empire 1st pf		61 1/2	59	61
2,128	Do 2d pf.		19 1/2	17	18
181	Can Cement		84 1/2	84	84 1/2
175	Can Car pf.		70	70	70
26	Canada Cottons pf.		88	88	88
165	Can Steamship		13	12 1/2	12 1/2
71	Canaid		49 1/2	49	49

Washington

STOCKS.

Sales.		High.	Low.	
49 Capital Traction	100%	90%	100%
40 Lansing Monotype	74	73%	74
16 Mergenthaler Lino	158%	156%	157
33 Wash Gas Light.	50	49%	49
85 Wash Ry & Elec pf.	70%	70%	70
20 Do com	65%	65	65%
BONDS.				
\$6,000 Cap Traction 5s.	94	94	94
5,000 City & Sub 5s.	80	80	80
2,500 Pet El fs. 1953.	102	101%	101
4,000 Do deb 6s.	100	99%	100
2,000 Do con 5s.	97	96	96
4,500 Do ref 7s.	107%	107	107
8,000 Wash Gas 6s.	101	100%	100

Other Markets on Page 402.

Income From Farm Products



RECENTLY published estimates which place the returns to the agricultural producers of the United States this year at as much as \$1,000,000,000 more than in 1922 have brought a flood of objections from farm organization leaders and agricultural economists. The estimates of greater farm incomes have been based largely upon the increased prices for corn, cotton and tobacco. Much has been made of the fact that wheat accounts for only 6 per cent. of the total annual value

of farm products, and the argument has been advanced that the rise in the price of corn will more than offset the loss due to the lower price of wheat. The research department of the American Farm Bureau Federation replies to this statement as follows:

"Such a computation would indicate that corn would bring more than \$600,000,000 more than last year. This assumes that the entire corn crop is sold as corn. Forty per cent. of the corn crop is sold as pork; about 15 per cent. as beef, and only 20 per cent. as corn.

"Corn in all forms will yield the farmer practically the same income this year as last, with pork and beef price trends taken into consideration."

The research department of the Farm Bureau Federation has conducted studies of sales from farms in practically every agricultural State in the Union, in the attempt to arrive at the gross cash income from sales of all products. The conclusion from these studies is that the \$1,000,000,000 increase estimated this year will not be borne out.

"Cash income is more significant than the hypothetical value of crops, which is the basis of the billion dollar figure," the organization declares. "The estimated billion dollar increase in income was based on the July forecasts for twelve crops, and on prices as of July 1. This method of computation does not give a true income figure for two reasons. The first is that about one-half the crops produced never leave the farm and so do not figure directly in income; the second is that July crop prices are usually about the highest of the year.

"Farmers' income cannot be determined from crop values. It can only be arrived at by totaling sales as nearly as they can be estimated for particular products. The grand total of farm sales for 1923-24 will total \$8,710,000,000 as compared with \$8,479,000,000 for 1922-23. Our estimates of sales for the past four years, based on the volume of

marketing and farm prices of thirty-eight commodities and groups of commodities, together with prospective sales in 1923-24, based on sixteen leading products, including selected crops, live stock and animal products, indicates an increase of \$200,000,000 in the farmers' total income."

In connection with the estimate of the Farm Bureau Federation an interesting statement has just been issued by the statistical department of the American Wheat Growers, Associated, which is the national sales agency for nine State wheat growers' associations. The co-operative marketing organization used figures on farm production from the Department of Agriculture, and Bureau of Census and Department of Commerce estimates of the total value added by manufacturers to raw materials. It finds that during a number of years the total value of the two classes of production remain practically equal, as shown by the following table:

Year	Farm value of all products	Value added by manufacturers
1899	\$4,717,000,000	\$4,831,000,000
1904	6,122,000,000	6,293,000,000
1909	8,558,000,000	8,529,000,000
1914	9,895,000,000	9,878,000,000
1919	24,982,000,000	25,500,000,000

"It is not necessary here to inquire into an explanation of the causes of this relationship," said George C. Jewett, general manager of the American Wheat Growers, Associated, in discussing the tabulation. "The fact is that these figures tie together farm products with manufactured products—the producer in the country with the manufacturer. There is an exchange of two quantities of commodities of equal total value. It matters very little to either group whether the commodities exchange for ten billions or twenty billions of dollars. The point of interest is, how does the amount in one group compare with the amount in the other when the exchange is made?

"If the total value of farm products for any reason drops below a parity with the value added by manufacture, then we must assume that the manufactured articles will decrease in price, or their production must be curtailed. That is apparently the situation faced by the nation today; a situation which cannot be cleared away by attempts to minimize the importance to national prosperity of wheat, or corn, or any other farm commodity."

Dividends Declared and Awaiting Payment

STEAM RAILROADS.

Company.	Per. Rate. Paid. able.	Pay- able.	Books Close.
Atch., Top. & S. F.	1½ Q Dec. 1	*Oct. 15	*Oct. 1
Baltimore & Ohio	1¼ Q Dec. 1	Oct. 13	
Do pf.	1 Q Dec. 1	Oct. 3	
Del., Lack. & West.	1½ Q Oct. 26	Oct. 6	
Ga. R. R. & Banking.	3 Q Oct. 15	Oct. 1	
Hudson Co.	.30c Nov. 1	Oct. 20	
Meadeville, C. L. & Line.	2 Q Oct. 1	*Sep. 15	
Morris & Essex Ext.	2 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 24	
N.J. Seashore	1½ Q Oct. 15	Oct. 1	
New London & Nor.	2½ Q Oct. 2	Sep. 15	
Norfolk & W. adj pf.	2 Q Oct. 19	Oct. 31	
Nor. & Worcester pf.	2 Q Oct. 1	Sep. 5	
Passaic & Del. Ext.	2 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 24	
Pitts. & W. Va. pf.	1½ Q Feb. 29	Feb. 1	
Syracuse, Bing. & N.Y.	3 Q Nov. 1	*Oct. 24	
Utica, Chenango & S. V.	3 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 13	
Vermont & Mass.	3 Q Oct. 8		

PUBLIC UTILITIES.

Am. Light & Traction	1 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 11
Do pf.	1 Stk Nov. 1	Oct. 11
Cit.-Oregon Power pf.	1½ Q Oct. 25	Oct. 15
Central-Breton Elec. Co.	3 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 10
Ches. & Pot. pf.	1 Q Oct. 15	Sep. 29
Balt. pf.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Sep. 29
Clin. N. & G. L. & T.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Sep. 15
Do pf.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Sep. 15

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INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS.

Company.	Per. Rate. Paid. able.	Pay- able.	Books Close.
Cleve. Elec. Ill.	1½ Q Oct. 15	*Oct. 1	
Do 6% pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	*Oct. 25	
Commonwealth Edison	2 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 13	
Detroit United Ry.	1½ Q Dec. 1	Nov. 1	
East. Bay Water pf. A.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Sep. 30	
Do pf. B. I. of Boston	1½ Q Oct. 15	Sep. 30	
Elec. Utilifree pf.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Oct. 6	
III. Nor. Utilifree pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Kentucky Utilities pf.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Sep. 30	
Louis. G. & E. of Ky. pf.	1½ Q Oct. 15	*Oct. 1	
Manchester T. L. & P. pf.	2 Q Oct. 15	*Oct. 1	
Mt. States Power pf.	1½ Q Oct. 20	*Sep. 29	
Massachusetts Gas.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Mil. El. Ry. & L. pf.	1½ Q Oct. 31	*Oct. 20	
Mo. Gas & El. Service prior Hen.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Sep. 29	
New-Cal. El. Corp. pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Newspaper & A. & Hamp. Ry. G. & E.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Northern States Power.	2 Q Nov. 1	Sep. 29	
Do pf.	1½ Q Oct. 20	Sep. 29	
Pittsburgh Utilities.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Oct. 1	
Do pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Pub. Service Nor. Ill.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Do pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
South. Cities Uth. pf.	1½ Q Oct. 10	Sep. 15	
So. New Eng. Tel.	2 Q Oct. 15	Sep. 29	
Southern Wis. Elec.	2 Q Oct. 15	*Sep. 29	
Texas Elec. Securities.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Sep. 29	
Do 2d pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	*Oct. 15	
Western Power Cos. pf.	1½ Q Oct. 15	*Sep. 29	
W. States G. & E. pf.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Sep. 30	
Wisconsin P. & L. pf.	1½ Q Oct. 20	*Sep. 30	
York Rys.	50c Q Oct. 15	Oct. 5	
Do pf.	1½ Q Oct. 20	Oct. 10	

BANK STOCK.

Company.	Per. Rate. Paid. able.	Pay- able.	Books Close.
Corn Exchange	5 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 31	
Industrial and Miscellaneous.			
Abitibi P. & Paper	\$1 Q Oct. 20	Oct. 10	
Alliance Realty	2 Q Oct. 20	Oct. 10	
Allied Chemical	\$1 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Allis-Chalmers	1 Q Nov. 15	Oct. 24	
Amalgamated Oil	.75c Q Oct. 15	Sep. 29	
Am. Bank Note	\$1.25 Q Nov. 15	Nov. 1	
Am. Can.	1½ Q Oct. 15	Oct. 31	
Am. Cigar	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Am. Coal	\$1 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Am. Glue pf.	2 Q Nov. 1	Oct. 16	
Am. Ind.	1½ Q Oct. 25	*Oct. 5	
Am. Shipbuilding pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Am. Smelt. & Refining	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Do pf.	1½ Q Dec. 1	Nov. 9	
Am. Vitrified Prod.	.50c Q Oct. 15	Oct. 5	
Art Metal Construction	.25c Q Oct. 31	Oct. 12	
Asbestos Corporation	1 Q Oct. 15	Sep. 29	
Do pf.	1½ Q Oct. 15	*Sep. 29	
Associated Dry Goods	1 Q Nov. 1	*Oct. 13	
Do 1st pf.	1½ Q Dec. 1	*Nov. 10	
Do 2d pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	*Oct. 10	
Atlantic Refining pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 5	
Bang Service Station	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 15	
Brown Shoe pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 20	
Bunte Bros. pf.	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 25	
Can. Explosives	1½ Q Oct. 31	*Sep. 29	
Do pf.	1½ Q Oct. 15	*Sep. 29	
Can. Ind. Alcohol	2 Q Oct. 8	Sep. 30	
Do pf.	1 Ex. Oct. 8	Sep. 30	
Chi. Motor Coach	1½ Q Oct. 8	Sep. 28	
Chi. Pneumatic Tool	1½ Q Oct. 15	Oct. 15	
Cluett-Peabody	1½ Q Nov. 1	Oct. 20	
Collins Co.	2 Q Oct. 15	Oct. 2	
Crescent Con. G. M.	10c Q Oct. 10	*Sep. 30	

B. & O.

We have prepared for distribution a circular showing the position of Baltimore & Ohio in comparison with other roads. This contains something of interest to holders of all railroad stocks. Copy sent free on request for

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Mexico's Lesson for Germany

Continued from Page 470

non-existent, so far as the performance of any usual banking functions was concerned. There were no financial houses of any active strength, and no financial leadership in or out of the Government service.

The writer was called in conference with the then Minister of Hacienda, who was completely without plan in the emergency. The suggestion was made that now that work was being re-established in the country, and export relations again possible, there were now many companies in the country, mining and otherwise, who were exporters of products for which they were paid abroad in gold or its equivalent. All of these companies had native payrolls and other expenses to meet within the country, which represented a considerable proportion of the gross value of their exports.

Why not make it obligatory upon such exporters, as a condition for permitting export, that they should bring back into the country within a feasible period of thirty to sixty days, an amount of actual gold coin or gold bullion, equivalent to a definite percentage of the value of the export—such gold to be turned over by the exporter to the National Mint in Mexico City for coinage at cost, and all such coins to be returned to the exporter for use by him in his domestic payments?

The suggestion was adopted in principle, but a little calculation showed it to be unnecessary to include under its provision any producers except those mining companies which produced silver or gold. All gold bars produced in the country were requisitioned by the Government, coined and immediately returned in full equivalent to the producers. Silver was allowed to be exported only in exchange for a fixed percentage of its value (together with any combined gold), which was brought back in gold bullion or gold coin. The same method was applied to other exports containing silver or gold in unrefined form.

The scheme worked admirably, though it took a little time for the new sources of gold coin thus opened, to supply the amount requisite for the country's business. During this time, considerable premiums had to be paid by mining companies and others for the coin necessary for their larger cash requirements; it involved the labor of gathering it up from a great many sources. Mexican currency actually commanded a premium at times over United States currency or exchange, of 25 per cent., or more; this as a transition from a condition in which the Mexican paper peso had been practically worthless.

It so happened that just at the time the Mexican law was promulgated, demanding the bringing into the country of gold against exports, the United States, as a war measure, placed an embargo on any shipments of gold out of that country except under most rigid Government control. As there was no other country which was not similarly hoarding such gold as it had, an insuperable obstacle seemed to have been raised against carrying out the Mexican rehabilitation scheme. The Federal Reserve Board in Washington, however, granted a hearing to certain of us who were familiar with the Mexican situation, and as a result of the conference, the embargo was lifted to a degree sufficient to enable compliance with the Mexican requirement.

Several things about the change from paper to gold were noteworthy. First, the gold which today constitutes Mexico's currency was neither sold to the Government nor loaned to it. Nor was it in any way made into currency on the basis of the Government's responsibility. The latter's only intervention was that of stamping the bullion into pieces of uniform weight and fineness, and giving it coin form so that it might readily pass from hand to hand. Any agency within the country in which people had had sufficient confidence to believe that it was not lying as to the weight and fineness of the gold tokens turned out by it would have served equally well for the minting process. The Government's stability or good faith had very little to do with the case.

The inquiry suggests itself—"Mexico went from practically nothing to an adequate supply of really valuable gold currency in a relatively short time. At whose cost was this change brought about?"

Obviously, it was not at the Government's expense, beyond the merely mechanical operation of coinage. Equally, it cost the importer nothing beyond the transportation and insurance of the gold involved. It actually made him profit, indirectly, since the more rapidly the gold could be brought in the more quickly he was free from the expense of gathering up a sufficient amount of coin for his weekly payments. The bullion was turned over by him to the mint, was returned to him integrally after coinage and passed out at its full gold value. Owing to the scarcity, while such scarcity existed, he could actually command a premium on his minted coins. It cost the people nothing in taxes or increased burden. They gave their labor, as usual, at their regular tasks, receiving therefor valuable gold instead of a declining or worthless paper.

What application—if any—can be made to Germany?

Germany must be enabled to live. A stable currency is one of the most essential elements to industrial life. A currency intrinsically worth its face value—at least till confidence and routine in financial matters are established—has its obvious advantages. Under existing conditions it is perhaps the only means for real stabilization.

Germany's circulation per capita before the war was of course far in excess of that of Mexico. The amount of gold necessary for its daily needs would be correspondingly greater. On the other hand, Germany has not been drained of her gold to any degree comparable with Mexico, in the period just preceding the revolt of the workingman which has been described. Her banks still exist; there are certain gold reserves still in existence; there is a degree of familiarity with the uses of commercial paper vastly greater than in the case of Mexico, with corresponding relief to the burden of business interchange; and it is by no means necessary that the gold should exist in an amount per capita equal to the circulating medium in use before the war; it can circulate faster, as it did in Mexico.

Germany is predominantly a manufacturing nation, whose raw materials must be brought from outside and paid for with the goods manufactured therefrom, together with ocean transportation and other services. Germany's exports, plus services rendered, must not only equal her imports plus services received but surpass them in value to the extent of huge reparations payments. In so far as her imports are raw materials they cannot be curtailed without seriously affecting her capacity to produce. If gold be added to her imports, exports would have to increase to the same amount, if the balance is to be maintained.

In Mexico's case the requisite gold was supplied in a very brief period by importation based on 25 per cent. of the value of one export—silver—plus the retention of all gold produced in the country itself. Germany produces no gold of consequence, but the value of its exports plus carrying service is enormous in comparison with Mexico's trade. Her existing stock of gold, her commercial organization, all are more favorable. And it would seem no difficult assumption that with a stabilization of a chaotic currency situation such as Mexico experienced Germany's capacity to produce would be increased far more than necessary to maintain the balance just referred to.

If any of the recent proposals under which Germany's creditors are to receive mortgages or stock in German industries becomes effective, then to that extent her creditors will become directly concerned in the best means to make those industries live. German industrialists are known to have enormous sums on deposit in this country, from which gold shipments are possible; some means of rendering these available may be found. Sooner or later the solution must be found. The Mexican parallel, so far as it goes, is merely set up for the thought it may engender.

Wisconsin's Dairy Marketing Experiment

Continued from Page 471

has devoted many years to the study of co-operative marketing, expresses the situation aptly:

"Marketing has been carried on for many years. It has been done by institutions of great and of small size. It is noteworthy that the farmers of Wisconsin, and most any other sections as well, are greatly dissatisfied with the results of existing marketing machines. In all the places where the farmers have constructively improved marketing, as for example the Danes in butter and bacon, the Siberians with butter, the New Zealanders with cheese and butter, the New England and some Wisconsin farmers with cranberries, the Californians with all sorts of farm produce, Florida farmers with citrus fruits, British Columbia farmers with milk and apples, Oregonians with cheese and apples, Washingtonians with fruit,—the one outstanding fact is that they have first organized co-operative commodity marketing companies. They have literally changed from the private marketing system to the co-operative system."

Bankers' associations can perform a real service to themselves and to their farmer constituents if they give every possible help and encouragement to the organization of these co-operative marketing companies, provided they are being organized along sound business principles. Just as the Californians found that it was better to have one company for selling citrus fruits, and another one for raisins, so will Wisconsin dairymen find that it is better to have one company for selling cheese and another one for selling butter.

Foreign Securities in American Markets - Uruguay

Continued from Page 475

"major" notes up to three times its paid-up capital, and "minor" notes up to 50 per cent. of its paid-up capital. The bank is obliged to maintain a gold reserve of 40 per cent. against "major" note circulation and other sight deposits. The currency at present, however, is inconvertible paper, in view of the gold embargo which has been in force since the war. The Uruguayan peso is one of the best secured currencies in the world, and particularly in South America. In the war period it was at a premium in practically all money centres throughout the world, and did not decline below its dollar parity until about the middle of 1920 following the post-war reaction. Its present quotation of about 71.12½ cents per peso is undoubtedly below what would prevail were it not for the existence of the gold embargo.

The public funded debt of Uruguay as of December 31, 1922, was as follows:

(Pesos—\$1,034,22)		
Internal debt	47,509,387.32	
External debt	129,004,004.09	
International debt	2,243,000.00	
Total funded debt	178,756,391.41	

This compares with a debt on the corresponding date of 1920, 1916 and 1914 of 172,202,766, 150,537,064, and 141,144,139 pesos, respectively. As of Dec. 31, 1921, 36.7 per cent. of the external debt was held within the country. No figures are available for 1922. In addition to the ordinary debt, the Government is also obligated by the railway guarantees which, by the terms of the Convention of 1891, amount to 3½ per cent. of the recognized capital of certain railways. This recognized capital amounts to 37,495,462 pesos. The maximum possible amount chargeable to the State's account, therefore, is 1,312,341.16 pesos, but in 1922 it was actually necessary to pay only 706,457 pesos.

Uruguay's debt record has been satisfactory since 1891, although, in common with practically all South American Governments, she suspended the sinking funds on her outstanding bonds with the exception of three issues for the period from 1915 to July 1, 1921, when the sinking funds were resumed. In 1922 payments on the sinking funds in arrears were resumed, in addition to the ordinary sinking fund.

The service on the public debt, including railway guarantees for 1922, was 12,416,051.56 pesos, or 35.9 per cent. of the revenues of 34,529,194 pesos for the fiscal year 1921-22, and 34.5 per cent. of the estimated revenues for the fiscal year 1922-23. The actual debt service for 1922, including railway guarantees, was 12,416,051.56 pesos.

The net debt service apparently is considerably less than this figure in as much as in the fiscal year 1921-22 the State received nearly 4,700,000 pesos from its interest in the National bank, the mortgage and insurance banks, the administration of the Port of Montevideo and the State-owned electrical works and other State-owned property. The profit from these enterprises is apparently sufficient to care for the debt created for their establishment.

Transactions on Out-of-Town Markets---Continued

Chicago.

STOCKS.

Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.
10 People's Gas Lt & Coke.....	90%	90%	90%
484 Shipbuilding	2½	2½	2½
10 Do pf	64	61	61
100 Pick (Albert) Co.....	10%	10%	10%
151 L. rights	8%	8%	8%
20 Public Service	90%	90%	90%
200 Standard Gas & Elec.....	28%	28%	28%
1,200 Do pf	49½	49½	49½
37,310 Stewart-Warner Speed.....	30%	30%	30%
100 Stevco Co.....	10%	10%	10%
10,089 Steel Inter.....	19%	18½	18½
50 Quaker Oats	220	220	220
60 Do pf	99	98%	98%
531 Reo Motor	16%	16%	16%
920 Standard Gas & Elec.....	28%	28%	28%
1,200 Do pf	49½	49½	49½
320 Stewart-Warner Speed.....	30%	30%	30%
150 U.S. Gypsum	75	74½	74½
2,435 Vesta Battery	31½	30%	30%
20 Wanner Malleable Cast.....	23	23	23
9,630 Wash. Co.....	50	43	47%
1,215 Weston Knit Mills	7½	7	7
415 Wrigley Mfg	115	114	115
1,200 Yellow Mfg B.....	260%	260%	260%
30,490 Yellow Taxi	118	113%	114%
BONDS.			
\$1,000 Armour of Del. B.....	80%	80%	80%
10,000 Chicago City Ry.....	73%	73%	73%
102 Fair (The) pf.....	52	51	51½
1,605 Gill Mfg	18	16%	18
40 Gossard (H. W.)	28	28	28
220 Gl Lakes Dock & Dredge.....	81	78½	78½
490 Godchaux Sugar.....	8%	10	8%
234 Hart Schaff & Marx.....	118%	118	118%
375 Hays Wheel	34%	34%	34%
2,910 Hedges Corp.....	17	17%	17%
1,272 Hydrex Corp.....	17½	16%	17%
40 Hurley Machine	50	47	49
75 Illinois Brick	79%	79	79%
10 Ill. Nor Ut pf.....	85	85	85
410 Indep Pneu Tool	83%	82%	83
710 Inland Steel	37%	36	37
1,785 International Lamp	11%	10	10%
152 Kuppenheimer (B)	27%	27	27%
10 Do pf	88	88	88
1,437 Ladd, Morris & Libby	7%	6%	7
1,250 Laramie Motor Co.....	32%	34%	32%
120 McQuay Norris	20	19%	20
1,027 Midwest Utilities	46	44%	46
316 Do pf	97	96%	97
142 Do pf	83	82%	83
10,558 Montgomery Ward	23	21	22%
400 Do pf A.....	103	102	102
105 Do pf	110	108	109%
30 Murray (J. W.) Mfg.....	19%	19%	19%
325 National Leather	3%	3%	3%

Sales.

Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.
326 Lichfield Navigation	67½	67	67½
400 Lite Brothers	20%	20%	20%
27 Minehill & Schuyler Haven	49%	49%	49%
15 North Penna	80	80	80
65 Pa. Coal L & P pf.....	59	59	59
985 Pa. Salt	88%	84	87%
8,119 Phila Elec	31%	30%	30%
472 Do pf	31%	31%	31%
410 Phila Insulated Wire	42	42	42
1,389 Phila Rapid Transit	35%	34%	34%
325 Phila Traction	60	59%	60
20 Phila & Western Ry	9	9	9
20 Do pf	34	34	34
30 Scott Paper Co. pf.....	94	94	94
3,000 Union Tractor	39%	39	39
2,069 Union Gas & Imp.....	54	53%	53%
62 Do pf	55½	55½	55½
2,116 West Jersey & Seashore	44%	40	43%
BONDS.			
\$4,700 City 4s, 1961	93%	92½	92½
4,000 Consol Gas 4s	88	88	88
3,000 Con Gas E L & P 4s	91%	91%	91%
1,000 Do 5½s	97%	97%	97%
2,069 Union Gas & Imp.....	1,000	1,000	1,000
62 Do pf	102	101%	101%
8,000 Elkhorn Coal 6s	97	96%	96%
4,000 Fairmount & C Trac 5s	90	90	90
16,000 Fairmount Cos 5s	94%	94%	94%
1,000 Clearfield & J. 6s	101½	101½	101½
3,000 Lexington Ry 5s	85%	85%	85%
18,000 Elec. & P. 4s, cfs	64	63%	63%
4,000 Equitable Gas 5s	102%	102%	102%
3,000 Monon Val Trac 5s	78%	78%	78%
18,000 Keystone Telephone 5s	75%	75%	75%
50,000 Phila Electric 1st 4s	99%	98%	98%
10,000 Do 5½s	101	100%	100%
24,000 Do 6s	103%	103%	103%
10,000 United Ry Invest 5s	93	92½	92%

Sales.

Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.
110 Am Vitrified Products	10	10	10
100 Glass Window Glass Mach.....	83	83	83
10 Do pf	90	90	90
5,110 Arkansas Nat. Gas	5½	5½	5½
105 Battistuzzi	157½	153	153
19 Che & Pe Tel pf	157½	156	156
225 Citizens' Nat. Bank	45%	45	45
30 Com Credit	72	72	72
96 Do pf	25	25	25
131 Do pf B	26%	26	26%
122 Con Gas E L & P	109%	109	109
57 Do 7% pf	104%	105	105
30 Do 8% pf	114%	114%	114%
128 Consol Coal	86%	86	86
120 Eastern Rolling Mill pf	86	85	85
31 Fidelity & Deposit	80%	80%	80%
13 Finance Co of Am	42%	42%	42%
75 Finance Svc pf	8%	8%	8%
40 Ga Southern & Fla 2d pf	25	25	25
15 Houston Oil pf	85	85	85
10 Manufacturers' Finance	51	51	51
15 Do 1st pf	24%	24%	24%
56 Do 2d pf	22	21	21
13 Marine Nat. Bank	40%	40%	40%
51 Maryland Casualty	82	82	82
487 Mer & M Nat. Bank	22%	22%	22%
15 Met & M Transp	106%	106%	106%
BOND.			
\$2,000 Independent Brewing 6s	80	80	80

Baltimore

STOCKS.

Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.
10 Am Wholesale pf	93	93	93
20 Arundel Corp	43%	42%	43%
11 Do pf	100	100	100
105 Battistuzzi	157½	153	153
19 Che & Pe Tel pf	157½	156	156
225 Citizens' Nat. Bank	45%	45	45
30 Com Credit	25	25	25
96 Do pf	26%	26	26%
131 Do pf B	26%	26	26%
122 Con Gas E L & P	109%	109	109
57 Do 7% pf	104%	105	105
30 Do 8% pf	114%	114%	114%
128 Consol Coal	86%	86	86
120 Eastern Rolling Mill pf	86	85	85
31 Fidelity & Deposit	80%	80%	80%
13 Finance Co of Am	42%	42%	42%
75 Finance Svc pf	8%	8%	8%
40 Ga Southern & Fla 2d pf	25	25	25
15 Houston Oil pf	85	85	85
10 Manufacturers' Finance	51	51	51
15 Do 1st pf	24%	24%	24%
56 Do 2d pf	22	21	21
13 Marine Nat. Bank	40%	40%	40%
51 Maryland Casualty	82	82	82
10 Westinghouse E & M	58%	58%	58%

Pittsburgh

STOCKS.

Sales.	High.	Low.	Last.
110 Am Vitrified Products	10	10	10
100 Glass Window Glass Mach.....	83	83	83
10 Do pf	90	90	90
5,110 Arkansas Nat. Gas	5		

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Open Security Market—Bonds

Continued from Page 466

LOCAL PUBLIC UTILITIES

Bid Offered

Atlantic Av. R. R. Co. of Brooklyn gen. 5s, 1931.....	83	87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Atlantic Av. R. R. Co. of Brooklyn imp. 5s, 1934.....	75	..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Bleeker St. & Fulton Ferry R. R. 4s, 1950.....	40	55	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Broadway 7th Av. R. R. Co. con. 5s, 1943.....	63½	65	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Bway Sur. R. R. Co. 1st 5s, '24 Brooklyn Park & West End R. R. 1st 5s, 1933.....	90	..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Brooklyn City & Newton R. R. 1st 5s, 1939.....	68	75	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Brooklyn City R.R. Co. 1st 5s, '41 Brooklyn Union Elec. R.R. Co. 50	86	88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co. 5s, '41 Brooklyn, Queens Co. & Suburban 1st 5s, 1941.....	91	..	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Brooklyn Queens Co. & Suburban con. 5s, 1941.....	85	90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Brooklyn Rap. Tran. Co. 5s, '45 Brooklyn Rap. Tran. Co. 48, 2002 Brooklyn Un. Elec. R.R. Co. 50	65	70	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Brooklyn Union 5s, 1945.....	95	96½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Brooklin Gas 6s, 1947.....	103	104½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Brooklyn Gas Co. 5s, '32 Brooklyn Gas Co. 7s, '29	109	110	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Cent. Gas Co. (N.Y.) 5s, '27 Col. & 9th Av. R. R. 5s, 1933.....	95½	97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Com. W. & Lt. (N.J.) 5½s, '47 Coney Island & Brooklyn R.R. 4s, '48 Con. Trac. of N. J. 5s, 1933.....	89	93	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Dry Dock, E. B'way & Bat. 5s, '32 Edison Elec. III. (Bklyn) 4s, '38 Edison Elec. III. (N.Y.) 5s, '35 Edison Elec. III. (N.Y.) 5s, '35 Elizabeth, Plainfield & Central Jersey Ry. 5s, 1950.....	70	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Equi. Gas Lt. Co. (N.Y.) 5s, '32 42d St. Man. & Nicholas Av. Ry. Co. 5s, 1930.....	50	60	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Gas & Elec. of Bergen Co. 5s, '48 Hoboken Ferry 5s, 1916.....	92	94½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Hudson County Gas 5s, 1949.....	93½	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Hud. & Man. R. Co. 4½s, '51 Jersey City, Hob. & Pat. 4s, '49 Kings Co. Elec. Lt. & Pow. Co. prior 1936.....	52	53	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Kings Co. Elec. Lt. & Pow. Co. prior 1936.....	100	101½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Kings Co. Elec. Lt. & Pow. Co. prior 1936.....	50	60	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Kings Co. Elec. Lt. & Pow. Co. prior 1936.....	93	95½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Long Isl'd Lighting Co. 5s, 1936 Long Isl'd Lighting Co. 6s, 1948.....	92	94	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Manhattan Ry. Co. 4s, 1990.....	55	57	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Manhattan Ry. of N. Y. 4s, 2013 Nassau Elec. R. R. 5s, 1944.....	45	55	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Nassau Elec. R. R. 5s, 1951.....	61	66	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Nassau Light & Power 5s, 1937.....	95	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
New Amsterdam Gas Co. 5s, '48 Newark Con. Gas Co. 1948.....	81	82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Newark Con. Gas Co. 1948.....	84	87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. Municipal Ry. 5s, 1966.....	88	90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & N. J. Ry. 5s, 1946.....	83	86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & N. J. R. R. 5s, 1932.....	95	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & Q. Elec. L. & P. 5s, '30 N. Y. & Q. Elec. L. & P. 5s, '30.....	90	97½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & Q. Elec. L. & P. 5s, '30 N. Y. & Q. Elec. L. & P. 5s, '30.....	82	83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & Richmod Gas 1st ref. 6s, 1957.....	82	83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & Richmod Gas 1st ref. 6s, 1957.....	84	87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & W. Terminal Ry. 5s, 1966.....	88	90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & N. J. Ry. 5s, 1946.....	83	86	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & N. J. R. R. 5s, 1932.....	95	98	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & Q. Elec. L. & P. 5s, '30 N. Y. & Q. Elec. L. & P. 5s, '30.....	96	97½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & Q. Elec. L. & P. 5s, '30 N. Y. & Q. Elec. L. & P. 5s, '30.....	82½	85	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & Richmod Gas 1st ref. 6s, 1957.....	86½	88	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & W. Terminal Ry. 5s, 1946.....	70	73	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
N. Y. & W. Terminal Ry. 5s, 1946.....	80½	81½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
North Hudson Co. Ry. 5s, 1928.....	79	83	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
New Jersey St. Ry. 5s, 1948.....	57	62	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Paterson & Pas. G. & E. 5s, '49.....	93	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Public Service Corp. of N. J. 7s, '41.....	98	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Publ. Serv. Corp. of N. J. 7s, '41.....	92	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Queensboro Elec. Lt. & P. 5s, '28.....	92	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Richmond L. & R. R. Co. 4s, '52.....	92	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Second Av. R. R. Co. (N.Y.) receiver's cts. 6s, 1919.....	50	55	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
South Ferry R. R. Co. 5s, 1919.....	25	27	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
South Jersey G. E. L. T. 5s, '53.....	91	91	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
South Blvd. R. R. Co. 1945.....	50	67	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Stand. Gas Lt. Co. of N.Y. 5s, '39.....	94	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Steinway Ry. Co. 6s, 1922.....	25	W. O.	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Third Av. Ry. Co. (N.Y.) 5s, '37.....	91½	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Third Av. Ry. Co. (N.Y.) 4s, '60.....	52	52	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
34th St. Crosstown Ry. 5s, 1996.....	55	57	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
23rd St. Ry. 5s, 1902.....	45	56	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Trenton Gas & Elec. Co. 5s, '49.....	92	96	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Union Ry. Co. of N.Y. 5s, 1942.....	70	75	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
United Elec. Co. of N.Y. 4s, '49.....	82	84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Westchester Elec. R. R. 5s, '43.....	65	70	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Westchester Lighting Co. 5s, '50.....	95	96½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Yonkers R. R. Co. 5s, 1946.....	55	65	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
PUBLIC UTILITIES				
Bid Offered				
Adirondack P. & L. 1st 6s, 1950.....	90	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Adirondack Elec. Pow. 1st 5s, '62.....	64½	66½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Alabama Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '46.....	90	91½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Ala. Trac. Lt. & P. 1st 5s, '62.....	60½	67½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Am. Gas. & Elec. 6s, 2014.....	94	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 6s, M. & N. '25.....	103½	105½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Am. Lt. & Trac. 6s, M. & N. '25.....	100½	101½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Am. Pow. & Lt. deb. 2016.....	90½	92½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Appalachian Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '41.....	88½	90	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Arkansas Light Pow. 8s, 1931.....	98½	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Appalachian Pow. Co. 7s, 1928.....	100	101½	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Aspinwall Pow. Lt. Co. 1st 5s, '42.....	90	95	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Bloomington, Ill. 5s, '40.....	74	77	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 0813
Buffalo Gen. Elec. 1st 5s, 19				

Open Security Market—Bonds

PUBLIC UTILITIES—Continued

Bld Offered

Cont. Cities Lt. P. & T. Co. 5s, '62	65½	67
Cont. Gas & Elec. Co. 5s, 1927.	95	96
Dallas Pow. & Lt. Co. 5s, 1949.	98½	100
Dayton Lt. Co. 1st & ref. 5s, '37	94	96
Dayton Pub. Tr. 1st & ref. 5s, 1942.	90½	98
Pen. City Tr. 1st & ref. 5s, '33.	45	48
Den. Gas & El. Co. 1st & ref. 5s, '51	85½	87
Detroit United Ry. 8s, 1941.	105½	107
Economy Lt. & Pow. Co. 5s, 1956	92	94½
Elect. Div. Co. 5s, 1933.	94½	95½
Empire Gas & Elec. and Empire Co. 1st 5s, 1941.	82½	84
Elmira W. Lt. & P. 1st 5s, '56.	86	87
H. T. & T. (Spokane) 1st 5s, '39.	90	93
Federal Pow. & Lt. Truc. 5s, 1942.	92½	94½
Fort Worth Pow. & Lt. 5s, 1931.	87	87
Gavinston-Hous. Elec. Ry. 5s, '54.	94½	95½
General Gas & Elec. 7s, 1952.	85	85
General Gas & Elec. 7s, 1954.	94	100
General Gas & Elec. 8s, 1929.	83	W. O.
General Gas & Elec. 8s, 1938.	85½	92
General Gas & Elec. 9s, 1932.	96	99
Georgia Lt. Pow. & Tr. 7s, 25.	80	83
Georgia Lt. Pow. & Tr. 5s, '41.	96	100
Georgia-Carolina Pow. 5s, 1952.	75	77
Great Western Power 5s, 1946.	81½	83
Houston Lt. & Pow. 5s, 1931.	94	95
Hydraulic Power Co. 5s, 1931.	96½	97½
Idaho Power Co. 1st 5s, 1947.	87½	92
Indiana Power 7½s, 1941.	101	102½
Indianapolis Gas 5s, 1952.	96½	98
Knoxville Ry. & Lt. Co. 5s, '46.	80	82
Lauderl. Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '46.	93	94½
Mad. River Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '35.	93	98
Memphis St. Ry. Co. 5s, 1945.	75	78
Middle West Utilities 8s, 1940.	105	105½
Minn. St. Ry. & St. P. Ry. 5s, '28.	92	94
Miss. River Pow. deb. 7s, 1935.	100½	102½
Monongahela V. Tr. 5s, 1951.	90	92
Montreal Lt. & P. 4½s, 1932.	91½	92½
Montreal Lt. & P. 5s, 1933.	93½	W. O.
Nashville Ry. & Lt. 5s, 1941.	88	90
Nashville Ry. & Lt. 5s, 1953.	89	91
Newport N. & H. R. Ry. 5s, '38.	75	77
Nebraska Pow. Corp. 1st 5s, '49.	75½	78
Niagara Falls Power 6s, 1932.	98	100
Niagara, Lock & Ont. 6s, 1938.	104	104
Northern Electric 1st 5s, 1939.	89½	90
Northern Ohio Traction & Light secured 6s, 1926.	102	103
Northern Ont. Lt. & Pow. 6s, '31.	95	97
Oklahoma Gas & Elec. 7½s, 1941.	101½	103½
Omaha C. B. & St. Ry. 5s, '28.	83½	85½
Pacific Pow. & Lt. Co. 1st 5s, '30.	92	93
Pa.-Ohio Pow. & Lt. 8s, 1930.	102	103
Pa.-Ohio Pow. & Lt. 8s, 1930.	103	104
Pa. Pow. & Lt. 1st 7s, 1951...	104	105
Pennsylvania Utilities 6s, 1926.	95%	95%
Portland Gas & Coke 1st 5s, '49.	97	98
Provincial Lt. & P. 1st 5s, '46.	94	W. O.
Provincial L. H. & P. 1st 5s, '46.	92½	93
Puget Sound Electric 5s, 1932.	82	W. O.
Puget Sound Pow. & Lt. 7½s, 41.	102	105
Rio de Jan. Tram., Lt. & P. 1st 5s, 1935.	80½	81½
Rio de J. T. L. & P. 1st 5s, '35.	84½	85½
Rockford Elec. Co. 1stref. 5s, '39.	87½	89
St. Paul City Ry. Cablestays 5s, '39.	91½	93
Salmon River Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '52.	94	95½
Seattle Electric 1st 5s, 1930.	96	W. O.
Seattle Electric 5s, 1929.	94	96
Seattle-Everett 1st 5s, 1939.	86	88
Seattle-Everett Light 5s, 1949.	81	83
Schenectady Ry. Co. 1st 5s, '46.	60	63
Shawinigan W. & P. 1st 5s, '50.	98½	99½
Shawinigan W. & P. 1st 5s, '50.	99½	101
Southern Canada Pow. 6s, 1948.	97	98
Southern Pub. Utilities 6s, 1943.	89	90
Southern Wm. Pow. Co. 1st 5s, '38.	73	75
Tacoma Ry. & P. Co. 1st 5s, '39.	80½	80½
Texas Pow. & Lt. 1st 5s, 1932.	99	92
Toronto Pow. Co., Ltd. gen. 5s, '24.	97	98
Traylor Eng. Mfg. Co. 1st 5s, '30.	102	104
United Lt. & Ry. Co. 1st 5s, '32.	86	88
United Lt. & Ry. Co. 6s, 1932.	92	94
Union Elec. Lt. & Pow. ref. & ext. 5s, M. & N. 1933.	91½	93
West Virginia Utilities 6s, 1935.	83½	87½
West Virginia Utilities 6s, 1935.	82½	87½
Wisconsin Edison 6s, 1924.	99½	101
Wisconsin Elec. Pow. 7½s, '45.	106½	108
Wis. River Pow. 1st 5s, 1941.	84	86
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	84	86
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	85	86
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	86	87
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	87	88
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	88	89
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	89	90
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	90	91
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	91	92
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	92	93
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	93	94
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	94	95
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	95	96
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	96	97
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	97	98
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	98	99
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	99	100
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	100	101
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	101	102
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	102	103
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	103	104
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	104	105
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	105	106
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	106	107
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	107	108
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	108	109
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	109	110
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	110	111
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	111	112
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	112	113
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	113	114
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	114	115
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	115	116
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	116	117
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	117	118
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	118	119
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	119	120
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	120	121
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	121	122
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	122	123
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	123	124
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	124	125
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	125	126
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	126	127
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	127	128
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	128	129
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	129	130
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	130	131
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	131	132
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	132	133
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	133	134
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	134	135
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	135	136
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	136	137
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	137	138
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	138	139
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	139	140
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	140	141
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	141	142
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	142	143
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	143	144
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	144	145
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	145	146
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	146	147
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	147	148
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	148	149
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	149	150
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	150	151
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	151	152
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	152	153
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	153	154
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	154	155
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	155	156
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	156	157
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	157	158
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	158	159
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	159	160
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	160	161
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	161	162
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	162	163
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	163	164
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	164	165
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	165	166
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	166	167
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	167	168
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	168	169
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	169	170
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	170	171
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	171	172
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	172	173
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	173	174
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	174	175
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	175	176
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	176	177
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	177	178
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	178	179
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	179	180
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	180	181
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	181	182
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	182	183
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	183	184
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	184	185
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	185	186
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	186	187
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	187	188
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	188	189
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	189	190
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	190	191
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	191	192
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	192	193
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	193	194
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	194	195
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	195	196
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	196	197
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	197	198
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	198	199
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	199	200
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	200	201
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	201	202
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	202	203
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	203	204
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	204	205
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	205	206
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	206	207
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	207	208
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	208	209
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	209	210
Pynchon & Co. 1st Broadway, N.Y.C.	210	211</td

ADVERTISEMENTS

ADVERTISEMENTS

Open Security Market—Stocks

RAILROADS

	Bid	Offered	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Ala. Gt. Southern ordinary	.50	.54	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Ala. Gt. Southern pf.	.75	.80	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Albany & Susquehanna	150	203	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Beech Creek R.R.	37	40	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Canada Southern	51	75	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Cleveland & Pittsburgh 7%	68	70	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Cleveland & Pittsburgh 4%	38	40	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Fort Wayne & Jac. son pf.	100	105	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Illinois Central Leased Line	71%	73	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Jellett & Chicago	118	120	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Kalamazoo Allegan G. Co.	102	108	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Minn. St. P. & S.M. Leased Line	69	64	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Mobile & Birmingham pf.	69	67	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Morris & Essex	75	77	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
New York & Harlem	130	140	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
New York, Lack. & Western	97	100	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Northern Central	73	76	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & C. pf.	137%	139%	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Rensselaer & Saratoga	112	116	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Schuylkill Val. Nav. & R. H.	45	50	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
St. Louis Bridge 1st pf.	107	110	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
St. Louis Bridge 2d pf.	51%	54	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Tunnel R. R. of St. Louis	107	111	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
United N. J. R. R. & Canal	192	197	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377
Valley Railroad	95	100	Minton & Wolff, 30 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 4377

BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES

	Bid	Offered	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.	Broad 4290
Hond & Mortgage	280	285	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.	Broad 4290
Chase National	345	350	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.	Broad 4290
Equitable Trust	189	192	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.	Broad 4290
Farmers Loan & Trust	542	549	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.	Broad 4290
National City Bank	341	345	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.	Broad 4290
U. S. Title Guaranty	432	438	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.	Broad 4290
U. S. Trust	1220	1235	Gilbert Elliott & Co., 26 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.	Broad 4290

SUGAR SECURITIES

	Bid	Offered	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Caracas Sugar Co.	9	12	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Central Aguirre Sugar Co.	80	81%	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Pajaro Sugar Co.	101	103	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Federal Sugar Refining Co.	63	66	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Nat. Sugar Refining	89	90	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
New Niquera Sugar Co.	95	100	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Sacannah Sugar Refining	55	59	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Savannah Sugar Refining pf.	79	82	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
West Indies Sug. Fin. Corp. pf.	25	25	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428

INDUSTRIALS

	Bid	Offered	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.	Whitehall 500
Hansche Anilin 4% pf.	500	570	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.	Whitehall 500
Krupp 5%	150	230	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.	Whitehall 500
Neckar 5%	50	75	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.	Whitehall 500

PUBLIC UTILITIES

	Bid	Offered	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Adirondack Pow. & Lt. com.	20	21	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Adirondack Pow. & Lt. 7% pf.	95	97	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Am. Gas & Elec. old, pf.	42	43	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Amer. Gas & Elec. com., new	137	138	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 754
Am. Gas & Elec. pf.	37%	37%	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 754
Amer. Light & Trac. pf.	90	91	John Nickerson & Co., 61 B'way, N.Y.C.	Bowl. Gr. 6450
Amer. Lt. & Trac. com.	115%	116%	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 754
Amer. Light & Trac. 6% notes	103	104	John Nickerson & Co., 61 B'way, N.Y.C.	Bowl. Gr. 6450
Am. Lt. & Tr. 6% pf. ex div.	160%	161%	MacQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 754
Am. Lt. & Tr. 6% pf. (ex div.)	89%	91	McQuoid & Coady, 25 Broad St., N.Y.C.	Broad 754
Am. Lt. & Tr. warrants	25	40	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Amer. Power & Light 7% com.	115	117	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Amer. Power & Light com.	60	67%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Amer. Pow. & Lt. 8% com. (ex div.)	160%	167%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Amer. Pow. & Lt. 6% pf.	82%	83%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Amer. Pow. & Lt. 6% pf.	83	84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Amer. Public Service 7% pf.	82	84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Am. Public Utilities com.	27	32	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Am. Public Utilities partic. pf.	45	48	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Am. Public Utilities prior pf.	60	69	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Appalachian Power Co. com.	29	30	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Ariz. Lt. & Pow. Co. com.	21	24	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co. 75 pf.	77	82	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Arkansas Light & Power com.	20	24	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Arkansas Light & Power pf.	82	84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Atlantic City Electric pf.	82	84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Bayuk Bros. 2d pf.	108	113	Pynchon & Co., 31 B'way, N.Y.C.	Bowl. Gr. 6450
Carolina Pow. & Lt. com.	74	79	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Central Ill. Pub. Ser. 6% pf.	97	98%	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Central Power & Lt. pf.	84	87	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Central States Elec. Corp. com.	15%	84	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Central States Elec. Corp. 7% pf.	68	71	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.	Rector 0813
Cities Service com.	130	132	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Cities Service bankers shares	13	13%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Cities Service 6% pf.	60%	65	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. com.	133	145	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Colorado Power Co. com.	18%	20	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Colorado Power Co. 7% pf.	92	95	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Commonwealth Ed. Co. 8% com.	32%	33%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Commonwealth Pow. Corp. com.	72	74	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Commonwealth Pow. Corp. 6% pf.	71%	73%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Continental Gas & Elec. com.	45	47	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Continental Gas & Elec. 6% pf.	73	76	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Consolidated Utilities pf.	68	69	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Consumers' Power Co.	87%	89%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Dayton Pow. & Lt. 7% pf.	84	86	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Dayton Power & Light pf.	85	90	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Dayton Power & Elec. 6% pf.	85	87	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
East Texas Elec. Co. 8% com.	104	108	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Electric Land & Share Co. 6% pf. (ex dividend)	96%	97	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Electric Bond & Share pf.	96%	97	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Fed. Light & Trac. com. (ex div.)	67	70	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Federal Lt. & Trac. Co. 6% pf.	68	71	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Fort Worth Pow. & Lt. 7% pf.	99	102	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
General Gas & Elec. com.	13	15	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
General Gas & Elec. 6% pf.	24	27	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
General Gas & Elec. 7% com. pf.	82	83	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
General Gas & Elec. pf. (new)	95	100	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Illinois North. Utilities 6% pf.	84	86	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Illinois Traction com.	50	51%	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Illinois Traction 6% pf.	86	89	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Interstate Pub. Serv. 7% pf.	90	100	H. L. Doherty & Co., 60 Wall St., N.Y.C.	Hanover 1000
Iowa Ry. & Light 7% pf.	87	90		

All of these bonds having been sold, this advertisement appears as a matter of record only

\$2,300,000

Standard Plate Glass Corporation

First and Refunding Mortgage Twenty-Year 6½% Sinking Fund Gold Bonds

To be dated September 15, 1923

To mature September 15, 1943

Authorized \$3,000,000, to be presently issued \$2,300,000. Interest payable March 15 and September 15, without deduction for normal Federal Income Tax not in excess of 2%. The Massachusetts Income Tax on the interest not in excess of 6% per annum will be refunded by the Corporation on proper application. Coupon bonds in denominations of \$1,000 and \$500 registerable as to principal. Redeemable at the option of the Corporation in whole or in part on any interest date on thirty days' notice at 105 and accrued interest.

The Corporation agrees to pay the Pennsylvania Four Mill State Tax

Principal and Interest payable at the office of
The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, Trustee

Salient features as summarized by Mr. Frank E. Troutman, President of the Corporation

History—Business: Standard Plate Glass Corporation has been organized to acquire the business and properties of the Standard Plate Glass Company, organized in 1887 and the Heidenkamp Plate Glass Corporation, the business of which was established in 1900. These two companies have a successful and continuous record of operation, extending over a period of more than twenty years during which time a profit was reported in every year. The new Corporation succeeds to a sound and firmly established business and will occupy a prominent position in the polished plate glass industry, its plants having an actual capacity in excess of 7,500,000 square feet per annum. The plants of the Corporation are located at Butler and Springdale, Pennsylvania, both within a short distance of Pittsburgh and so situated that adequate transportation facilities and supplies of raw materials, fuel and labor are available. The principal consumers of polished plate glass in large quantities are the automotive, furniture and building industries. The use of polished plate glass in these and other industries has increased greatly in recent years and future prospects for the continued growth of the plate glass industry appear excellent.

Security: This issue of First and Refunding Mortgage Bonds will be secured in the opinion of counsel by a direct first mortgage on the entire fixed assets of the former Standard Plate Glass Company, consisting of real estate, plant, buildings and equipment having an actual manufacturing capacity of 5,000,000 square feet of polished plate glass per annum. Messrs. Ford, Bacon & Davis have appraised this property and report a depreciated value of over \$4,400,000. Subject to a closed issue of \$700,000 first mortgage bonds of the Heidenkamp Plate Glass Corporation, the Bonds will be further secured on all real estate, plant and equipment formerly owned by that Company which property has an appraised depreciated value in excess of \$1,800,000 and an annual manufacturing capacity of 2,500,000 square feet of polished plate glass. The total depreciated value of the fixed assets subject to the lien of these Bonds is in excess of \$6,300,000 or more than 200% of the principal amount of mortgage bonds secured thereon. In addition, investment in stocks of affiliated companies having a book value of approximately \$745,000 will be pledged under the first lien of these First and Refunding Mortgage Bonds. The equity behind this issue of Bonds is represented by \$1,250,000 7% Ten-Year Debentures, over \$4,000,000 7% Cumulative Preferred Stock and 100,000 shares of no par value common stock.

Earnings: Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Company report that the combined average annual net earnings of the predecessor companies, during the five years ended December 31, 1922, after depreciation and before Federal Income Taxes, were \$1,013,000 or more than five times the interest requirements on \$3,000,000 mortgage bonds to be presently outstanding. This period includes 1918, when war conditions curtailed production greatly, and 1921, a year of business depression. In the ten-year period ending December 31, 1922, the combined annual earnings, after depreciation and before Federal Income Taxes, of the two companies as reported by them, averaged more than three times the annual interest charges on the mortgage debt to be outstanding. These earning figures only partially reflect the increased manufacturing capacity which has been constructed within the past two years. The plants are now operating at capacity and net earnings as reported for the first six months of this year are at the annual rate of \$1,600,000, more than eight times the annual interest requirements of \$195,000 on the mortgage debt to be outstanding.

Sinking Fund: On January 15, 1924, and semi-annually thereafter, the Corporation agrees to pay to the Trustee a sum equal to one and one-half per cent of the largest amount of Bonds issued; these funds to be used to retire Bonds, either through purchase up to, or call by lot at, the redemption price. Bonds acquired will be held alive for the Sinking Fund and the interest thereon will be used in the retirement of additional Bonds. This semi-annual cumulative sinking fund will provide for the retirement of this entire issue of Bonds on or before maturity. In addition to the regular fixed sinking fund, it is provided that 25% of net earnings, as defined in the mortgage, will be used either to reduce the mortgage debt of the Corporation or expended in additions and improvements to its properties.

We offer these bonds when, as and if issued and received by us, subject to approval of all legal details by Messrs. Patterson, Crawford, Miller & Arensberg, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the Corporation, and Messrs. Beekman, Menken & Griscom, New York, for the Bankers. The books and accounts of the predecessor Companies have been examined by Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Co. Appraisals have been made by Messrs. Ford, Bacon & Davis.

Application will be made to list these bonds on the Pittsburgh and Chicago Stock Exchanges.

Price 98½ and interest, to yield over 6½%

Redmond & Co.

Otis & Co.

The information contained in this advertisement is based upon information and statistics upon which we have relied in the purchase of these bonds. We do not guarantee, but believe it to be correct.

8. 1923